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Thesis abstract 
The Communicable Diseases, Epidemiology and Surveillance (CDES) branch, Victorian 
Government Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), works closely with the 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU) to conduct surveillance of 
communicable diseases in Victoria. From February 2018 to December 2019, I attended field 
placements at both CDES and MDU. This thesis comprises projects which together meet the 
requirements for the Masters of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) (MAE). The projects 
include: an analysis to assess changes in the epidemiology of invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Victoria, 2008–2018; an evaluation of the surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in Victoria; a 
cross-sectional study of the genomic epidemiology of vancomycin-resistant enterococci, 
Victoria, November 2018; investigation of an outbreak of salmonellosis at a Mother’s day 
lunch in regional Victoria, and recruitment of case-controls for a multi-jurisdictional outbreak 
investigation of hepatitis A. In addition, this thesis describes teaching activities undertaken as 
part of the MAE. 
 
 
  
 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would first like to acknowledge Dr Emma Field. Thank you for being an incredibly kind 
supervisor who was always available for discussion, and for your helpful feedback on earlier 
drafts. Associate Professor Stephen Lambert took over my supervision in the final months of 
the MAE. Thank you, Stephen, for your extremely useful comments in the final stage and for 
pushing me to improve my writing with each draft. 
 
Thank you to Marion Easton and Professor Benjamin Howden for providing me with the 
opportunity to complete the MAE. Being immersed in CDES and MDU enabled me to learn an 
immense amount in a short space of time. I am grateful to all of the staff at both the DHHS and 
MDU for helping me to navigate the journey from veterinary clinician to epidemiologist in the 
human health field. I am particularly thankful to the MDU Epidemiology team — Mathilda 
Wilmot, Courtney Lane and Siobhan St George, for providing friendly support and advice.  
 
Thank you to the MAE 2018 cohort for your friendship. Special thanks go to Ximena Tolosa 
(MAE 2017) and Laura Goddard (MAE 2019) for always being available to listen and discuss life, 
the universe and the MAE.  Dave, thanks for being there through the highs and the lows, and 
for putting up with my ongoing list of ambitions. Lastly, thanks to Kevin for keeping it real and 
making me laugh on a daily basis. 
  
 
6 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
3GC  Third generation cephalosporins 
23vPPV  23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine 
AEA  Australian Epidemiological Association 
AGAR  Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance  
AMR  Antimicrobial resistance 
AMRL  Australian Mycobacterium Reference Laboratory 
APAS  Australian Passive Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System 
AST  Antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
AURA   Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Australia 
BSI  Bloodstream infection 
CAR  Critical antimicrobial resistance  
CARAlert National Critical Antimicrobial Resistance Alert Surveillance System  
CDES  Communicable Diseases, Epidemiology and Surveillance 
CDPC  Communicable Diseases, Prevention and Control 
CI  Confidence interval 
CLSI  Clinical & Laboratory Standards Institute 
CPE  Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales 
CSF  Cerebrospinal fluid 
DHHS  Department of Health and Human Services 
EHO  Environmental Health Officer  
EUCAST European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
HAV  Hepatitis A virus 
HCF  Healthcare facility 
IPD  Invasive Pneumococcal Disease 
IRR  Incidence rate ratio 
  
 
7 
 
LFF  Lesson from the field 
LGA  Local government area 
LIMS  Laboratory information management system 
MAE  Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
MDR  Multi-drug resistant 
MDU  Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory  
MIC  Minimum inhibitory concentration 
MJOI  Multi-jurisdictional Outbreak Investigation 
MLST  Multi-locus sequence type 
MLVA  Multi-locus variable analysis of tandem repeats 
NAAT  Nucleic acid amplification test 
NEPSS   National Enteric Pathogen Surveillance system 
NNDSS  National Notifiable Disease Notification System 
NNN  National Neisseria Network 
NSW  New South Wales  
PCV7  7-valent pneumococcal conjugative vaccine 
PCV13  13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
PDI  Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity 
PHESS  Public Health Event Surveillance System 
PHO  Public Health Officer 
RR  Risk ratio 
SNPs  Single nucleotide polymorphism 
TB  Tuberculosis 
VCRSU  Victorian Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales Surveillance and 
Response Unit  
VHPSS  Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme 
VICNISS  Victorian Health-Care Acquired Infection Surveillance System 
  
 
8 
 
VPD  Vaccine preventable diseases 
VRE  Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci 
VREfm  Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium 
WGS  Whole genome sequencing 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter I: Summary of Field Experience and 
Core Competencies 
 
Chapter I: Summary of Field Experience and Core Competencies  
10 
 
1. Masters of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Experience 
I attended two field placements concurrently throughout my MAE: the Microbiological 
Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU) and the Communicable Diseases, 
Epidemiology and Surveillance (CDES) branch within the Victorian Government Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS). 
1.1 Applying to the MAE 
Until I commenced the MAE, I had been exclusively employed in small animal clinical 
veterinary practice, with the exclusion of a nine-month period conducting an honours project 
in the field of zoonoses and genomics at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL). My 
experience at AAHL introduced me to the concept of public health and one health, which is 
how I came to be interested in completing further study in this field. It is only through speaking 
with other vets involved in public health that I came across the MAE programme, and decided 
to apply.  
As someone who had not needed to use Microsoft Excel prior to 2018, the MAE has been an 
incredibly steep learning curve. The transition from clinical practice, where all of my problem 
solving was conducted in 15-minute appointments, to the longer-term work of public health 
research, was particularly challenging. However, through the MAE I have not only developed 
skills in public health research and analysis, I have also learnt about diseases I previously knew 
nothing about. Most importantly, the MAE has enabled me to develop a much clearer vision of 
how I can combine my skills as a veterinarian with public health work in the future.  
1.2 CDES and MDU 
The CDES branch works closely with MDU to conduct surveillance and coordinate the response 
to infectious diseases in Victoria. Epidemiologists within the CDES branch conduct surveillance 
of notifiable diseases, working closely with public health officers to manage outbreaks and 
other issues.  
MDU sits within the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity. MDU is Victoria’s 
bacteriological reference laboratory, functioning in determining the public health significance 
of received samples, and providing guidance to health professionals and the Victorian DHHS on 
the response to infectious diseases. MDU is also the World Health Organization Regional 
Reference Laboratory for Invasive Bacterial-Vaccine Preventable Diseases and houses Doherty 
Chapter I: Summary of Field Experience and Core Competencies  
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Applied Microbial Genomics which researches the use of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in 
public health. 
For my placement at CDES I was supervised by Marion Easton, the Principal Epidemiologist for 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and WGS. As Marion also works from MDU one day each week, 
this enabled her to contribute to supervision of all my MAE projects. At MDU I was supervised 
by the Director of MDU, Professor Benjamin Howden. I was also fortunate to receive 
mentoring and supervision from the MDU Epidemiology team.  
1.3 Overall experience 
Completing dual placements as part of my MAE came with both benefits and challenges. My 
understanding of the relationship between CDES and MDU was greatly enhanced by my role 
within both organisations. As the majority of my MAE projects focused on AMR, I found that a 
laboratory-based placement was essential to improve my understanding of antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing techniques and genomics. 
In addition to the core MAE projects, within CDES I was involved in the following: 
• Analysis of data for the Seasonal Influenza Survey 2018, which was conducted by the 
media department to assess knowledge of influenza among the Victorian population 
• Attendance at weekly surveillance meetings 
• Attendance at fortnightly WGS teleconferences held between MDU and CDES in order 
to coordinate the response to findings of WGS combined with the results of 
epidemiological investigations 
• Conducting Salmonella food trawler questionnaires as part of cluster investigations 
(April and November, 2018) 
My placement at MDU provided me with the following additional opportunities: 
• From 2019, I was responsible for entering data for isolates that are eligible for 
inclusion in the National Alert System for Critical Antimicrobial Resistances. This 
enabled me to better understand the surveillance of AMR 
• Attendance at the University of Melbourne Research Platform Services courses, 
including an introductory course for R Studio 
• Attendance at seminars held at the Doherty, which covered topics including 
Indigenous health, hepatitis, vaccine preventable diseases, AMR and genomics 
Chapter I: Summary of Field Experience and Core Competencies  
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• An improved understanding of the surveillance and response of carbapenemase-
producing Enterobacterales, which is coordinated by CDES and MDU 
• An improved understanding of AMR surveillance systems, including the Victorian 
Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme (VHPSS), which is coordinated within MDU 
1.4 Summary of core activities related to course requirements  
The core requirements of the MAE programme, as satisfied by each chapter within this thesis, 
are summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1. Chapters satisfying MAE core competencies 
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Chapter II: Changes in the 
Epidemiology of Invasive 
Pneumococcal Disease, 
Victoria, 2008–2018 
✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ 
Chapter III: Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance in 
Victoria  
✓ ✓   ✓     
Chapter IV: A cross-sectional 
study of the genomic 
epidemiology of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci, Victoria, 
2018  
✓ ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓ 
Chapter V: Salmonellosis at a 
Mothers’ Day Lunch in 
Regional Victoria  
✓ ✓ ✓      ✓ 
Chapter VI: Recruiting Case 
Controls for a Multi-
Jurisdictional Outbreak 
Investigation of Hepatitis A 
✓  ✓      ✓ 
Chapter VII: Teaching 
Experience      ✓    
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Using data from the VHPSS, based at MDU, I conducted a ten-year review of invasive 
pneumococcal disease (IPD) in Victoria (Chapter II). I assessed changes in serotypes and 
antimicrobial susceptibility that occurred after the introduction of the 13-valent pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine (PCV13) in Victoria. This analysis found that the majority of vaccine 
serotypes have reduced significantly after the introduction of the PCV13 in Victoria, and that 
levels of resistance to antimicrobials used for empirical treatment of IPD have not increased.  
I evaluated existing surveillance activities for AMR in Victoria (Chapter III). This enabled me to 
understand the complexities of AMR surveillance, as well as providing me with experience 
conducting stakeholder interviews. The findings of this work will inform the development of 
the AMR surveillance and response unit within CDES. 
I conducted an epidemiological study based at MDU (Chapter IV). This was a cross-sectional 
study of the genomic epidemiology of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) in Victoria. This 
experience enabled me to learn about the role of genomics in AMR surveillance, as well as the 
resources involved in conducting snapshot-style surveillance. The study built on knowledge of 
the burden of disease due to VRE in Victoria, and demonstrated the use of WGS for 
surveillance. 
Chapter V and VI describe my experiences of outbreak investigation conducted within CDES. In 
chapter V, I describe an outbreak of salmonellosis in regional Victoria. Completing this early on 
in the MAE, I was able to apply learnings from MAE coursework to a real-world scenario. 
Chapter VI describes my experiences recruiting case-controls for a multi-jurisdictional outbreak 
investigation of hepatitis A. This experience provided me with an understanding of the 
resources involved in conducting case-control studies, as well as enabling me to gain additional 
experience in conducting case interviews.  
Chapter VII summarises teaching activities that were completed during the MAE.
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1. Preface 
Janet Strachan, the Principal Epidemiologist for Vaccine Preventable Diseases (VPD) at the 
Victorian Government Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), initiated this project. 
The Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme (VHPSS) is a voluntary laboratory-based 
system, which collects data on the serotypes and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) of all invasive 
(blood and cerebrospinal fluid) bacterial and fungal specimens in Victoria. The VHPSS is 
coordinated by MDU Epidemiology. VHPSS data are not regularly provided to the DHHS and 
there are currently no regular reports published, however data requests can be submitted to 
the VHPSS on an ad hoc basis.  
The DHHS receives all notifications for cases of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD), including 
serotype results generated by MDU. Currently, MDU does not conduct routine antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing for IPD isolates. The DHHS therefore does not receive AMR data for IPD 
except when diagnostic laboratories submit this information with notifications. The aim of this 
study was to determine firstly how serotypes of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae isolates 
have changed in Victoria after the introduction of 13-valent pneumococcal-conjugate vaccine 
(PCV13) in July 2011. Secondly, we aimed to assess if the proportion of isolates with AMR 
changed with the introduction of PCV13. These findings would also inform the Communicable 
Diseases Epidemiology and Surveillance team at DHHS about the level of AMR in IPD isolates, 
and how frequently data requests should be lodged with the VHPSS as part of future surveillance 
activities. 
1.1 My role 
I was the primary investigator for this project, with guidance from academic and field 
supervisors, and the DHHS Epidemiologist for VPD. My role included the development of a 
research proposal, completion of an ethics application, performing data analysis in Stata, and 
writing up the study findings for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. I also presented findings 
from this project as a poster at the Australian Epidemiological Association (AEA) Conference, 
Brisbane, October 2019 and in oral format at the Communicable Diseases Control Conference, 
Canberra, November 2019. 
1.2 Lessons learnt 
This project taught me some of the challenges of working with real-world surveillance data 
including the need for extensive data cleaning, assessing the dataset for duplicates and 
evaluating missing data variables. The learnings from this project also informed my evaluation 
Chapter II: Changes in the Epidemiology of Invasive Pneumococcal Disease  
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of AMR surveillance in Victoria (Chapter III). I learnt that while there are valuable AMR data 
collected by the VHPSS, the amount of missing data makes it difficult to form strong conclusions. 
Laboratories do not consistently provide minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs), or 
information on the antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) techniques and guidelines used to 
interpret AST. Consequently, this analysis relied on qualitative interpretations provided by the 
laboratories (susceptible, intermediate susceptibility, and resistant).  
1.3 Public health impact 
This analysis found that there were significant reductions in PCV13 serotypes after the 
introduction of the PCV13, however there were increases in non-vaccine serotypes. In addition, 
serotypes 3 and 19F increased after the PCV13 was introduced, despite their inclusion in the 
vaccine. Further investigation is required to determine if the increase in serotype 19F resulted 
from vaccine failures. While earlier evidence suggests that PCV13 is effective at preventing 
disease associated with serotype 3, the increase in the incidence of this serotype may result 
from the PCV13 being ineffective in the prevention of nasopharyngeal colonisation, resulting in 
a lack of herd immunity for this serotype. Local vaccine effectiveness studies are required to 
understand the increase in serotype 3 cases in Victoria. Implementing the use of PCV13 in adults 
may reduce the incidence of serotype 3, however this requires evaluation.  
While there was no increase in levels of AMR identified by this analysis, only penicillin and third 
generation cephalosporins were able to be examined. Limitations identified in the AMR dataset 
informed recommendations made as part of the surveillance evaluation for AMR in Victoria 
(Chapter III). Minor modifications to the VHPSS would enable a more useful dataset which could 
be used for state-wide AMR surveillance. Specifically, the addition of data variables including 
AST technique and clinical guidelines used by the submitting diagnostic laboratory (to interpret 
MICs as susceptible, intermediate or resistant) would improve the data quality for AMR 
surveillance. Working with diagnostic laboratories to increase the proportion of submitted MIC 
results would also enhance the usefulness of the VHPSS for AMR surveillance of IPD and other 
organisms. 
1.4 Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge the following people for their assistance with this project: 
• Janet Strachan and Marion Easton for initiating this project, and assisting with the study 
design  
• Dr Emma Field for providing useful feedback on early drafts and for encouraging me to 
present this work at conferences 
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• Associate Professor Stephen Lambert for providing useful feedback on late drafts 
• The coordinators of the VHPSS for enabling me to use this dataset 
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2. Abstract 
Background: The 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) replaced the 7-valent 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) on the childhood National Immunisation Program in 
July 2011. We assessed changes in pneumococcal serotypes and AMR profiles for IPD in Victoria 
in the period following PCV13 introduction. 
Methods: IPD data for 01 January 2008 to 30 June 2018 were extracted from the Victorian 
Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme, a voluntary laboratory-based system for invasive 
isolates. Cases were divided into three equal periods (pre-PCV13: 01 January 2008–30 June 
2011; transition: 01 July 2011–31 December 2014; post-PCV13: 01 January 2015–30 June 2018). 
Serotypes were classified as those included in the PCV7 vaccine (PCV7), PCV13 but not the PCV7 
(PCV13), and those included in neither vaccine (non-PCV). Antimicrobial susceptibility data were 
assessed using clinical breakpoints as interpreted by diagnostic laboratories. Using Poisson 
regression the incidence of serotypes was compared between time periods. Differences in the 
proportion of isolates with AMR to penicillin and third-generation cephalosporins (3GC) were 
assessed using chi-squared or Fisher’s exact tests as appropriate. 
Results: There were 3,865 IPD cases with available serotype data. The pre-PCV13 period 
included 1,215 cases; of which 99% had penicillin susceptibilities and 95% had 3GC 
susceptibilities. The post-PCV13 period included 1,277 cases; of which 100% had penicillin 
susceptibilities and 91% had 3GC susceptibilities. Univariate regression found that overall, the 
incidence rate ratio (IRR) for PCV13 serotypes decreased (IRR 0.54, 95% CI: 0.48–0.60) after the 
PCV13 was introduced. This was largely driven by reductions in serotype 19A (IRR 0.07, 95% CI: 
0.02–0.30), 6A (IRR 0.04, 95% CI: 0.01–0.27), and serotype 1 (IRR 0.07, 95% CI: 0.02–0.30). 
Against this trend, serotype 3 increased (IRR 1.56, 95% CI: 1.24–1.95). Overall, the incidence of 
PCV7 serotypes decreased (IRR 0.63, 95% CI: 0.52–0.79), however serotype 19F increased (IRR 
2.18, 95% CI: 1.49–3.17) after the introduction of the PCV13. The proportion of isolates resistant 
and non-susceptible to penicillin were comparable between the pre-PCV13 and post-PCV13 
periods, however there were minor changes in the proportion of isolates susceptible to penicillin 
(increased from 88.8% to 91.6%, X2=5.55, p=0.02). Antimicrobial susceptibility to 3GC in the pre-
PCV13 and post-PCV13 periods were comparable. 
Conclusion: While there were overall decreases in the incidence of serotypes included in the 
PCV13, serotypes 19F and 3 increased. Further investigation is required to determine the 
mechanisms underlying the increases of these serotypes. Levels of AMR did not increase 
however ongoing surveillance is essential to identify emerging changes.  
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Changes in Epidemiology of Invasive Pneumococcal 
Disease with the Introduction of the 13-valent 
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine, Victoria, 2008–
2018 
S Bowman-Derrick1, 2, 3, E Field1, M Easton2, J Strachan2, B.P. Howden3 
1National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, 2Victorian Government 
Department of Health and Human Services, 3 The Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public 
Health Laboratory, The University of Melbourne 
Introduction 
Invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD), caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae, has clinical 
manifestations which include bacteraemia, meningitis, and sepsis (1, 2). IPD is associated with 
high levels of morbidity and mortality, with more than 800,000 deaths in children estimated to 
occur annually worldwide (3). Infants and those aged older than 60 years have the greatest risk 
of contracting IPD (2). 
In Victoria, IPD has been notifiable since 2001 and all invasive S. pneumoniae isolates undergo 
capsular serotyping, performed by the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory 
(MDU). Serotypes of IPD isolates are recorded in the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance 
Scheme (VHPSS), a voluntary laboratory-based surveillance system which includes organisms 
isolated from blood and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), coordinated within MDU.  
Since the introduction of vaccination for pneumococcal disease in Australia, there have been 
several changes to immunisation recommendations. A 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide 
vaccine (23vPPV) was funded for Victorians aged 65 years and older in 1998, and introduced 
under the National Immunisation Program in 2005 (4).  In Australia, infants are vaccinated 
against IPD at two, four and six months (3 + 0), with a booster at 12 months for those with 
underlying medical conditions placing them at increased risk of IPD (3 + 1) (5). A 7-valent 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) was introduced in 2001, and included in the publicly 
funded childhood immunisation schedule in 2005 (6). The 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine (PCV13) replaced the PCV7 in the routine immunisation schedule in July 2011 (5). In 
Victoria, from July 2018, the vaccine schedule for children under the National Immunisation 
Programme will change to a 2 + 1 schedule, with vaccines at  2, 4 and 12 months. 
The use of conjugate vaccines in children results in decreased levels of nasopharyngeal 
colonisation and therefore decreased transmission to adults for vaccine serotypes (7). The 
implementation of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine programs in children are therefore 
expected to result in herd immunity effects, with changes in all age groups (8). The 23vPPV 
contains 10 additional serotypes compared to the PCV13, however generates an inferior 
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immune response for most serotypes and the impact IPD in the over 65 year age group is 
debated (4, 9). Importantly, 23vPPV is not thought to effectively prevent vaccine-serotype 
colonisation (4). 
Introduction of a new pneumococcal vaccine is associated with a process known as serotype 
replacement, whereby the prevalence of serotypes present in the vaccine decreases and that of 
serotypes not included in the vaccine increases (10, 11). Some serotypes of S.pneumoniae have 
developed resistance to commonly used antimicrobials which can make empirical treatment 
ineffective (2, 12). As the distribution of serotypes changes with the implementation of new 
vaccines, it follows that levels of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) may also change. For example, 
after the introduction of PCV7 in Victoria in 2005, serotype 19A, which is associated with multi-
drug resistance, increased, impacting overall levels of AMR within IPD (5, 13, 14).  
With this work we describe the epidemiology of IPD in Victoria from 2008 to 2018 and assess 
changes in pneumococcal serotypes and AMR profiles in the period following the introduction 
of PCV13. 
Methods 
Study sample 
Data for all cases of IPD were extracted from the VHPSS with specimen collection dates from 01 
January 2008 to 30 June 2018, inclusive. Duplicate isolates were defined as multiple specimen 
types or multiple isolates (of the same serotype) collected from a patient within a 30-day period. 
Where patients had both a CSF and blood isolate collected within 30 days of each other, only 
the CSF isolate was included.  
Serotypes were grouped as PCV7 (those in the PCV7 vaccine only), PCV13 (those in the PCV13 
but not the PCV7) and non-PCV (serotypes not included in either conjugate vaccine). Three equal 
time periods were allocated based on the date of specimen collection: pre-PCV13 (01 January 
2008–30 June 2011), a transition period, to allow time for PCV13 to have an impact (01 July 
2011–31 December 2014), and post-PCV13 (01 January 2015–30 June 2018).  
Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis was conducted using Stata 15.1 (StataCorp, Texas, USA). Poisson regression 
was used to assess changes in the incidence of serotypes over time, including obtaining standard 
errors for parameter estimates (15). 
Complete case analysis was conducted for isolates with antimicrobial susceptibility data. 
Cefotaxime and ceftriaxone antimicrobial susceptibility results were combined and reported as 
third generation cephalosporins (3GC). Where ceftriaxone and cefotaxime AST were discordant, 
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the higher minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) was included in the analysis. AST data were 
analysed at two levels; using available clinical breakpoint data as interpreted by diagnostic 
laboratories (susceptible, intermediate or resistant), and using reported MIC values. Due to the 
extent of missing MIC data, isolates were further categorised as raised MIC (penicillin >0.06 
mg/L; 3GC ≥0.5 mg/L). Differences in the proportion of susceptible, intermediate and resistant 
isolates were assessed using a chi-squared or Fisher’s exact test. Changes in isolates with raised 
MICs over time were assessed using Poisson regression. 
Ethical approval 
This analysis was conducted under ethics approval from the Australian National University 
Human Research Ethics Committee, approval number 2018/690. 
Results 
There were 3,897 isolates reported to the VHPSS, excluding duplicates, from 01 January 2008–
30 June 2018. An additional 32 isolates were excluded from this analysis as serotyping results 
were unknown (15 isolates not forwarded to MDU, 17 not viable for serotyping). This left a total 
of 3,865 isolates for analysis (3,767 blood, 98 CSF), representing 93% of Victorian notifications 
to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System for the same period (16-18). 
During the study period, the mean annual incidence of IPD was 6.5 cases per 100,000 population 
per year, ranging from 5.3 to 7.2 (Figure 1). The highest incidence was among those aged 
younger than 5 and 65 years and older. In contrast, among those aged 5 to 64 years, the 
incidence remained relatively stable. Over the study period, there were isolates from 1,727 
(44.6%) females and 2,138 (55.3%) males. The rate in males was higher than that in females in 
all years for those aged 65 years and older, in all years except 2014 for those aged younger than 
5 years, and in all years except 2008 and 2009 for those aged 5 to 64 years.  
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Figure 1. Incidence of IPD by age group in Victoria, as per isolates reported to the Victorian 
Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme, 01 January 2008 to 30 June 20181 
 
Over the study period, the most prevalent serotypes were 19A (13.9%), 3 (10.6%), 7F (9.3%), 22F 
(8.5%), 6C (5.4%), and 19F (4.6%) (Table 1). Of all isolates, 53.9% were non-PCV. PCV7 isolates 
accounted for only 10.6% of serotypes, while 35.6% of isolates were PCV13 serotypes. Among 
children aged younger than 5 years of age, serotype 19A predominated (31.0%). Among those 
aged 5 to 64 years, serotype 7F was most prevalent (14.8%), followed by serotype 19A (12.1%). 
Among those aged 65 years and older, serotype 19A (12.0%) and serotype 3 (11.7%) were most 
prevalent. 
 
1 While the graph appears to display a decrease in incidence in 2018, this is due to seasonality as 
notifications of IPD tend to increase in quarter 3 (July to September) 
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Table 1. Numbers and proportions of serotypes by age group, 01 January 2008 to 30 June 
2018. Data source: Isolates reported to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme. 
Percent prevalence of each serotype 
Serotype2 <5 years n (%) 5 to 64 years n (%) ≥65 years n (%) All ages n (%) 
PCV7 serotypes 
Serotype 9V 0 30 (1.6%) 15 (0.9%) 45 (1.2%) 
Serotype 23F 0 8 (0.4%) 16 (1.0%) 24 (0.6%) 
Serotype 18C 0 11 (0.6%) 5 (0.3%) 16 (0.4%) 
Serotype 14 0 40 (2.2%) 18 (1.1%) 58 (1.5%) 
Serotype 6B 1 (0.3%) 10 (0.5%) 20 (1.2%) 31 (0.8%) 
Serotype 4 1 (0.3%) 41 (2.2%) 16 (1.0%) 58 (1.5%) 
Serotype 19F 29 (7.8%) 87 (4.7%) 61 (3.7%) 177 (4.6%) 
Total PCV7 31 (8.3%) 227 (12.2%) 151 (9.2%) 409 (10.6%) 
PCV13 serotypes 
Serotype 5 0 1 (0.1%) 0 1 
Serotype 6A 1 (0.3%) 16 (0.9%) 15 (0.9%) 32 (0.8%) 
Serotype 1 2 (0.5%) 29 (1.6%) 2 (0.1%) 33 (0.9%) 
Serotype 7F 18 (4.8%) 275 (14.8%) 67 (4.1%) 360 (9.3%) 
Serotype 3 27 (7.2%) 193 (10.4%) 191 (11.7%) 411 (10.6%) 
Serotype 19A 116 (31.0%) 225 (12.1%) 196 (12.0%) 537 (13.9%) 
Total PCV13 164 (44.0%) 739 (39.9%) 471 (28.8%) 1374 (35.6%) 
Non PCV1 
Serotype 22F 19 (5.1%) 154 (8.3%) 157 (9.6%) 330 (8.5%) 
Serotype 6C 12 (3.2%) 58 (3.1%) 138 (8.4%) 208 (5.4%) 
Serotype 9N 10 (2.7%) 94 (5.1%) 64 (3.9%) 168 (4.3%) 
Serotype 33F 14 (3.8%) 72 (3.9%) 49 (3.0%) 135 (3.5%) 
Serotype 23A 4 (1.1%) 48 (2.6%) 74 (4.5%) 126 (3.3%) 
Serotype 23B 21 (5.6%) 37 (2.0%) 57 (3.5%) 115 (3.0%) 
Serotype 15A 7 (1.9%) 29 (1.6%) 67 (4.1%) 103 (2.7%) 
Serotype 35B 8 (2.1%) 35 (1.9%) 58 (3.5%) 101 (2.6%) 
Serotype 11A 8 (2.1%) 39 (2.1%) 48 (2.9%) 95 (2.5%) 
Serotype 16F 3 (0.8%) 35 (1.9%) 45 (2.7%) 83 (2.1%) 
Serotype 8 2 (0.5%) 54 (2.9%) 15 (0.9%) 71 (1.8%) 
Serotype 10A 13 (3.5%) 29 (1.6%) 20 (1.2%) 62 (1.6%) 
Serotype 38 8 (2.1%) 12 (0.6%) 38 (2.3%) 58 (1.5%) 
Serotype 15B 9 (2.4%) 16 (0.9%) 31 (1.9%) 56 (1.4%) 
Serotype 15C 15 (4.0%) 17 (0.9%) 16 (1.0%) 48 (1.2%) 
Other3 25 (6.7%) 159 (8.6%) 139 (8.7%) 323 (8.4%) 
Total Non-PCV 178 (47.7%) 888 (47.9%) 1016 (62.0%) 2082 (53.9%) 
Total all serotypes 373 1,854 1,638 3,865 
 
2 Serotypes listed including those which make up ≥2% of total for either the <5, 5 to 64 or ≥65 year 
age group 
 
3 Other serotypes include Serotypes 2, 6D, 7, 7B, 7C, 9A, 9L, 10B, 10F, 12F, 13, 15F, 17F, 18A, 18B, 
20, 21, 22A, 23, 24, 24F, 29, 31, 34, 35A, 35F, 37, non-typeable 
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After the introduction of the PCV13 vaccine, the overall incidence of PCV7 (IRR 0.63, 95% CI: 
0.52–0.79) and PCV13 (IRR 0.54, 95% CI: 0.48–0.60) serotypes decreased (Table 2, Figure 2). 
Notably, serotype 19F (IRR 2.18, 95% CI: 1.49–3.17) and serotype 3 (IRR 1.56, 95% CI: 1.24–1.95) 
increased, despite their inclusion in the PCV13. The decrease in PCV13 serotypes was due to 
reductions in the incidence of serotypes 1 (IRR 0.07, 95% CI: 0.02–0.30), 6A (IRR 0.04, 95% CI: 
0.01–0.27) and 19A (IRR 0.23, 95% CI: 0.18–0.30).  
Non-PCV serotypes increased (IRR 1.63, 95% CI: 1.51–1.76) after the introduction of the PCV13. 
The largest increases in non-PCV serotypes were 9N (5.07, 95% CI: 3.12–8.21), 15C (IRR 3.55, 
95% CIL 1.45–8.68), and 15A (IRR 3.16, 95% CI: 1.67–5.99). Several serotypes demonstrated a 
change in IRR during the transition period in addition to the post-PCV13 period.  
 
4 
 
4 While the graph appears to display a decrease in incidence in 2018, this is due to seasonality, as 
the number of notifications of IPD tends to increase in quarter 3 (July to September) 
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Figure 2. Number of cases of IPD, per 100,000 population, 01 January 2008 to 30 June 
2018. Data source: Isolates submitted to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance 
Scheme4 
PCV13 introduction July 2011 
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Table 2. Comparison of IPD serotypes by time period. Incidence rate ratio (IRR) as determined by Poisson regression, indicates the change in incidence 
compared to the pre-PCV13 time period as the baseline. Data source: isolates submitted to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme.5 
  Pre-PCV13 Transition Post-PCV13 
  01 January 2008–30 June 2011 1 July 2011–30 December 2014 01 January 2015–30 June 2018 
  No. 
Cases 
Mean cases/year No. 
cases 
Mean 
cases/year 
IRR (95% CI) No. 
cases 
Mean 
cases/year 
IRR (95% CI) 
PCV7 
Serotype 14 26 7.4 18 5.1 0.63 (0.35–1.14) 14 4.0 0.50 (0.26–0.95) 
Serotype 18C 14 4 1 0.3 0.06 (0.01–0.50) 1 0.3  0.07 (0.01–0.50) 
Serotype 19F 37 10.6 53 15.1 1.3 (0.86–1.97) 87 24.9 2.18 (1.49–3.17) 
Serotype 23F 15 4.3 5 1.4  0.30 (0.11–0.83) 4 1.1  0.25 (0.08–0.74) 
Serotype 4 42 12 9 2.6 0.20 (0.10–0.40) 7 2.0 0.15 (0.07–0.34) 
Serotype 6B 21 6 4 1.1 0.17 (0.06–0.50) 6 1.7 0.26 (0.11–0.65) 
Serotype 9V 28 8 11 3.1  0.36 (0.18–0.71) 6 1.7 0.20 (0.08–0.48) 
Total 183 52.3 101 28.9 0.50 (0.40–0.64) 125 35.7 0.63 (0.52–0.79) 
PCV13 
Serotype 1 26 7.4 5 1.4  0.17 (0.07–0.45) 2 0.6  0.07 (0.02–0.30) 
Serotype 19A 276 78.9 191 54.6 0.63 (0.53–0.74) 70 20.0 0.23 (0.18–0.30) 
Serotype 3 107 30.6 124 35.4 1.05 (0.82–1.35) 180 51.4 1.56 (1.24–1.95) 
Serotype 5 0 0 1 0.3 - 0 0 - 
Serotype 6A 25 7.1 6 1.7 0.22 (0.09–0.53) 1 0.3 0.04 (0.01–0.27) 
Serotype 7F 101 28.9 200 57.1 1.80 (1.44–2.26) 59 16.9 0.54 (0.40–0.74) 
Total 535 152.9 527 150.6 0.90 (0.81–0.98) 312 89.1 0.54 (0.48–0.60) 
 
5 Statistical significance is defined as p<0.05, values meeting statistical significance are bolded: those demonstrating an increase are shown in red; those demonstrating a 
decrease are shown in green. 
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Non-PCV 
Serotype 11A 23 6.6 36 10.3 1.42 (0.85–2.39)  36 10.3 1.45 (0.86–2.43) 
Serotype 15A 12 3.4 50 14.3 3.79 (2.03–7.08) 41 11.7 3.16 (1.67–5.99) 
Serotype 16F 19 5.4 21 6.0 1.00 (0.54–1.86) 43 12.3 2.09 (1.23–3.57) 
Serotype 22F 106 30.3 122 34.9 1.05 (0.82–1.34)  102 29.1 0.89 (0.69–1.16) 
Serotype 23A 30 8.6 25 7.1 0.76 (0.45–1.28) 71 20.3 2.19 (1.44–3.33) 
Serotype 23B 19 5.4 41 11.7 1.96 (1.14–3.36) 55 15.7 2.68 (1.60–4.49) 
Serotype 33F 40 11.4 36 10.3 0.82 (0.52–1.27) 59 16.9 1.36 (0.92–2.02) 
Serotype 35B 30 8.6 30 8.6 0.91 (0.55–1.50) 41 11.7 1.26 (0.79–2.01) 
Serotype 6C 64 18.3 91 26.0 1.30 (0.95–1.76) 53 15.1 0.77 (0.54–1.09) 
Serotype 9N 19 5.4 45 12.9 2.15 (1.27–3.66) 104 29.7 5.07 (3.12–8.21) 
Serotype 10A 20 5.7 20 5.7 0.91 (0.49–1.68) 22 6.3 1.02 (0.56–1.86) 
Serotype 8 24 6.9 21 6 0.80 (0.44–1.42) 26 7.4 1.0 (0.58–1.74) 
Serotype 38 14 4 21 6 1.36 (0.70–2.67) 23 6.6 1.52 (0.79–2.94) 
Serotype 15C 6 1.7 19 5.4 2.88 (1.15–7.18) 23 6.6 3.55 (1.45–8.68) 
Serotype 15B 14 4 19 5.4 1.23 (0.62–2.45) 23 6.6 1.52 (0.79–2.94) 
Others 57 16.3 112 32 1.79 (1.31–2.43) 154 44 2.50 (1.86–3.35) 
Total 497 142.0 709 202.6 1.30 (1.19–1.41) 876 250.3 1.63 (1.51–1.76) 
 
Chapter II: Changes in the Epidemiology of Invasive Pneumococcal Disease  
30 
 
The average annual incidence of PCV13 serotypes reduced in all age groups after the 
introduction of the PCV13 (Figure 3). In contrast, the average annual incidence of non-PCV 
serotypes have increased in all age groups after the introduction of the PCV13. 
 
Figure 3. Average annual incidence of IPD by age group and time period, Victoria, 2008 to 
2018. Data source: isolates submitted to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance 
Scheme. 
 
After the introduction of the PCV13, the largest decrease in the incidence of IPD occurred for 
those aged the younger than 5 years (IRR 0.70, 95% CI: 0.55–0.88), with a smaller decrease in 
those 5 to 64 years (IRR 0.87, 95% CI: 0.80–0.95) (Table 3). Conversely, the incidence of IPD in 
those aged 65 year and older increased (IRR 1.27, 95% CI: 1.16–1.40).  
The overall incidence of PCV13 serotypes decreased to the greatest extent in those younger than 
5 years (IRR 0.29, 95% CI: 0.20–0.44), with a smaller decrease in those aged 5 to 64 years (IRR 
0.59, 95% CI: 0.50–0.69) and those 65 years and older (IRR 0.62, 95% CI: 0.51–0.76). Notably, 
the incidence of serotype 19A decreased in all age groups (<5 years: IRR 0.15, 95% CI: 0.08–0.30, 
5 to 64 years: IRR 0.26, 95% CI: 0.17–0.39, ≥65 years: IRR 0.28, 95% CI: 0.19–0.41). Against this, 
the incidence of serotype 3 increased in all age groups (<5 years: IRR 1.72, 95% CI: 0.78–3.79, 5 
to 64 years: IRR 1.47, 95% CI: 1.07–2.04, ≥65 years: IRR 1.58, 95% CI: 1.11–2.24). 
The overall incidence of PCV7 serotypes increased in those younger than 5 years (IRR 4.50, 95% 
CI: 1.71–11.86) driven by a significant increase in the incidence of serotype 19F (IRR 3.53, 95% 
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CI: 1.43–8.75). In contrast, the overall incidence of PCV7 serotypes decreased in those aged 5 to 
64 years (IRR 0.59, 95% CI: 0.44–0.79) and 65 years and older (IRR 0.51, 95% CI: 0.36–0.73), 
despite increases in the incidence of serotype 19F (5 to 64 years: IRR 1.67, 95% CI: 1.02—2.76, 
≥65 years: IRR 3.43, 95% CI: 1.53–7.68). 
Table 3. Comparison of IPD serotype groups and selected serotypes by time period and age 
group. Incidence rate ratio (IRR), as determined by Poisson regression, indicates the change 
in incidence compared to the pre-PCV13 time period as the baseline. Data source: isolates 
submitted to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme.6 
Factor Transition period IRR (95% CI) Post-PCV13 IRR (95% CI) 
<5 years 
IPD overall 0.65 (0.51–0.82) 0.70 (0.55–0.88) 
PCV7 1.96 (0.64–6.01) 4.50 (1.71–11.86) 
Serotype 19F 1.63 (0.56–4.72) 3.53 (1.43–8.75) 
PCV13 0.64 (0.49–0.82) 0.29 (0.20–0.44) 
Serotype 3 0.56 (0.18–1.74) 1.72 (0.78–3.79) 
Serotype 19A 0.54 (0.39–0.77) 0.15 (0.08–0.30) 
Non-PCV 1.67 (1.24–2.25) 2.11 (1.61–2.77) 
Serotype 15A 1.40 (0.09–22.19) 6.62 (0.78–56.07) 
Serotype 9N 1.40 (0.20–9.80) 3.97 (0.82–19.37) 
5 to 64 years 
IPD overall 0.98 (0.91–1.06) 0.87 (0.80–0.95) 
PCV7 0.48 (0.36–0.65) 0.59 (0.44–0.79) 
Serotype 19F 0.96 (0.56–1.67) 1.67 (1.02–2.76) 
PCV13 1.00 (0.88–1.12) 0.59 (0.50–0.69) 
Serotype 19A 0.67 (0.52–87) 0.26 (0.17–0.39) 
Serotype 3 0.98 (0.69–1.38) 1.47 (1.07–2.04) 
Non-PCV 1.26 (1.10–1.44) 1.72 (1.52–1.94) 
Serotype 9N 1.71 (0.88–3.33) 4.64 (2.57–8.39) 
Serotype 15A 4.94 (1.45–16.87) 3.53 (0.98–12.76) 
≥65 years 
IPD overall 1.14 (1.06–1.26) 1.27 (1.16–1.40) 
PCV7 0.44 (0.30–0.64) 0.51 (0.36–0.73) 
Serotype 19F 2.39 (1.02–5.56) 3.43 (1.53–7.68) 
PCV13  0.91 (0.77–1.09) 0.62 (0.51–0.76) 
Serotype 19A 0.73 (0.55–0.97) 0.28 (0.19–0.41) 
Serotype 3 1.58 (0.81–1.72) 1.58 (1.11–2.24) 
Non-PCV 1.23 (1.10–1.37) 1.41 (1.27–1.56) 
Serotype 15A 3.28 (1.53–7.03) 2.36 (1.08–5.17) 
Serotype 9N 3.78 (1.29–11.03) 7.46 (2.69–20.67) 
 
6 Statistical significance is defined as p<0.05, values meeting statistical significance are bolded. 
Values indicating an increased incidence are shown in red; those indicating a decrease are shown in 
green. 
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Antimicrobial susceptibility 
Over the study period, 98.7% of (3,815) isolates had available clinical breakpoint data for 
penicillin and 91.9% (3,551) had data available for third generation cephalosporins (3GCs). 
Only 50% of isolates (n=1920) had susceptibility results for vancomycin, 42% (n=1634) had 
susceptibility results for erythromycin, and 30% (n=1148) had susceptibility results for 
clindamycin. 
Among 66 isolates resistant to penicillin, nine were also resistant to 3GC (13.6%). Of 324 isolates 
non-susceptible to penicillin, 37 were also non-susceptible to 3GC (11.4%). Between time 
periods, there was no change in the proportion of isolates resistant or non-susceptible to 
penicillin, however the proportion of isolates susceptible to penicillin increased (88.8% pre-
PCV13 to 91.6% post-PCV13, X2=5.55, p=0.02) (Table 4). There was no change in the proportion 
of isolates susceptible, non-susceptible or resistant to 3GC. 
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Table 4. Proportions of isolates by antimicrobial susceptibility and time period, 01 January 2008 to 30 June 2018. Chi-squared or Fisher’s exact test indicates 
whether there was a change in the proportion of isolates between the time periods. Data source: clinical breakpoint data submitted by diagnostic laboratories 
to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme.78 
 Penicillin 
 
Pre-PCV13 n (%) Transition n (%) Chi-squared Post-PCV13 N (%) Chi squared Total n (%) 
Susceptible 1,072 (88.8%) 1,183 (88.9%) X2=0.003, p=0.96 1,170 (91.6%) X2=5.55, p=0.02 3,425 (89.8%) 
Non-susceptible 115 (9.5%) 119 (8.9%) X2=0.26, p=0.96 90 (7.0%) X2=3.17, p=0.08 324 (8.5%) 
Resistant  20 (1.7%) 29 (2.2%) X2=0.91, p=0.61 17 (1.3%) X2=2.70, p=0.10 66 (1.7%) 
Total 1,207 1331   1,277   3,815 
 3GC 
Susceptible  1,131 (98.1%) 1,211 (97.6%) X2=0.73, p=0.39 1,133 (97.9%) X2=0.32, p=0.57 3,475 (97.9%) 
Non-susceptible 19 (1.6%) 24 (1.9%) X2=0.28, p=0.60 19 (1.6%) X2=0.29, p=0.59 62 (1.7%) 
Resistant 3 (0.3%) 6 (0.5%) Fisher’s exact, p=0.51 5 (0.4%)  X2=0.03, p=0.85 14 (0.4%) 
Total 1,153 1,241  1,157  3,551 
 
 
7 Non-susceptible indicates intermediate antimicrobial susceptibility 
8 Statistical significance is defined as p<0.05, values meeting statistical significance are bolded 
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Among isolates with penicillin resistance and non-susceptibility, serotypes 15A, 19A and 19F 
were most prevalent (Table 5). Among isolates with 3GC resistance, serotype 19A and 19F 
predominated, whereas among non-susceptible isolates, serotype 19A, 14 and 15A were most 
prevalent. 
 
Table 5. Serotypes predominant among isolates with resistance and non-susceptibility to 
penicillin and 3GC, 01 January 2008 to 30 June 2018. Data source: Victorian Hospital 
Pathogen Surveillance Scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penicillin MIC data were available for 2441 isolates (63.2%); 3GC MIC data were available for 
2221 isolates (57.5%). Regression analysis showed a 25% increase in the incidence (IRR 1.25, 
95% CI: 1.04–1.51) of raised penicillin MIC (>0.06 mg/L) in the transition period, however there 
was no change in the post-PCV13 period (IRR 1.02, 95% CI: 0.84–1.24). For 3GC with raised MIC 
(≥0.5 mg/L), there was no statistically significant change in either the transition or post-PCV13 
period (IRR 1.15, 95% CI: 0.81–1.63, IRR 1.11, 95% CI: 0.78–1.59, respectively). 
Discussion 
Since the introduction of the PCV13, there has been a significant decrease in the overall 
incidence of vaccine serotypes in Victoria. Against this, the incidence of serotypes 3 and 19F 
have increased in all age groups, despite their inclusion in the PCV13. Based on clinical 
 Penicillin 3GC  
Serotype Resistant Non-susceptible Resistant Non-susceptible 
Serotype 4 1 (1.5%) 2 (0.6%) 0 0 
Serotype 6A 1 (1.5%) 3 (0.9%) 0 0 
Serotype 7F 0 0 1 (7%) 2 (3.2%) 
Serotype 11A 2 (3.0%) 13 (4.0%) 0 2 (3.2%) 
Serotype 12F 1 (1.5%) 1 (0.3%) 0 0 
Serotype 14 4 (6.1%) 16 (4.9%) 0 8 (12.9%) 
Serotype 15A 11 (16.7%) 37 (11.4%) 0 7 (11.3%) 
Serotype 15B 1 (1.5%) 7 (2.2%) 0 0 
Serotype 15C 2 (3.0%) 2 (0.6%) 0 0 
Serotype 19A 19 (28.8%) 120 (37.0%) 4 (29%) 18 (29.0%) 
Serotype 19F 8 (12.1%) 9 (2.8%) 4 (29%) 4 (6.5%) 
Serotype 20 1 (1.5%) 1 (0.3%) 0 0 
Serotype 23A 2 (3.0%) 21 (6.5%) 0 0 
Serotype 23B 1 (1.5%) 18 (5.6%) 1 (7%) 5 (8.1%) 
Serotype 23F 1 (1.5%) 5 (1.5%) 0 2 (3.2%) 
Serotype 33F 0 7 (2.2%) 0 0 
Serotype 35B 4 (6.1%) 18 (5.6%) 1 (7%) 6 (9.7%) 
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breakpoint data reported by Victorian diagnostic laboratories, the proportion of isolates 
susceptible to penicillin increased, and the levels of AMR to 3GC were comparable.  
The overall rate of IPD remained highest in individuals younger than 5 years and 65 years of age 
and older, as in other countries (19-21). In the post-PCV13 period, a 46% reduction in the 
incidence of PCV13 serotypes was largely driven by decreases in serotype 1, 6A and 19A. While 
the PCV13 is funded for children younger than 5 years, the incidence of PCV13 serotypes 
decreased in all age groups, as in other studies (5, 22-26). While we hypothesised that the 
incidence of all vaccine serotypes would decrease after the introduction of the PCV13, there was 
a significant increase in the incidence of serotype 3 and serotype 19F in the post-PCV13 period. 
This is consistent with other studies examining serotype changes after the introduction of the 
PCV13 (24, 27). Other studies found no decrease in serotype 3 after the introduction of PCV13 
(8, 28, 29). Serotypes 3 and 19F have both been associated with increased risk of death (30). 
Serotype 19F has also been associated with penicillin and cefotaxime resistance and was one of 
the most prevalent serotypes displaying AMR in this analysis (11). 
It is possible that the increase in serotype 19F occurred due to reduced vaccine efficacy against 
this serotype (19, 31, 32). A review of vaccine failures in children found that 19F had one of the 
highest incidents of vaccine failure (33). This analysis was not able to examine this possibility, as 
no vaccination records are collected by the VHPSS. To further investigate the effectiveness of 
the PCV13 against serotype 19F, additional studies including factors such as number of doses 
and age at which they were received would be required (34).  
While PCV13 appears to have efficacy against serotype 3 at the individual level in both children 
and adults, it does not appear to be effective at the population level (35). In those aged 65 years 
and older, serotype 3 was the second most-prevalent, which may be due to minimal herd 
immunity for this serotype (7, 31, 36). As colonisation with S. pneumoniae is a precursor to IPD, 
and children younger than 5 years are a major source of transmission for adults, herd immunity 
relies on the prevention of carriage of PCV13 serotypes in children (37). The persistence of 
serotype 3 may therefore be explained by PCV13 being successful at directly protecting against 
disease, but not as effective at preventing carriage (7, 35).  If colonisation with serotype 3 
persists among children, it follows that this serotype can be transmitted and potentially be an 
increasing cause of IPD among adults and the unvaccinated (35). Rather than relying on herd 
immunity for serotype 3, direct vaccination of populations at risk of disease, using the PCV13, is 
likely to be a more successful approach to reducing disease due to this serotype (7, 24, 29, 35, 
37). 
Consistent with other studies, non-PCV serotypes increased after the introduction of the PCV13, 
comprising more than half of all cases over the study period (11, 23, 38, 39). The most 
36 
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pronounced increases in incidence were seen in serotype 9N, 15A and 15C. Serotype 15A has 
emerged in several countries following the implementation of PCV13 (14, 40-42). Increases in 
the incidence of serotype 15A have been associated with meropenem non-susceptibility, 
penicillin non-susceptibility, macrolide resistance, and multi-drug resistance (14, 41-44). The 
prevalence of AMR among isolates of serotype 15A is concerning, as this is not included in any 
of the conjugate vaccines or the 23vPPV used in Australia (44). 
Post-PCV13 proportions of penicillin non-susceptibility and resistance are low compared to 
other studies however somewhat higher than penicillin resistance among invasive isolates of 
S.pneumoniae in the UK (0.7%) (5, 8, 11, 21, 45, 46). Low levels of resistance over the study
period indicate continued use of penicillin and 3GC is appropriate for empirical treatment of IPD 
in Victoria. While some studies assessing the impact of the PCV13 have found reductions in the 
proportion of isolates resistant to penicillin or cefotaxime, others have found no change in AMR 
with the emergence of non-vaccine serotypes (5, 23, 24, 47). Others identified increases in 
penicillin resistance among non-vaccine serotypes (35). While proportions of isolates with 
penicillin resistance were comparable between pre- and post-PCV13 periods, the proportion 
susceptible to penicillin increased. This small change in the prevalence of penicillin
susceptibility is unlikely to be clinically significant. This change was driven by a significant
decrease in the incidence of serotype 19A, among all age groups, which is commonly 
associated with high levels of penicillin non-susceptibility (24). 
This analysis used data collected by the VHPSS, which relies on voluntary contribution by 
diagnostic laboratories. While the majority of isolates notified to the DHHS appear to have been 
included in this study, there are several limitations with available data. This analysis was only 
able to examine antimicrobial susceptibility data for penicillin and 3GC, which are used for 
empirical treatment of IPD in Australia. To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
changes in the antimicrobial susceptibility of S. pneumoniae, additional antimicrobials should be 
included in future analyses. Diagnostic laboratories contributing to the VHPSS test S. 
pneumoniae for a range of antimicrobials however there is a lack of consistency of testing and 
reporting between laboratories. As a large proportion of MIC results were missing from the 
dataset, useful conclusions on trends in MIC values were not able to be obtained from this 
analysis. Furthermore, AST techniques and guidelines used to interpret them are not 
consistently reported, indicating that there is a need for standardisation of AST reporting to the 
VHPSS. 
From July 2018, the vaccine schedule for children under the National Immunisation Programme 
changed from 3 + 0 to 2 + 1. This is expected to lead to further changes in the epidemiology of 
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IPD, therefore similar analyses, with the addition of MIC and vaccination data, should be 
conducted in future.  
Conclusions 
This study identified an overall decrease in PCV13 serotypes after the introduction of PCV13 in 
Victoria. This was partly offset by increases in non-PCV13 serotypes. There was no increase in 
AMR to penicillin or 3GC antimicrobials. These findings indicate the importance of ongoing 
surveillance to identify changes in the epidemiology of serotypes and AMR within IPD in Victoria. 
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1. Preface
There are multiple systems that conduct surveillance of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), both 
within Victoria and Australia-wide. While these systems enable AMR trends to be examined, the 
data that the systems produce currently lack integration. Furthermore, available data are not 
always accessible to the Victorian Government Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) which has the legislative power and authority to implement public health response to 
increasing levels of AMR or an increase in cases with a particular AMR pattern.  
Marion Easton, the Principal Epidemiologist for AMR and Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), 
initiated this project as a result of plans to develop an AMR Surveillance and Response Unit 
within the DHHS. This unit is referred to as the Victorian AMR unit throughout this chapter. Since 
this evaluation commenced, the Victorian AMR unit has been established, however is still in the 
early stages of operation. The primary aim of this project was to determine how the surveillance 
of AMR within Victoria could be improved. 
1.1 My role 
I developed the evaluation framework for this project, conducted document reviews for current 
systems monitoring AMR in Victoria and Australia, designed semi-structure stakeholder 
interview guides and an online survey in Qualtrics, conducted the interviews, collected and 
analysed data, and made recommendations.  
1.2 Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge the following people and organisations for their assistance and participation in 
this project: 
• Marion Easton and Professor Benjamin Howden, for sharing their experiences of
working on AMR in Victoria, and for assisting in refining the project aims and
questionnaire design
• Siobhan St George, Courtney Lane, Mary Valcanis, and Kerrie Stevens for sharing their
experiences of AMR surveillance at the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health
Laboratory (MDU)
• Dr Emma Field for her valuable feedback on structuring and refining this evaluation
• Dr Norelle Sherry for sharing her knowledge on AMR surveillance in Victoria
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• All Victorian diagnostic laboratories who discussed their experiences of AMR
surveillance in Victoria
• The coordinators of The Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance for sharing their
experiences of AMR surveillance
1.3 Lessons learnt 
Through conducting this project, I have learnt about real-world public health surveillance in 
addition to how to conduct a surveillance system evaluation. The evaluation process has enabled 
me to gain an understanding of the complexities of antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST), 
laboratory processes, and AMR surveillance techniques and limitations. In the second year of 
my MAE, I was responsible for entering eligible isolates into the National Critical Antimicrobial 
Resistances Alert system on behalf of MDU. This gave me direct experience of AMR surveillance, 
and enabled me to further understand AMR and WGS testing processes.  
The stakeholder engagement process was conducted via a combination of in-person interviews 
and a web-based survey. Using a combination of methods taught me the advantages and 
disadvantages of each. I learnt that semi-structured interviews are time consuming and can be 
difficult to arrange yet enable issues to be investigated in greater detail. In contrast, online 
surveys are challenging to design and carry the risk of misinterpretation by the respondent, 
however, are efficient and quick, and enabled the maximum number of stakeholders to 
contribute. In future, I would commence stakeholder engagement earlier and conduct in-person 
interviews followed by online surveys to obtain additional information.  
Lastly, the complexity of AMR surveillance has highlighted the importance of refining project 
objectives on commencement of the evaluation process. AMR surveillance is a very broad topic, 
encompassing all bacterial and fungal organisms when considered at the highest level. Each 
organism has different considerations within the laboratory-based surveillance system, 
including which antimicrobials are tested and monitored, the use of WGS results, and the 
collection of specific patient variables. Once AMR surveillance is further established within the 
DHHS, future evaluations should focus on assessing the surveillance of AMR within one or two 
organisms. Conducting evaluations with a narrower focus will enable more specific 
recommendations to be made.  
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1.4 Public health implications 
This evaluation reviewed the current surveillance activities for AMR in Victoria and highlighted 
the differences and interactions between systems. Current AMR surveillance activities in 
Victoria are successful in monitoring long term trends, however surveillance lacks the timeliness 
to implement a useful public health response to outbreaks or emerging resistance for most 
organisms. In addition, many of the existing surveillance systems do not currently complete the 
surveillance cycle through providing timely and useful reports to relevant stakeholders.  
Recommendations to improve the data quality, timeliness, acceptability and usefulness of AMR 
surveillance in Victoria were formulated. Importantly, the implementation of reporting to end-
users of AMR data is essential to enable effective public health action for AMR. This evaluation 
highlighted that AMR surveillance is currently conducted in a resource-limited setting. Future 
surveillance activities must therefore be prioritised through only conducting continuous 
surveillance for specific organism-antimicrobial combinations, with AMR in other organisms 
potentially monitored using intermittent cross-sectional surveys.  
Another key issue with current AMR surveillance processes is the potential for duplication of 
effort between systems. This could be improved by establishing a clear governance structure 
and documentation of processes for AMR surveillance. Publication of an AMR surveillance 
strategy for Victoria to outline governance would assist in clarifying which of the existing systems 
is responsible for selected organism-antimicrobial combinations. In this way, AMR surveillance 
could be conducted more effectively and potentially for a wider range of organisms. 
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2. Abstract
Introduction: AMR occurs when bacteria or fungi survive in the presence of antimicrobial 
agents. Organisms with AMR cause infections that are more difficult to treat, and are associated 
with higher morbidity and mortality. Moreover, AMR is associated with longer hospital stays and 
increased healthcare costs. Currently, there are several surveillance systems monitoring AMR in 
Victoria, however these systems lack integration. A centrally coordinated Victorian AMR unit, 
based at the DHHS, is expected to improve the integration and public health impact of AMR 
surveillance in Victoria. To inform the implementation of this surveillance unit, an evaluation of 
existing surveillance activities in Victoria was conducted.  
Methods: This evaluation followed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Updated 
Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems. Attributes evaluated included 
simplicity, data quality, acceptability, representativeness, timeliness and usefulness. Attributes 
were evaluated using a combination of document review and interviews with surveillance 
coordinators and contributing diagnostic laboratories. 
Results: Victorian diagnostic laboratories currently contribute to 10 AMR surveillance systems. 
Four systems conduct surveillance in Victoria: the National Enteric Pathogen Surveillance 
Scheme, the Victorian AMR unit, the Victorian Health-Care Associated Infection Surveillance 
System, and the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme. Victoria also contributes to 
six systems at the national level: the Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, the 
Australian Passive AMR Surveillance System, the Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Australia 
Surveillance System, the National Critical Antimicrobial Alert Surveillance System, the National 
Neisseria Network, and the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System.  
Existing AMR surveillance in Victoria is complex, in part due to the number of systems involved. 
The quality of data collected by AMR surveillance systems is high, however there are issues with 
the standardisation of antimicrobial susceptibility data. Several factors affect the 
representativeness of AMR surveillance in Victoria. In addition, Victoria is underrepresented in 
national AMR surveillance. Diagnostic laboratories do not find current surveillance activities 
highly acceptable, as current methods of data submission are time consuming and resource 
intensive. Furthermore, several systems are not currently producing reports on surveillance 
activities. While current AMR surveillance is useful for monitoring long term trends in Victoria, 
it does not enable a public health response to be conducted in a timely manner. 
Recommendations and conclusion: While current AMR surveillance in Victoria successfully 
monitors long-term trends, it suffers from a lack of co-ordinated governance and oversight and 
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centralisation of data collection. Improvements in the dissemination of surveillance data, 
timeliness of data sharing, and reporting would greatly improve the public health impact of AMR 
surveillance in Victoria. Key recommendations include the development of a Victorian AMR 
surveillance strategy, with clear documentation of surveillance processes and prioritisations, 
and the implementation of regular, timely and useful reporting to relevant stakeholders.
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3. Introduction
3.1 What is AMR? 
AMR is defined as reduced effectiveness of antimicrobials against microbial organisms (1). The 
terms AMR and antibiotic resistance are often used interchangeably. As this chapter focuses 
exclusively on bacteria, the term AMR will be used to refer to antibiotic resistance, the resistance 
of bacteria to antibiotics.  
Antibiotics target specific components of bacterial cells and are grouped into classes based on 
the mechanism of action, such as inhibition of cell wall production (e.g. penicillin), protein 
production (e.g. tetracyclines) and DNA production (e.g. fluoroquinolones) (2). Many bacteria 
have intrinsic or natural AMR. Intrinsic AMR may occur as a result of the bacteria not possessing 
a specific cellular target, the antimicrobial not being able to access the cellular target, or due to 
the bacteria’s production of enzymes which inactivate the antimicrobial, such as beta-lactamase 
which inactivates penicillin (1, 3). Such enzymes are often encoded by plasmids, which are 
circular pieces of DNA located in the cell cytoplasm, and are able to be transmitted between 
bacteria (4, 5).  
In addition to intrinsic AMR, bacteria can acquire resistance mechanisms through genetic 
mutations or the transfer of resistance genes from other organisms (6). All humans carry normal 
or commensal gut flora, which can acquire genes conferring AMR. Bacteria with acquired 
resistance have a selective advantage over bacteria susceptible to a particular antibiotic (5, 7). 
Excessive and indiscriminate use of antimicrobials acts as a selection pressure for bacteria, 
enabling bacteria with resistance to survive in preference to susceptible bacteria, contributing 
to increasing prevalence of AMR (5, 7). 
3.2 The spread of AMR 
In addition to transferring resistance genes to other organisms, resistant bacteria can spread 
between infected or colonised people, both within the community and healthcare facility setting 
(8). Within healthcare facilities, infections can spread directly between patients, via contact with 
health-care workers or other people, and indirectly through contaminated environmental 
surfaces including medical equipment and hospital furniture (8). In contrast, in the community, 
transmission of resistant bacteria often occurs through faecal-oral or airborne transmission and 
via sexual contact (3). Close relationships between humans and animals provide another 
potential pathway for the transmission of resistance mechanisms or resistant organisms and 
transmission of resistance may occur through food derived from animals (9, 10). Resistant 
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bacteria within humans and animals can also be excreted into the environment and enter 
waterways via the sewage system (11). 
International travel, particularly that to and from Asia and India, is associated with an increased 
risk of becoming colonised by an antibiotic resistant bacteria, especially when  individuals have 
been hospitalised overseas (4). With the increasing frequency and availability of international 
travel and trade, the likelihood of resistant organisms being transferred across borders has 
increased (12). In addition, as Australia is located in close proximity to many countries with less 
strict antimicrobial prescribing practices and regulations, it is increasingly at risk of cross-border 
transmission of multi-resistant organisms (13).  
3.3    Public health importance of AMR 
It is estimated that antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections cause at least 700,000 deaths 
annually, which may increase to 10 million deaths by the year 2050 (7). No new antimicrobial 
classes have been developed since the 1980s, therefore action must ensure that the available 
antimicrobials remain effective (12).  
The World Health Organization states that we may move into a “post-antibiotic era” if we do 
not take action to prevent increasing levels of AMR, as modern medicine heavily relies on the 
use of antimicrobials to treat infectious diseases (7, 12). Infections caused by organisms with 
AMR are more difficult to treat successfully and are associated with increased morbidity and 
mortality (12, 14). Furthermore, the availability and success of chemotherapy and complex 
surgical procedures is dependent on the use of antimicrobials to treat infections which may arise 
from these treatments (5, 7). Increasing AMR is also associated with higher healthcare costs due 
to the requirement for newer antimicrobials, increased treatment durations and longer stays in 
hospital, as well as increased workloads within the healthcare system (14). 
3.4 Surveillance of AMR 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines surveillance as “the ongoing, systematic 
collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data regarding a health-related event 
for use in public health action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health” (15). 
The surveillance of AMR relies on the results of AST which is conducted by microbiology 
laboratories. Common testing techniques for bacteria include automated broth microdilution, 
such as Vitek, disc diffusion and E tests (Appendix 1) (1). These tests produce a minimum 
Chapter III: Surveillance of AMR in Victoria 
53 
inhibitory concentration (MIC), which is the concentration of the level of antimicrobial required 
to inhibit the growth of the bacteria being tested (1).  
The results of AST are interpreted using guidelines which are published by organisations such as 
the US Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) and the European Committee on 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST), which are the two major standards used globally 
(1). These guidelines define the clinical breakpoints for each organism and antimicrobial 
combination, which are the levels of MICs defined as susceptible, intermediate and resistant (1). 
Surveillance is required to determine the prevalence of AMR, identify the emergence of new 
resistance patterns, assess changes in AMR, identify outbreaks, and to inform the most 
appropriate control actions (13). The results of AMR surveillance can also inform antimicrobial 
stewardship within jurisdictions (13). Antimicrobial stewardship programs, both within hospitals 
and the community, seek to reduce indiscriminate prescribing of broad-spectrum antimicrobials 
by practitioners, and to ensure appropriate antimicrobials are used to treat infections (5).  
Several countries have well developed surveillance systems for AMR. For example, the European 
Centre for Disease Control has coordinated the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network since 2005, which conducts AMR surveillance spanning multiple European countries. 
The Danish Integrated Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Research Programme has 
conducted continuous monitoring of AMR and antimicrobial use in animals, food and humans 
since 1995, with the program resulting in decreased levels of AMR (16).  
In Australia, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care has implemented 
the national Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Australia and National Critical Antimicrobial 
Resistance Alert (CARAlert) surveillance systems. These systems are successful in monitoring 
national AMR trends, in combination with antimicrobial use, however do not enable a timely 
response to emerging AMR or outbreaks.  
3.5 Aims of the evaluation 
The aim of this evaluation was to identify ways in which existing AMR surveillance activities, 
coordination and governance of AMR surveillance in Victoria could be improved, in order to 
inform the implementation of an AMR surveillance and response unit within the DHHS. 
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3.6 Scope of the evaluation 
The systems evaluated in this chapter were assessed in terms of AMR surveillance only, although 
many of these systems monitor other components such as serotype prevalence and 
antimicrobial use. While surveillance of antimicrobial use, in combination with surveillance of 
AMR, is an essential component of the public health response to AMR, an evaluation of this 
aspect of surveillance was beyond the scope of this project (3). While a one health approach to 
AMR surveillance, incorporating human, animal, food and environmental isolates, is essential, 
evaluation of this aspect of surveillance was also considered beyond the scope of this project 
(9). 
AMR surveillance is important for many organisms, however this evaluation focussed only on 
those in Table 1. Organisms considered were those that are notifiable in Victoria, with existing 
or emerging AMR of clinical and public health importance, and those included in the CARAlert 
system (Table 1). A distinction is made between notifiable and non-notifiable health-care 
acquired organisms as the legislative power for follow up of cases by the DHHS differs. The DHHS 
routinely follows up AMR within notifiable diseases within healthcare facilities, however cannot 
follow up non-notifiable diseases unless they are deemed reportable under the Victorian Public 
Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. For example, while carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales 
(CPE) is not notifiable in Victoria, reporting of all cases to the DHHS is performed according to 
the Victorian guideline on CPE for Health Services. At the time of writing, the regulations of the 
Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 were under review. New regulations mean that 
additional organisms will become notifiable as of 2020, including: CPE, Carbapenemase-
producing Pseudomonas sp. and Acinetobacter sp., vanA vancomycin-resistant enterococci, and 
Candida auris.  
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Table 1. Organisms considered in the evaluation
Organism 
Notifiable pathogen1 National Critical Antimicrobial Resistance Alert Surveillance System 
(CARAlert)  
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales Will be notifiable as of 2020 Yes 
Enterococcus spp. vanA vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci  will be notifiable as of 
2020 
Yes 
Haemophilus influenzae type b Yes Not included in the CARAlert system 
Invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae Yes Not included in the CARAlert system 
Neisseria gonorrhoeae Yes Yes 
Neisseria meningitides Yes Not included in the CARAlert system 
Salmonella spp. Yes Yes 
Shigella spp. Yes Yes 
Streptococcus pyogenes May become notifiable in future Yes 
1 Notifiable diseases are those that are mandated to be reported to the DHHS under the regulations of the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 
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3.7 Evaluation objectives 
The objectives of this evaluation were to: 
• Describe current surveillance activities for AMR in Victoria, and national activities to
which Victoria contributes;
• Evaluate selected attributes of AMR surveillance in Victoria; and
• Identify possible areas for improvement of surveillance of AMR in Victoria, given
available resources
4. Methods
This evaluation was conducted using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Updated 
Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems (15) as a guide. A framework for 
evaluation of AMR surveillance in Victoria was developed using the relevant attributes. 
Surveillance systems for the evaluation were identified in consultation with the DHHS Principal 
Epidemiologist for AMR and WGS, and through review of AMR surveillance annual reports. 
Stakeholders for consultation were identified through interviews with staff at MDU and the 
DHHS (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Stakeholders and contribution to the evaluation of AMR surveillance in Victoria 
Organisation Stakeholder or Informant Contribution to the evaluation 
The Australian 
Group for 
Antimicrobial 
Resistance 
Chairperson and scientific officer Discussion of experiences setting up AMR 
surveillance and coordinating data collection 
MDU Epidemiologists (surveillance coordinators of the Victorian Hospital 
Pathogen Surveillance Scheme, National Enteric Pathogen Surveillance 
Scheme, Victorian CPE Surveillance and Response Unit) 
Discussion of the function and experiences of 
existing systems coordinated within MDU 
Laboratory managers Discussion of the details of AST, data sharing 
between DHHS and MDU, and contributions to 
existing systems 
Victorian diagnostic 
laboratories 
Senior scientists 
Clinical microbiologists 
Discussion of experiences of existing 
surveillance systems for AMR, providing details 
on data sharing processes and AST 
DHHS Principal Epidemiologist for AMR and WGS Formulation of objectives for AMR surveillance, 
discussion of experiences of existing systems 
Partner Notification Officer manager Discussion of existing follow up procedures 
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Selected attributes reviewed were simplicity, data quality, acceptability, representativeness, 
timeliness and usefulness. Stability, sensitivity, flexibility and positive predictive value were not 
evaluated. Stability and flexibility were not considered to be relevant to the aims of the 
evaluation and positive predictive value and sensitivity are not possible to evaluate within the 
context of this project. The attributes were evaluated via document review of surveillance 
protocols, interviews with MDU epidemiologists and laboratory staff, and where available, 
coordinators of surveillance systems (Table 3). Assessment of the data structure of each 
surveillance system was not performed as part of this evaluation.  
As key stakeholders, Victorian diagnostic laboratories contributed to this review. As there are 
more than 20 diagnostic laboratories in Victoria, the decision was made to consult with a single 
representative from each organisation (n=12). Senior staff at diagnostic laboratories were given 
the option to discuss their experiences of AMR surveillance in-person or by telephone interview, 
or by completion of a questionnaire. Due to stakeholder time constraints, six laboratories 
elected to complete a written questionnaire.  
4.1 Ethics approval 
A waiver of consent under the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee 
protocol 2017/909 covered this study.  
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Table 3. Data sources for evaluation and attributes assessed for each AMR surveillance system to which Victorian laboratories contribute 
Interview with 
surveillance 
coordinator 
Interview with 
laboratories 
Document 
review 
Attributes evaluated 
Surveillance system 
Sim
p
licity 
D
ata q
u
ality 
A
cce
p
tab
ility 
R
e
p
re
se
n
tativen
e
ss 
Tim
e
lin
e
ss 
U
se
fu
ln
e
ss 
Australian Group on 
Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Australian Passive AMR 
Surveillance System (APAS) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Antimicrobial Use and Resistance 
Australia (AURA) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
National Alert System for Critical 
Antimicrobial Resistances 
(CARAlert) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
National Enteric Pathogen 
Surveillance Scheme (NEPSS) 
✓ ✓
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National Neisseria Network 
(NNN) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
National Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System (NNDSS) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Victorian AMR unit ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Victorian Hospital Pathogen 
Surveillance System (VHPSS) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Victorian Health Care Acquired 
Pathogen Surveillance System 
(VICNISS) 
✓ ✓
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5. Results
5.1  Description of surveillance activities 
In total, there are 10 surveillance systems to which Victorian laboratories contribute (Table 4). 
Of these systems, four are coordinated in Victoria: the National Enteric Pathogen Surveillance 
system (NEPSS), the Victorian AMR unit (including the Victorian Tuberculosis Programme and 
the Victorian CPE Surveillance and Response Unit (VCRSU)), the Victorian Hospital Pathogen 
Surveillance Scheme (VHPSS), and the Victorian Health-Care Associated Infection Surveillance 
System (VICNISS). Six of the 10 surveillance systems are coordinated nationally: the Australian 
Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR), the Australian Passive AMR Surveillance System 
(APAS), Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Australia (AURA), the National Alert System for Critical 
Antimicrobial Resistances (CARAlert), the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
(NNDSS), and the National Neisseria Network (NNN).  
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Table 4. Organisms included in AMR surveillance systems2 
2 The NNDSS, which collates notifications of disease from all jurisdictional health departments, is in 
the process of developing data specifications for the surveillance of AMR for gonorrhoea, to 
commence later in 2019 
3 Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales 
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CPE3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Enterococcus 
spp. 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
H. influenzae
type b
✓ ✓ ✓
Invasive 
S.pneumoniae
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
M. 
tuberculosis 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N. gonorrhoea ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N. 
meningitides 
✓ ✓ ✓
Salmonella sp. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Shigella sp. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
S. aureus ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
S. pyogenes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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5.1.1 AGAR 
AGAR has conducted surveillance of AMR since 1985, initially focusing on S. aureus (17). The 
focus of surveillance has evolved, and AGAR currently conducts national laboratory-based 
surveillance of AMR within blood-stream infections. Funded by the Australian Commission for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, surveillance currently focuses on three surveys (Table 5). In 
Victoria, only five large laboratories based within healthcare facilities contribute to AGAR. 
Participating laboratories submit data to AGAR via a web portal and send isolates for typing to 
laboratories based in Western Australia and South Australia. 
Table 5. AGAR surveillance programs (18-20) 
Surveillance Program Organisms Focus of surveillance 
Australian Enterococcal Sepsis 
Outcome Programme 
Enterococcus spp. Ampicillin and glycopeptide 
resistance 
molecular epidemiology 
Australian Staphylococcal Sepsis 
Outcome Programme 
S. aureus Methicillin resistance 
Molecular epidemiology of 
methicillin resistant S. aureus 
Gram-Negative Sepsis Outcome 
Programme 
Enterobacterales 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Acinetobacter spp. 
Multi-drug resistance 
Emerging resistance to 
carbapenems and colistin 
Molecular epidemiology 
5.1.2 APAS 
APAS was established in 2015 by the Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Health 
Care, supported by Queensland Health (21). APAS is a national sentinel surveillance system for 
AMR. APAS uses a data cube which accepts data extractions from laboratory information 
systems. Once a laboratory is set up with the system, they can access the data cube to prepare 
reports and antibiograms, which are profiles of AST results used to contribute to improved 
antimicrobial stewardship within healthcare facilities. In Victoria, only one laboratory based at 
Monash Health currently contributes to APAS. 
5.1.3 AURA 
AURA was established in 2014 by the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health 
Care (22). AURA was implemented to conduct surveillance of AMR and antimicrobial use at the 
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national level (23). Surveillance focuses on a defined set of priority organisms with data collated 
from several different sources (Table 6). 
Table 6. AURA data sources (22) 
Organism Data source 
Carbapenemase-resistant Enterobacterales AGAR, APAS, CARAlert 
Enterococcus spp. AGAR, APAS, CARAlert 
H. influenzae type b APAS 
M. tuberculosis CARAlert, NNDSS 
N. gonorrhoeae CARAlert, NNN 
N. meningitides NNN 
Salmonella spp. AGAR, APAS, CARAlert 
Shigella spp. AGAR, APAS, CARAlert 
S. aureus AGAR, APAS, CARAlert 
S. pneumoniae APAS 
S. pyogenes APAS, CARAlert 
5.1.4 CARAlert 
CARAlert was also established in 2016 by the Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare for the early detection of organisms with critical antimicrobial resistance (CAR) 
patterns (Table 7) (24). CAR isolates are those with mechanisms or antimicrobial susceptibility 
patterns which pose a significant threat to the use of last-line antimicrobials (25).  
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Table 7. CARAlert isolates and definitions 
Organism CARAlert definition 
Carbapenemase-
producing 
Enterobacterales 
Enterobacterales with confirmed carbapenemase resistance 
genes and/or ribosomal methylase producing species 
(confirmed 16s rRNA methylase genes) 
WGS is required to identify the full set of resistance genes (24) 
Enterococcus spp. Linezolid non-susceptible 
M. tuberculosis Multi-drug resistant (MDR) – resistant to rifampicin and 
isoniazid 
N. gonorrhoeae Ceftriaxone non-susceptible, and/or azithromycin resistant 
Salmonella spp. Ceftriaxone non-susceptible 
Shigella spp. MDR strains – Resistant to three or more of ampicillin, 
ciprofloxacin, co-trimoxazole, ceftriaxone/cefotaxime  
S. aureus Vancomycin non-susceptible or vanA gene detected, 
daptomycin non-susceptible or linezolid non-susceptible 
S. pyogenes Reduced penicillin susceptibility 
Additional organisms added to the CARAlert system, July 2019 
Acinetobacter baumanni 
complex 
Carbapenemase-producing 
Candida auris All isolates 
Enterobacterales Transmissible colistin resistance 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Carbapenemase-producing 
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Under the CARAlert system, all diagnostic laboratories in Australia submit suspect isolates and 
initial test results to a confirming laboratory which submits isolate data to the CARAlert 
webportal. The confirming lab is responsible for advising the referring laboratory of the results 
of the isolate, and the referring laboratory reports the results to the requesting doctor. In 
Victoria, MDU confirms the majority of Victorian CARAlert isolates including vancomycin 
intermediate-susceptible S. aureus, CPE, linezolid non-susceptible Enterococcus spp., and 
linezolid non-susceptible S. aureus and N. gonorrhoea. The Australian Mycobacterium Reference 
Laboratory (AMRL) at the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory conducts 
confirmatory testing for M. tuberculosis. There is only one other laboratory currently known to 
conduct any other confirmatory testing, based at Monash Health. Monash Health is only able to 
confirm vancomycin-intermediate susceptible S. aureus. 
5.1.5 NEPSS 
NEPSS was established in 1980 to monitor human and non-human gastrointestinal pathogens in 
Australia (26). While NEPSS was originally a national system, it became a mostly Victorian 
database in the early 2000s. NEPSS is coordinated by MDU. Any gastrointestinal pathogens can 
be included in the system.  
Based on information from MDU Epidemiology, NEPSS is no longer actively used as a surveillance 
system. NEPSS currently functions as a repository for human, food, animal and environmental 
gastrointestinal isolates and is a longstanding database of typing and AST data.  As the MDU 
Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) does not currently enable searching to be 
performed by test result, NEPSS is used to check certain aspects of metadata associated with an 
isolate, for example, the specific Salmonella serotypes previously isolated from animals.  
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5.1.6 NNDSS 
The NNDSS was established in 1990 by the Communicable Diseases Network Australia to 
coordinate national surveillance of notifiable diseases and is coordinated by the Australian 
Government Department of Health (27). The NNDSS compiles data on notifiable conditions from 
states and territories. The DHHS submits defined datasets to the NNDSS at regular intervals. At 
the time of writing, the only organisms with data for AMR within the NNDSS were S. pneumoniae 
(invasive disease only) and M. tuberculosis. In late 2019, AST data for N. gonorrhoeae will 
commence collection by the NNDSS. 
5.1.7 NNN 
The NNN commenced in 1979 in order to establish a standardised method of AST for N. 
gonorrhoea (28). The NNN is coordinated by the Neisseria Reference Laboratory based in New 
South Wales (NSW), comprising the Australian Gonococcal Surveillance Programme and the 
Australian Meningococcal Surveillance Programme. These programmes include monitoring of 
trends in AMR of N. gonorrhoeae and N. meningitidis. All Victorian AST is conducted by MDU, 
with data sent to the coordinating centre in NSW on a quarterly basis. 
5.1.8 Victorian AMR unit 
The Victorian AMR unit was established in 2019 by the DHHS in order to improve the 
coordination of AMR surveillance in Victoria. All notifiable diseases are reported to the DHHS by 
clinicians and/or laboratories. Incorporated into the surveillance of notifiable diseases, the 
DHHS has developed AMR surveillance for several notifiable organisms: N. gonorrhoeae, Shigella 
spp., Salmonella spp., M. tuberculosis and CPE. Surveillance of M. tuberculosis AMR falls under 
the Victorian Tuberculosis Programme and CPE surveillance is conducted as part of the Victorian 
CPE Surveillance and Response Unit (VCRSU). Surveillance of AMR within N. gonorrhoeae, 
Shigella spp. and Salmonella spp. is conducted in association with MDU. 
Victorian Tuberculosis Programme 
AMR surveillance is particularly important for tuberculosis (TB), as MDR isolates have high public 
health importance due to their need for extended treatment (up to two years), the risk of 
forward transmission, their association with treatment compliance issues and high treatment 
costs (29). Melbourne Health, based at the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, 
runs the Victorian TB programme, which has conducted TB surveillance since 2001. While 
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notifications are received by the DHHS, all case management, contact tracing and screening is 
conducted by Melbourne Health. The AMRL conducts all AST for TB.  
VCRSU 
CPE are bacteria of the family Enterobacterales that are identified as carrying a carbapenemase 
gene, which confers resistance to carbapenem antibiotics (30). The VCRSU was formed in 
response to a CPE outbreak in 2014 (30). The unit comprises the DHHS, MDU, and VICNISS. The 
aims of the unit are to detect all cases of CPE and transmission within and between healthcare 
facilities and to guide the management of outbreaks (30).  
AMR surveillance conducted by MDU 
The DHHS funds the public health laboratory work of MDU, the state’s bacterial reference 
laboratory. Notifiable isolates are routinely sent to MDU for further typing. MDU conducts AST 
for selected notifiable organisms including N. gonorrhoeae, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp. and 
N. meningitides, and for several health-care acquired organisms including Enterobacterales,
Enterococcus spp. and S. aureus. MDU provides the AST results for Shigella spp., Salmonella spp. 
and N. gonorrhoeae to the DHHS. MDU does not perform AST for all organisms it receives. For 
example, while MDU receives every isolate of S. pneumoniae for serotyping, AST is not routinely 
performed. 
In addition to routine AST, MDU conducts cross-sectional studies of specific organisms in 
response to increasing numbers of cases of AMR. These snapshots are not currently performed 
on a scheduled basis. Previous studies by MDU have looked at CPE (2012), Clostridium difficile 
(2010 and 2012), vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (2015 and 2018) and levels of AMR within 
cases of invasive pneumococcal disease (2013 and 2015) (31-34). 
5.1.9 VHPSS 
Coordinated within MDU, the VHPSS was established in 1988 (26). The VHPSS monitors the 
prevalence and type of bacterial and fungal infections, and AMR, in blood and cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF) specimens within Victorian healthcare facilities and the community. Data are 
submitted to MDU by diagnostic laboratories in one of two ways. Firstly, laboratories that have 
decided to actively participate in this system submit data to the VHPSS directly. Secondly, for 
laboratories that have not decided to actively contribute to the VHPSS, MDU extracts relevant 
data from LIMS where notifiable pathogens have been submitted for subtyping, and enters them 
into the VHPSS.  
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5.1.10 VICNISS 
VICNISS was established in 2002 to conduct surveillance of healthcare-associated infections in 
order to reduce the occurrence of these infections in Victorian healthcare facilities (35). VICNISS 
reports on organism types and counts, including vancomycin-resistant enterococci and 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus, however does not include any AST data. The organisation plays a 
key role in the response to CPE in Victoria, as part of the VCRSU. 
5.2  Evaluation of attributes 
In this section, the attributes of surveillance in terms of overall AMR surveillance in Victoria are 
described. As no overall AMR surveillance system is currently in operation in Victoria, this 
evaluation focussed on the attributes of the combined systems that produce data on AMR. The 
attributes have been assessed via discussions with stakeholders and reference to available 
documentation. Eight diagnostic laboratories completed an online survey and an additional 
three participated in semi-structured interviews. Of those that completed the survey, one 
laboratory also participated in a semi-structured telephone interview.  
5.2.1 Simplicity 
Simplicity is defined as the structure and ease of operation of a surveillance system (15). The 
surveillance of AMR in Victoria is complex, with multiple systems involved at the state and 
national level. Simplicity of AMR surveillance in Victoria is therefore discussed under the 
following subheadings: objectives of surveillance, reporting sources and dataflow, case 
definitions, data submission, case follow up, and reporting. 
Objectives of AMR surveillance in Victoria 
The objectives of AMR surveillance vary between the surveillance systems (Table 8). For 
example, while AGAR has very specific objectives for monitoring trends of AMR within a subset 
of organisms, the Victorian AMR unit and CARAlert monitor trends but also aim to identify 
transmission or outbreaks of isolates with AMR. Several systems which collect AMR data do not 
have specific objectives in relation to the surveillance of AMR. 
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Table 8. Objectives of AMR surveillance systems in Victoria 
Surveillance system Objectives 
AGAR • Gram Negative Sepsis Outcome Programme: monitor AMR in Enterobacterales, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Acinetobacter
spp., detect emerging resistance to last-line antimicrobials, determine the prevalence of co-resistance and multi-drug
resistance, examine the molecular basis of resistance to third generation cephalosporins, quinolones and carbapenems (20)
• Australian Staphylococcal Sepsis Outcome Programme: to assess the prevalence of staphylococcal isolates with methicillin
resistance, in addition to assessing the molecular epidemiology of methicillin-resistant S. aureus (19)
• Australian Enterococcal Sepsis Outcome programme: determine the proportion of Enterococcus faecium and E. faecalis
bacteraemia isolates with resistance to ampicillin and glycopeptides, in addition to monitoring the molecular epidemiology of
these species (36)
APAS • To enable analysis and reporting of AMR data at a local, state and national level. This enables clinicians and policy makers to
access AMR data to inform public health action
AURA • To improve the integration of AMR data to inform control strategies at the national level (22)
CARAlert • Early detection of organisms with critical AMR patterns (24)
• To assist health departments in the identification of outbreaks of CAR isolates (25)
NEPSS • Monitoring human and non-human gastrointestinal pathogens in Australia
NNN • Australian Gonococcal Surveillance Programme: to monitor trends in AMR within N. gonorrhoeae at a national level, and to
provide the data required to ensure that treatment protocols for gonorrhoea are kept up to date (37)
• The objective of the Australian Meningococcal Surveillance Programme does not appear to be documented in annual reports
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Victorian AMR unit • Monitor trends in AMR
• Guide response activities to prevent ongoing transmission
• Detect outbreaks and monitor the impact of response measures
VHPSS • Monitor bacterial and fungal infections and their levels of AMR in blood and CSF specimens within Victorian healthcare facilities
and the community
VICNISS • Reduction of the occurrence of health-associated infections in Victorian healthcare facilities (35)
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Reporting sources and data flow 
Reporting sources for AMR range from notifiable disease reports to voluntary laboratory 
reporting (Table 9). Unless a high proportion of laboratory participation is achieved, surveillance 
systems relying on voluntary reporting underestimate the true number of cases with AMR. In 
contrast, while reporting of notifiable diseases to the DHHS is mandatory, reports do not 
necessarily include data on AST.  
Only two diagnostic laboratories indicated that they currently provide all AST results to the 
DHHS. Most laboratories provide AST results only for pathogens where the DHHS has requested 
them, results which vary by organism or only provide clinically relevant AST results. To achieve 
useful surveillance of AMR for an organism, all AST results, including both susceptible and 
resistant breakpoint findings and MIC values, should be obtained from diagnostic laboratories 
which contribute to surveillance. In addition, the guidelines used to interpret MIC values as 
susceptible or resistant should be obtained from diagnostic laboratories. This enables the 
proportion of resistance or non-susceptibility to be assessed as a proportion of isolates tested.  
When asked about why they do not provide complete AST results with notifiable disease reports, 
most laboratories indicated they did not know that the DHHS is interested in these data. One 
laboratory assumed that anything sent to MDU is provided onwards to the DHHS. Several 
laboratories incorrectly assume that VHPSS data are forwarded onto the DHHS and the national 
surveillance system, AURA.  
Chapter III: Surveillance of AMR in Victoria  
73 
Table 9. Reporting sources of Victorian AMR surveillance systems 
Surveillance 
system 
Reporting sources in Victoria 
AGAR Five Victorian hospital laboratories — Alfred Health, Austin Health, 
Monash Health, Royal Children’s Hospital and St Vincent’s Hospital 
APAS One hospital laboratory (Monash Health) 
AURA Collates data from multiple surveillance systems (Figure 1) 
CARAlert All diagnostic laboratories refer samples to reference or confirming 
laboratories (MDU, AMRL, and Monash Health) 
Confirming laboratories submit data to CARAlert 
NEPSS Samples from Victorian diagnostic laboratories submitted to MDU 
NNDSS S. pneumoniae AST data sourced from Victorian diagnostic
laboratories (not necessarily provided to the DHHS)
M. tuberculosis AST data sourced from AMRL
NNN MDU 
Victorian AMR unit MDU provides AST data for Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., N. 
gonorrhoea and CPE 
AMRL provides AST data for M. tuberculosis 
VHPSS Seven hospital laboratories, one private laboratory contribute directly 
Other notifiable isolate laboratory data is extracted from MDU LIMS 
VICNISS All public hospitals (selected private hospitals) 
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The current data flow for AMR surveillance is summarised in Figure 1. While the Victorian AMR 
unit is best placed to conduct public health follow up for AMR surveillance data, it does not 
currently receive all relevant data. For example, AMR data on selected pathogens causing 
bacteraemia are submitted by selected hospital laboratories to AGAR, and this information is 
not received by the DHHS. While the VHPSS is a valuable source of AMR data for several 
organisms, data are not currently provided to the Victorian AMR unit or forwarded onto AURA. 
MDU reports relevant isolates to the CARAlert system, which provides regular data summaries 
to the DHHS. These summaries do not include the specific healthcare origin of isolates, making 
it difficult for the DHHS to identify outbreaks using CARAlert data. 
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Figure 1. Pathway of AMR data movement in Victoria by reporting source and organism, 20194
4 AMRL: Australian Mycobacterial References Laboratory, AGAR: The Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, APAS: Australian Passive Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance, AURA: Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Australia, CARAlert: National Alert System for Critical Antimicrobial Resistances, MDU: Microbiological Diagnostic 
Unit Public Health Laboratory, NNDSS: National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, NNN: National Neisseria Network, RCH: Royal Children’s Hospital, DHHS: 
Department of Health and Human Services, VHPSS: Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme 
AURA priority organisms  
All blood and CSF organisms 
Neisseria meningitides & N.gonorrhoeae 
Salmonella spp., shigella spp., N. gonorrhoeae, 
Enterobacterales  
CARAlert organisms  
Vancomycin intermediate susceptible S.aureus 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
M.tuberculosis & Streptococcus pneumoniae
Enterococcus spp., Staphylococcus aureus, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Enterobacterales, 
Acinetobacter spp. 
Notifiable pathogens and CPE 
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Case definitions 
The complexity of AMR surveillance is increased by a lack of consistency of case definitions of 
AMR for specific organisms between surveillance systems (Appendix 2). Systems differ in 
whether AMR is defined by diagnostic laboratories or reference laboratories, as well as whether 
MICs are interpreted as susceptible, intermediate/non-susceptible or resistant using EUCAST, 
CLSI, or other guidelines. While MIC values can theoretically be converted between EUCAST or 
CLSI guidelines, the clinical breakpoints are not consistent for all antimicrobials and therefore 
AST results are not necessarily comparable if interpreted using different guidelines (38-40). 
Possible solutions to this are that any potential differences between guidelines are evaluated 
for organism-antimicrobial combinations, or that all laboratories contributing to AMR 
surveillance for an organism use the same guidelines.  
In addition, systems are inconsistent with definitions of duplicate isolates. Duplicate definitions 
are important as often multiple isolates are submitted for the same patient. For example, while 
the VCRSU includes a single isolate of CPE (for each resistant gene and subtype) for each patient, 
the CARAlert system uses a reinfection period of three months (24). In contrast, the VHPSS and 
AGAR, which also include CPE in surveillance, allow repeat isolates from patients if they have 
been collected more than 14 days apart.  
Occasionally different AST patterns may be identified within a single patient. This is particularly 
relevant for AMR surveillance of N. gonorrhoeae as isolates with different AST may be originate 
from a pharyngeal and a rectal sample. In Victoria there is currently no clear or documented 
definition regarding which isolates should be prioritised where there are multiple isolates from 
the same patient. Clear case definitions for AMR will improve the simplicity and the usefulness 
of the surveillance of AMR within gonorrhoea. Suggested definitions for N. gonorrhoea are 
provided in Appendix 3. 
Data submission 
Data submission methods used by AMR surveillance systems vary. Methods include manual data 
entry, completion of hardcopy forms and upload of an Excel spreadsheet (Appendix 4). 
Currently, different laboratory IT systems across all public hospitals are a major barrier to 
integrated AMR surveillance. As IT systems are not readily changeable, several laboratories 
expressed a preference for providing AST data extracted directly from Vitek into an Excel 
spreadsheet. Alternatively, several laboratories indicated that upload of a spreadsheet 
containing relevant data would be feasible, as this appears to be the most convenient method 
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of data transfer. While Vitek extracts only contain AST results, these can be linked with other 
notification data using the laboratory submission number.  
Many diagnostic laboratories indicated that current data submission methods to various 
surveillance systems are challenging. I was responsible for entering CARAlert data at MDU for a 
large part of 2019. In my experience, manual data entry of CARAlert isolates was a time-
consuming process. Systems such as AGAR collect a large amount of patient data in order to 
examine the factors associated with AMR, which tends to increase the burden on contributing 
laboratories. 
Most laboratories indicated that they cannot cope with any additional workload involved in 
contributing to AMR surveillance, as they lack the required resources. Within this context, it is 
important to work with laboratories to determine the best method of data submission for AMR 
surveillance. The implementation of electronic submission of AMR data would assist 
laboratories in participating in additional surveillance activities.  
The current process of manual data entry at the DHHS will be upgraded to electronic laboratory 
reporting, initially for four major Victorian laboratories, within the first half of 2020. This will 
greatly simplify the process of surveillance for AMR. Once implementation of electronic 
laboratory reporting is completed for the major laboratories, it will be expanded to include all 
diagnostic laboratories. Electronic laboratory reporting will eventually enable AST results from 
all laboratories to be transmitted directly into the DHHS PHESS. 
Case follow up 
The level of case follow-up based on AMR surveillance varies with the organism being reported. 
The Victorian AMR unit is currently the only AMR surveillance system able to conduct public 
health case follow up based on surveillance findings. Existing follow up processes are 
summarised in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Processes for the follow up of AMR cases by the Victorian AMR unit 
Organism Method of follow up Staff responsible for 
case follow up 
Purpose of follow up Laboratory follow up Data stored 
CPE Phone call VICNISS obtains 
information in 
conjunction with 
healthcare facility’s 
Infection Control 
Practitioner 
Obtain detailed epidemiological 
data, including hospitalisation 
history, travel history, ward 
movements 
Informs epidemiological analysis 
to determine if case is locally 
acquired (as opposed to acquired 
overseas) 
WGS on all isolates to 
identify resistance genes 
and multi-locus sequence 
types 
MDU Epidemiologists 
combine patient data with 
phylogenetic analyses to 
identify clusters and 
transmission pathways 
All patient data stored 
in PHESS, TRA 
information stored on 
VICNISS portal 
(accessible by Infection 
Control Practitioners 
only) 
Doherty/DHHS Infection 
Control Practitioner 
Works with healthcare facility 
per specific guidelines indicating 
when they are no longer affected 
by CPE transmission 
Identification of transmission risk 
areas (TRA); an area (usually a 
ward) where CPE has been 
known to spread between 
patients (30) 
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M. 
tuberculosis 
Enhanced surveillance 
forms are completed for 
all cases of TB, enabling 
cases to be prioritised 
for follow up, phone call 
for priority cases 
Infection control/TB 
programme nurses at 
Melbourne Health 
Assess risk factors for 
transmission (e.g. travel history), 
whether case is new/relapse, 
current treatment, treatment 
outcome, ensure treatment 
compliance, contact tracing  
WGS enables identification 
of clusters 
PHESS 
N. 
gonorrhoea 
Enhanced surveillance 
form sent to treating 
doctor (all cases), phone 
call for cases with critical 
AMR 
Partner Notification 
Officers (specialised 
Public Health Officers 
based at the Melbourne 
Sexual Health Centre) 
Education of cases, contact 
tracing 
WGS on isolates with 
critical AMR to assist in 
identification of clusters 
PHESS 
Salmonella 
spp. 
Phone call for cases with 
critical AMR 
Public Health Officers Education of cases, obtain food 
history, contact tracing 
Ensure all isolates referred to 
MDU 
WGS on all Salmonella 
isolates as part of routine 
cluster identification 
PHESS 
Shigella spp. Smart forms for clinical 
notification provides 
some information and all 
cases are contacted via a 
phone call 
Public Health Officers Exclude cases who work in high 
risk areas such as food handling 
and health or childcare worker 
Education of cases, contact 
tracing, ensure all isolates 
referred to MDU 
WGS to detect 
transmission 
PHESS 
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Reporting 
Reports on AMR surveillance vary with each system (Table 11). While most systems produce 
annual reports, diagnostic laboratories indicate that more regular reporting is desirable. Some 
systems do not produce any regular reports on AMR surveillance data.  
Table 11. Reporting outcomes of AMR surveillance systems 
Surveillance system Reporting frequency and audience 
AGAR Annual reports published online, annual meetings with contributing 
laboratories 
APAS Contributing laboratory can extract data and create reports, annual 
reports published online 
AURA Annual reports published online 
CARAlert Annual reports and bi-monthly data updates published online, 
fortnightly data updates are provided to state health department 
representatives and selected diagnostic laboratories 
NEPSS No reporting conducted 
NNDSS Annual reports including AMR data planned but several years behind 
NNN Annual reports published online 
VHPSS No regular reports, provides data upon request to contributing 
laboratories or the DHHS 
Victorian AMR unit Internal reports within weekly surveillance meetings, defined 
datasets to the NNDSS at regular intervals 
TB: internal reports within weekly surveillance meetings, quarterly 
reports to the TB advisory council of Victoria, International reporting 
to the WHO for the global TB control report, de-identified data of all 
confirmed cases sent to NNDSS daily  
VCRSU: Regular internal reports at DHHS surveillance meetings; 
MDU publishes CPE antibiograms5 online 
VICNISS Annual reports published online, no AST data reported 
5 Antibiograms are tables of antimicrobial susceptibilities used to inform local antimicrobial 
prescribing 
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5.2.2 Data quality 
Data quality is defined as the completeness and validity of the data collected by the surveillance 
system (15). All Australian laboratories are accredited by the National Association of Testing 
Authorities and operate under the Quality Assurance Program of the Royal College of 
Pathologists Australia (24). While data from individual laboratories are of high quality, one of 
the complexities with the surveillance of AMR is the collection of standardised data. To collect 
standardised AMR data, ideally the same AST methodology needs to be used across surveillance 
systems, with clinical breakpoints interpreted using the same guidelines to identify susceptible 
or resistant organisms. Data quality for organisms with AST conducted by MDU is high as AST 
values have been produced using the same testing techniques, and interpreted using the same 
guidelines, for organisms over time, enabling the collection of standardised AMR data (Appendix 
5).  
Of the 11 diagnostic laboratories that participated in this evaluation, all indicated using similar 
AST methodologies including Vitek (n=11), disc diffusion (n=9) and E tests (n=9). Eight of eleven 
laboratories indicated using CLSI guidelines exclusively for clinical breakpoint interpretation. Of 
the remaining three laboratories, one uses both CLSI and Calibrated Dichotomous Susceptibility 
guidelines, another uses both CLSI and EUCAST, and one uses EUCAST guidelines exclusively. To 
determine the comparability of data in terms of AMR surveillance, additional detail on the 
testing method for each organism under surveillance is required. 
The level of standardisation of data by system is summarised in Table 12. Several systems source 
AMR data from diagnostic laboratories rather than reference laboratories and therefore are not 
able to collect standardised data as a range of AST techniques and clinical breakpoints have been 
used. 
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Table 12. Standardisation of data from AMR surveillance systems in Victoria 
Surveillance 
system 
Are AST data 
standardised? 
Data source/issues with standardisation 
AGAR Yes All laboratories use Vitek/Phoenix for AST, all 
laboratories use EUCAST guidelines to interpret clinical 
breakpoints 
APAS No Any laboratory can contribute AST data 
AURA No Sourced from AGAR, NNDSS, NNN, CARAlert, APAS 
CARAlert Yes Only reference laboratories can confirm the 
identification of a CARAlert isolate 
NEPSS Yes AST conducted by MDU 
NNDSS Yes M. tuberculosis: all testing performed by AMRL
No S. pneumoniae: Victorian data derived from clinical
laboratories using different testing techniques and
guidelines
NNN Yes MDU conducts all testing using AGSP and AMSP 
guidelines 
VHPSS No Many laboratories do not provide complete AST 
results, AST method is not always reported, and many 
laboratories only report a breakpoint interpretation 
and no MIC value 
Victorian AMR 
unit 
Dependent on 
organism 
Data from MDU and VIDRL standardised 
Data from diagnostic laboratories not standardised 
VICNISS No AST data Not applicable 
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5.2.3 Representativeness 
Representativeness is defined as how accurately the occurrence of the event is described over 
time by the surveillance system (15). The representativeness of AMR surveillance in Victoria 
varies with each system and the legal requirement for data submission (Table 13).  
Notifiable organisms are referred by diagnostic laboratories to MDU or AMRL for further typing 
including AST for some organisms. For notifiable organisms to be included in AMR surveillance, 
AST testing needs to be performed by the diagnostic or reference laboratory, and the results 
reported to the relevant surveillance system. For example, while invasive S. pneumoniae is 
notifiable, MDU does not currently perform AST for this organism. In contrast, MDU does 
perform AST for all Salmonella, Shigella and N. gonorrhoea isolates, and as the DHHS has 
requested that all AST results for these organisms are forwarded to the Epidemiologist for AMR, 
these organisms are well represented in surveillance conducted by the Victorian AMR unit.  
Non-notifiable healthcare acquired organisms that are not included in the CARAlert system are 
not well-represented in AMR surveillance in Victoria. AMR surveillance for these organisms is 
also affected by the specific AMR case definitions of each system conducting surveillance. For 
example, AGAR conducts sentinel surveillance of all bacteraemia isolates of vancomycin-
resistance Enterococcus spp., but only monitors a specific number of antimicrobials. 
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Table 13. Summary of representativeness of AMR surveillance in Victoria 
Surveillance system Mandatory or 
voluntary 
submission 
Specimen types Number of laboratories contributing 
AGAR  Voluntary Blood only Five large hospital-based laboratories only 
No private laboratories 
APAS Voluntary Any Only one Victorian laboratory based at a large urban hospital currently 
contributes 
AURA Voluntary Per individual systems Varies with species 
Laboratories contributing to AGAR, CARAlert, NNDSS, NNN 
CARAlert Voluntary Per case definitions All 
NEPSS Voluntary Any Unknown 
NNDSS Mandatory All cases that meet the 
case definition for 
All 
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notifiable diseases are 
reported to the NNDSS 
NNN Voluntary Per case definitions All 
Victorian AMR unit Mandatory for 
notifiable diseases, 
CPE and Candida 
auris  
All per case definitions All 
VHPSS Voluntary Blood and CSF only • Seven laboratories contribute directly to the VHPSS
• For notifiable pathogens referred to MDU for typing or other testing,
relevant data will be extracted from LIMs and entered into the VHPSS.
• Non-notifiable pathogens will not necessarily be referred to MDU and
are therefore only included in VHPSS if contributing laboratory
provides data
VICNISS Depends on 
surveillance type6 
Any No AST data collected  
6 All health services must participate in S. aureus bacteraemia and Clostridium difficile surveillance under the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 
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The representativeness of AMR surveillance is affected by several other factors which vary with 
the specific organism (Figure 2). For example, the representativeness of CPE surveillance is 
affected by the testing and screening practices of clinicians and healthcare facilities. Screening 
protocols are not standardised in Victoria, and as CPE may colonise a patient whilst causing no 
symptoms of illness, whether a screening test is performed will determine if a CPE case is 
reported to the VCRSU.   
Figure 2. Surveillance pyramid for AMR surveillance 
Another factor in the representativeness of AMR surveillance is whether an appropriate test is 
ordered on an appropriate specimen to enable AST. For example, phenotypic AST cannot be 
performed with nucleic acid amplification tests (NAAT) which may be used for diagnosis of 
bacterial pathogens. This is particularly relevant to N. gonorrhoea. In 2017, N. gonorrhoea 
isolates with AST performed represented only 31% of gonorrhoea cases notified in Victoria, as 
the majority of cases were diagnosed with NAATs (41). Previously, laboratories were only funded 
to perform a single diagnostic test to diagnose an organism. Consequently, many clinicians only 
requested NAAT. As of 2019, the implementation of reflexive culture under the Medicare 
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Benefits Schedule is expected to increase the representativeness of AST surveillance for 
notifiable pathogens, as laboratories will be funded to perform culture and sensitivity if these 
pathogens are confirmed by NAAT. This process will reduce the number of cases diagnosed only 
by NAAT and therefore increase the number of isolates able to be tested for phenotypic 
antimicrobial susceptibility.  
Within Victoria, the only laboratories contributing to AGAR are based within hospitals, and no 
private laboratories contribute. Therefore, AMR within the community is not well represented 
by AGAR. As a relatively small number of laboratories contribute to AGAR, which feeds data into 
the AURA system, Victorian AMR data, particularly data on AMR within the community are also 
underrepresented within the AURA system. Representativeness of Victoria AMR data could be 
improved by contributing to AURA via an existing surveillance system such as the VHPSS, or by 
providing additional AST data from MDU, with the consent of diagnostic laboratories.  
5.2.4 Timeliness 
Overall, AMR surveillance in Victoria lacks the timeliness required to effectively respond to 
emerging AMR and outbreaks. For example, for systems based within Victoria, the time between 
sample submission to MDU and reporting of AMR data to the DHHS ranges from two weeks to 
three months, depending on the organism (Appendix 5.). In order to identify and respond to 
cases of concern, optimal timeliness for an AMR surveillance system is real-time surveillance. 
Timeliness is affected by multiple factors including the time taken for samples to be submitted 
to the laboratory, the time taken for culture and AST to be completed, data entry, analysis, 
reporting and case follow-up. While real-time surveillance may not be achievable in the near 
future, the frequency of data provision and reporting needs to be increased.  
5.2.5 Acceptability 
Acceptability is the willingness of organisations to participate in the surveillance system (15). 
The current structure of AMR surveillance in Victoria does not appear to be acceptable for most 
diagnostic laboratories. As the surveillance of AMR is largely laboratory-based, a large part of 
the work burden falls on laboratory staff.  
Many laboratories reported that participation in AMR surveillance is time-consuming and 
resource intensive. Reported reasons for not participating in AMR surveillance were largely a 
lack of resources and time, represented by the following comment:  
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Realistic funding (is required) as scientists need to be taken off usual tasks to perform 
data collection, entry, and isolate retrieval. This is a significant opportunity cost. This is 
a luxury we are struggling to meet. 
In addition, several laboratories expressed concern about duplication of effort and additional 
AMR surveillance, represented by the following two comments: 
Currently (it) seems that there is duplication in that there are too many systems – it 
would be better to have one centralised system (ideally a national one). Multiple systems 
create an increased work burden for laboratories. 
(There is) concern about increasing the complexity of AMR surveillance would lead to 
strained relationships and reduced compliance of laboratories contributing data. 
To minimise duplication and additional workload for laboratories, it is important to define 
priorities for AMR surveillance, in terms of specific organism antimicrobial combinations and 
objectives. These priorities should be set based on consultations with laboratories and clinicians. 
Diagnostic laboratories were asked to comment on what other organisms should be prioritised 
for AMR surveillance, in addition to those already under surveillance. Many laboratories 
indicated organisms that are not currently a focus of routine AMR programs. These include 
Pseudomonas spp., Acinetobacter spp., Clostridium difficile, vancomycin-resistant Enterococci, 
quinolone and gentamicin resistance in Enterobacterales, and Extended Spectrum Beta-
Lactamases.   
In addition to developing surveillance priorities, surveillance activities should avoid creating 
unnecessary work for laboratories; contribution to surveillance should be as simple as possible. 
The minimum amount of required data should be requested, data submission should be simple, 
and data needs to be disseminated to relevant parties in a timely manner (42).  
In order to complete the cycle of surveillance, it is essential that regular feedback on AMR 
surveillance is provided. While laboratory liaison meetings, which both the DHHS and 
representatives from all diagnostic laboratories attend, are currently scheduled biannually, 
several AMR surveillance systems do not provide contributing laboratories with regular reports. 
When asked about future AMR surveillance and preferences for receiving reports, most 
diagnostic laboratories prefer the circulation of surveillance reports via email rather than reports 
being published online. One laboratory specifically requested that reports are sent as a link via 
email, rather than as an attachment. Most laboratories prefer quarterly reports, in addition to 
annual reports.  
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5.2.6 Usefulness 
A useful surveillance system is one which contributes to the prevention and control of AMR (15). 
A useful AMR surveillance system should be able to identify outbreaks or resistant organisms 
and identify emerging resistances. In addition, AMR surveillance systems should provide the 
data on AMR surveillance to end users such as diagnostic laboratories, healthcare facilities and 
clinicians, in order to inform antimicrobial stewardship and treatment guidelines (42). A useful 
AMR surveillance system should also prioritise pathogens for surveillance and use the 
surveillance data to inform appropriate public health action (42). To meet this requirement, 
ideally AMR surveillance needs to be combined with data on antimicrobial use.  
Current surveillance activities in Victoria are useful for monitoring long-term trends. The 
usefulness of individual AMR surveillance systems is discussed below. 
Victorian AMR unit 
The Victorian AMR unit receives AST for a limited subset of organisms. For the organisms where 
AST data are received, public health officers and partner notification officers are able to 
contribute to the control of AMR by: 
• Liaising with laboratories and doctors to ensure that isolates are sent to MDU for typing
and AST
• For isolates with AMR, arranging clearance testing and/or referral to an infectious
diseases specialist
• Conducting contact tracing and follow up testing as required
While case follow-up is effective in preventing the spread of AMR to additional cases, it does not 
address the underlying factors involved in AMR. For example, an increase in the number of 
gonorrhoea cases with AMR may relate to previous antimicrobial use in the patients. Systems 
such as the as the Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project, operated by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the European Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme, 
operated by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, collect extensive variables 
in order to understand the factors associated with AMR (Appendix 7).  
The Victorian TB programme is highly useful due to the level of treatment supervision and 
follow-up provided. Follow-up enables education of cases and improves treatment compliance. 
Melbourne Health conducts case follow up based on risk level, with pulmonary cases being 
prioritised due their infectious nature. Patients with pulmonary TB are isolated until they have 
been treated for 14 days and obtained a negative sputum smear. All patients with MDR TB 
receive directly observed therapy in order to increase the likelihood of successful treatment 
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completion. Contact tracing is also prioritised by risk and minimises the possibility of further 
transmission of TB.  
The VCSRU is useful for monitoring trends of CPE, detecting and managing outbreaks and 
transmission within and between healthcare facilities. In response to the identification of locally 
acquired cases, control measures are implemented to prevent more patients becoming infected. 
CPE antibiograms created by MDU are useful for clinicians however they are currently published 
on the MDU website and are not circulated directly to relevant clinical staff. As the aim of 
antibiograms is to assist clinicians who treat patients with suspected CPE infections, distributing 
this data directly to healthcare facilities is expected to improve the usefulness of the VCRSU.  
AURA and CARAlert 
AMR surveillance conducted by AURA and CARAlert is successful at monitoring long-term trends. 
Laboratories based within healthcare facilities indicate that they use AURA and CARAlert data 
to understand local AMR epidemiology, which inform local infection control procedures: 
It is good to know local epidemiology on selected bacterial antimicrobial resistance……to 
be kept posted about emerging resistance in our region. We can share this with hospital 
infection control, infectious diseases physicians and hospital clinicians…… This may 
encourage increase(d) vigilance and focus on promoting hand hygiene, cleaning and 
contact precaution for managing patients with enteric symptoms. 
Understanding of local epidemiology assists in interpreting local susceptibility trends, as 
well as providing an overview of broader susceptibility patterns nationally. 
In addition, CARAlert reports are used by MDU to compare AMR in Victoria to other states. 
CARAlert data are presented at monthly MDU laboratory meetings in order to inform laboratory 
testing practices.  
AGAR 
Laboratories participating in the AGAR scheme tend to use the data to inform internal 
antimicrobial stewardship programmes: 
Education and improving local knowledge of the epidemiology of AMR, and providing a 
standard for comparison of resistance genes/phenotypes in the laboratory 
Used to understand what MRSA and VRE genes and clones are circulating in 
Australia….and comparing our hospital to the state….this identifies the main multi-
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resistant bacteria…to focus on at our institution….which allows for screening of targeted 
units and enhancing cleaning methods and hand hygiene 
AGAR surveillance data are also useful for comparison to European data, as this programme 
follows the methodology used by the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network. 
One stakeholder commented that AGAR needs to develop a more specific research question 
relating to the collection of clinical data, such as thirty-day mortality, in order to enhance the 
use of the data. While AGAR annual reports include information on the subtyping, phylogenetic 
analyses are only conducted as part of research and these results are not fed back to 
contributing laboratories. 
Data on antimicrobial use 
While current AMR surveillance activities successfully monitor trends of AMR, surveillance data 
are only combined with data on antimicrobial use at the national level. To improve the 
usefulness of surveillance conducted within Victoria, data on AMR should be combined with 
data on antimicrobial use at the local level. This could be achieved by forming collaboration with 
the National Centre for Antimicrobial Stewardship, based in Victoria, which conducts research 
in order to improve antimicrobial prescribing in Australia. Reporting AMR data together with 
data on antimicrobial use would lead to improved understanding of factors involved in the 
emergence of AMR (43). 
Reporting 
The current usefulness of AMR surveillance in Victoria is limited by the lack of timely, consistent 
dissemination of data to end-users. Implementing regular, timely reports on AMR surveillance 
is essential to complete the surveillance cycle and achieve useful surveillance. Increasing the 
frequency of reports would also enhance the acceptability of the surveillance activities. This is 
particularly important for diagnostic laboratories who feel increasing burden from the workload 
associated with the provision of AMR data to multiple systems. 
Representativeness 
The usefulness of AMR surveillance in Victoria is also affected by the representativeness of the 
systems, many of which have low levels of representativeness due to the voluntary nature of 
data contribution. AURA and AGAR notably have low levels of contribution by Victorian 
organisations, meaning it is difficult to accurately compare Victorian data to other jurisdictions. 
Surveillance within the context of existing activities 
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Currently, the DHHS largely conducts AMR surveillance for organisms tested by MDU only, as 
complete AST data are not routinely provided by diagnostic laboratories. While the usefulness 
of AMR surveillance would be improved by additional laboratories participating in surveillance, 
some laboratories expressed concerns about the need to provide additional data without a clear 
objective: 
Need to be careful about asking laboratories to contribute more data without having a 
clear objective as to why, and being clear about what data, and for what purpose. 
The number of institutions requesting more data transfers and isolates to be sent for 
further analysis, without any financial support to be compensated for this extra work, 
needs to be understood and considered, so only the most important things will be 
prioritised. 
These comments highlight the importance of implementing AMR surveillance within the context 
of existing surveillance activities. 
5.2.7 Resource requirements for AMR surveillance 
The resources currently required for AMR surveillance in Victoria are summarised in Table 14. It 
is evident that significant resources are already being used in contributing to existing 
surveillance systems. As there are limited additional resources currently available, it is important 
to prioritise surveillance activities and to carefully consider how collected data will be used to 
inform and implement public health action.  
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Table 14. Victorian resources used in AMR surveillance 
Surveillance 
System 
Resources 
AGAR • Laboratory scientist combines AST data with patient data and uploads
AST data to webportal
• Medical microbiology registrar collates patient metadata
• Packaging and sending isolates interstate for sequencing (Western
Australia/South Australia)
• Sample storage prior to submission, packaging of isolates to send
away for typing
• Staff time to contribute data; 10 to 20 hours per month on data
extraction and collection of patient metadata
APAS • Requires significant IT infrastructure to participate in system
AURA • No additional resources to contribute currently
CARAlert • Diagnostic laboratories submit relevant isolates to MDU/AMRL
• Manual data entry to CARAlert webportal, conducted by MDU
• MDU conducts confirmatory testing of isolates
• IT infrastructure at MDU to filter relevant reports
NEPSS • Extraction of MDU LIMS data and upload into NEPSS
NNDSS • Data submission to NNDSS by DHHS
NNN • Data submission to coordinating centre by MDU
VHPSS • Data requires checking by data manager and epidemiologists to
ensure case definition is met
• Full time data manager follows up missing data variables
• Epidemiologist
Victorian AMR 
Unit 
• Policy advisor
• Epidemiologist
• Biostatistician
• Public Health Officer
• VCRSU epidemiologist (based at MDU)
• TB epidemiologist (component of work role)
• Melbourne Health Infection control nurses
• Data submitted to DHHS by MDU
• DHHS funds AST conducted by MDU for notifiable organisms
VICNISS • Epidemiologist
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6. Discussion
This evaluation has described the AMR surveillance activities conducted for human isolates in 
Victoria. Several issues were identified and recommendations made.  
AMR surveillance activities in Victoria lack cohesion. This can be greatly improved by building on 
existing AMR surveillance conducted by the Victorian AMR unit. Once the Victorian AMR unit is 
fully operational, it is expected that it can act as a central coordinating body for Victoria. This 
would improve the simplicity of AMR surveillance in Victoria. A single coordinating entity is also 
likely to reduce duplication of effort for AMR surveillance in Victoria.  
While the timeliness of AMR surveillance could be improved by significant upgrades of 
information technology systems, this is an expensive and time-consuming solution. Rather, 
timeliness is expected to improve as a result of implementing clear governance, potentially 
through the further development of the Victorian AMR unit. 
6.1 Objectives of AMR surveillance 
To improve the usefulness of future AMR surveillance, it is essential that objectives are clearly 
defined and documented. Current objectives of the Victorian AMR unit are to monitor trends of 
AMR among key organisms and identify and respond to outbreaks of resistant organisms. For 
collected surveillance data to inform public health action, additional proposed objectives could 
be:  
• To collect and disseminate data on AMR, in a timely manner, to clinicians and healthcare
facilities in order to inform antimicrobial stewardship and prescribing
• To combine data on AMR with data on antimicrobial use at the jurisdictional level, in order
to inform required changes in antimicrobial stewardship
• To gain an understanding of the factors associated with the emergence of AMR
6.2 Resource constraints and prioritisation of surveillance 
activities  
Resource constraints were a common theme throughout this evaluation. Diagnostic laboratories 
lack the resources to take on any additional work required to participate in surveillance. In 
addition, variation in laboratory information management systems do not enable AST data to 
be readily shared. Of concern, many surveillance activities are currently performed without 
dissemination of data in the form of reports. Given the resource-constrained setting, it is 
important to prioritise future surveillance activities for AMR. This could be achieved by 
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development of an AMR strategy for Victoria, developed in conjunction with key stakeholders 
such as healthcare facilities, diagnostic laboratories, and coordinators of existing AMR 
surveillance systems.  
From the perspective of the DHHS and the AMR unit, it is most feasible to focus on developing 
and enhancing surveillance of AMR for notifiable organisms. As demonstrated by the 
surveillance and response of CPE, surveillance of healthcare acquired infections is complex, and 
requires the participation of multiple organisations and the collection of detailed patient data 
in order to achieve a useful public health response. Currently, the Victorian AMR unit has well 
developed surveillance processes for a small number of notifiable organisms. Once surveillance 
activities are well established for notifiable organisms, potentially the same model can be 
extended to additional pathogens.  
In determining which organisms to prioritise for AMR surveillance, it is essential to consider the 
existing surveillance activities described throughout this evaluation. Focusing on organisms 
already being tested for antimicrobial susceptibility, where data are not already being provided 
to the DHHS, may initially be the most efficient way to conduct additional AMR surveillance. For 
example, S. pneumoniae is categorised as an urgent AMR threat by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and is routinely tested for antimicrobial susceptibility by diagnostic 
laboratories. AST data for invasive isolates are included in the VHPSS and could feasibly be 
provided to the DHHS on a regular basis.  
Of note, the VHPSS appears to be an underused data source. Many laboratories were under the 
impression that VHPSS data are already being provided to the DHHS on a regular basis. This 
misunderstanding further highlights the importance of regular reporting to stakeholders as part 
of surveillance.  
Consideration of resourcing additional AMR surveillance is demonstrated by evaluating the 
implementation of S. pneumoniae and vancomycin-resistant E. faecium (VREfm) surveillance. To 
conduct AMR surveillance for invasive pneumococcal disease, the DHHS would need to consider 
whether data from the VHPSS (originating from diagnostic laboratories) or data from MDU are 
required. To maintain the acceptability of AMR surveillance in Victoria, it is preferable to use 
VHPSS data rather than requesting laboratories submit duplicate data to the DHHS. In order to 
conduct surveillance using VHPSS data, the system would need to implement the collection of 
AST methodology used by each laboratory, in addition to clinical breakpoints used, and MIC 
values. Alternatively, to collect standardised AST data, the DHHS would need to fund MDU to 
conduct AST testing for all invasive S. pneumoniae isolates. Similar considerations would apply 
for the surveillance of AMR among other notifiable organisms.  
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In Chapter IV I describe a month-long surveillance study of the genomics of VREfm in Victoria. 
While it has been proposed that only one genotype of VREfm, van A, will be notifiable in Victoria 
as of 2020, it is expected that surveillance and response will most likely follow a similar process 
to that used for CPE. This would result in increased workload for MDU Epidemiology, who are 
also responsible for managing the VHPSS. Furthermore, as VREfm bacteraemia are already under 
surveillance by AGAR, with isolates sent interstate for sequencing, surveillance would require 
collaboration with interstate laboratories.  
Comprehensive continuous surveillance is appropriate for organisms where AMR is known to be 
a current threat, however for other organisms it may be more appropriate to conduct 
intermittent or sentinel surveillance (42). For each organism under surveillance, given the 
available resources, it needs to be decided whether continuous surveillance is essential, or if 
another approach such as ‘snapshots’ or cross-sectional studies conducted at regular intervals 
are more appropriate. In response to a snapshot that identifies an issue of emerging 
surveillance, continuous surveillance practices could then be implemented.  
Considering the above factors, it appears that the least resource intensive organism to add to 
surveillance would be one already included in the VHPSS, such as S. pneumoniae. However, due 
to the previously described issues with current surveillance processes, it may be more successful 
to focus on surveillance and reporting for a limited number of pathogens, and then expand the 
number of organisms once systems are more timely, acceptable and useful. 
While it is important to work towards a one health approach to the surveillance of AMR in 
Victoria, clear processes which include a dissemination plan for surveillance data must be 
implemented before surveillance activities are expanded to included veterinary, food, and 
environmental data sources.  
7. Recommendations for AMR surveillance in Victoria
Based on the attributes of current AMR surveillance, the follow recommendations have been 
made: 
Objectives and coordination of AMR surveillance 
• Clarify the primary objective(s) of AMR surveillance in Victoria, including clearly defining
which organism-antimicrobial combinations are the focus of surveillance.
• Define and document which data variables are required to appropriately monitor and
respond to increasing levels of AMR.
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• Determine for each organism-antimicrobial combination whether continuous
surveillance or snapshot surveillance at defined intervals is the best method given
available resources.
• Together with diagnostic laboratories and coordinators of AMR surveillance systems,
develop a Victorian AMR strategy to assign and document responsibilities for each
aspect of surveillance.
Usefulness of AMR surveillance 
• Where possible, work to harmonise organism-specific case definitions of AMR between
surveillance systems.
• Implement regular reporting on CPE surveillance and response.
• Continue developing and publishing CPE antibiograms and ensure clinicians are aware
of antibiograms by circulating to relevant networks.
• In consultation with diagnostic laboratories, implement regular provision of VHPSS data,
for specific organism-antimicrobial combinations, to the DHHS and/or AURA.
• For data that cannot be sourced from the VHPSS, request that all diagnostic laboratories
submit AST data as defined by organism-antimicrobial combinations prioritised for
surveillance within the DHHS.
• In consultation with diagnostic laboratories, consider reporting of CARAlert data from
MDU to the DHHS.
• Request that MDU provides AST data for all priority pathogens to the DHHS on a more
regular basis, at least monthly.
• To understand the factors associated with emerging AMR, consider the collection of
additional data variables for pathogens where the DHHS is conducting AMR surveillance.
Data quality of AMR surveillance 
• As diagnostic laboratories use varying guidelines to interpret clinical breakpoints, work
with laboratories to implement a method of collecting the guidelines used. As guidelines
used may change, these should be included on all AMR data submissions.
• Modify the VHPSS submission form to include the AST method used and the clinical
guidelines used to interpret antimicrobial susceptibility results.
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Acceptability of AMR surveillance 
• Increase the frequency of communication with diagnostic laboratories. This could be
achieved by increasing the frequency of Laboratory Liaison meetings to enable clear
discussions of planned changes to AMR surveillance in Victoria.
• Work with diagnostic laboratories to determine the best method of data submission for
AMR surveillance.
• Once AMR surveillance is implemented within the DHHS, work towards the distribution
of quarterly data updates and annual reports to laboratories via email.
• Reinstate regular reporting by the VHPSS, either directly by the VHPSS or as part of DHHS
AMR surveillance reports (if VHPSS data are provided to the DHHS).
• Ensure that CARAlert data updates are received by all laboratories who contribute
isolates for testing
Enhancing AMR surveillance in Victoria 
It appears that there are three main areas for improvement: 
• Improving coordination and governance to ensure that AMR surveillance findings are
disseminated to laboratories, clinicians, and healthcare facilities in order to maximise
public health impact. This can be achieved through centralised coordination of
surveillance activities. Potentially, the development of a Victorian AMR strategy which
documents organism-antimicrobial priorities, surveillance processes and standards, a
data dictionary and dissemination plan.
• Improve the use of existing surveillance data. This can be achieved most readily by
ensuring VHPSS data are provided to the DHHS on a regular basis, and potentially
provided onwards to the national AURA system.
• Work towards collaboration with organisations conducting surveillance of
antimicrobial use. This will ensure that collected AMR data is used to inform
antimicrobial stewardship.
8. Conclusions
Current surveillance activities in Victoria are successful in monitoring long-term trends of AMR. 
Improvements in dissemination of surveillance data and the timeliness of data sharing and 
reporting will greatly improve the public health impact of AMR surveillance in Victoria.
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Appendix 1. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
techniques 
Broth micro-dilution (34) 
Broth micro-dilution is the reference method for AST and is performed on a large scale with 
machinery such as the Vitek 2® (Biomerieux) and the Sensititre® (Thermo Fisher Scientific). The 
Vitek 2® uses cartridges that contain antimicrobials which are incubated with a standardised 
bacterial suspension of the organism in question. This produces a growth curve for the particular 
organism, which is then compared to a standard curve. This machinery is used in most diagnostic 
laboratories and produces quantitative results (MIC) in addition to qualitative results 
(susceptible, intermediate or resistant). The Sensititre® uses antimicrobials which are freeze-
dried in 96-well plates, enabling many samples to be tested at once.  
Disc diffusion 
Using broth-microdilution methods, most organisms are able to be tested for AST however 
certain fastidious organisms require different techniques such as disc diffusion (34). This 
technique involves the use of paper disks containing antimicrobials placed on agar plates 
containing the organism being tested (44). AST is then performed by measuring the size of the 
area of inhibition of bacterial growth around the disks after a designated time in an incubator at 
a standardised temperature (45).  
Agar dilution 
This technique involves placing bacteria onto agar plates containing different concentrations of 
antimicrobials (45). The AST result is determined by the highest concentration of antimicrobial 
that inhibits growth for that organism. This is more labour-intensive than automated methods, 
however may be used for bacteria with a rapid growth rate (45). 
E-test (antimicrobial gradient assays) (34)
The E-test uses a strip which is impregnated with a gradient of concentrations of an 
antimicrobial. A standard inoculum of organism is spread across a standard agar plate and the 
E-test strip is then applied to the agar plate.  The MIC result is read directly from the strip where
the organism first touches it. This test was originally designed for more fastidious organisms. It 
is also useful for testing antimicrobials not included in the pre-designed freeze-dried panels used 
in the Sensititre®. 
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Appendix 2. Case definitions for AMR surveillance7 
Surveillance 
system 
Case definition for inclusion in the 
system 
Definition of duplicates Case definition for AMR 
AGAR Bloodstream isolates only: E. faecium 
and E. faecalis, S. aureus, 
Enterobacterales, Acinetobacter spp. 
and P. aeruginosa 
Repeat isolates from a patient are 
included if they have been collected 
more than 14 days after the first 
positive specimen. 
As per EUCAST guidelines 
APAS All isolates Not defined Antimicrobial susceptibility as interpreted by diagnostic 
laboratories 
AURA Specific for each organism As determined by originating 
surveillance system 
As determined by originating surveillance system 
CARAlert Specific for each organism, must be 
notified by a confirming laboratory  
CARAlert isolates collected on the 
same day or in the same admission 
period, or within three months (24) 
however MDU does not receive data 
on admission dates 
Isolates are entered using the MDU 
laboratory identification number; no 
unique patient identifier is used. A 
single patient may have several 
isolates submitted under multiple 
different MDU laboratory 
As specified in section 5.1.4 
7 VICNISS is not included in this table as it does not include AST in surveillance 
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identification numbers; therefore, the 
web portal may not enable accurate 
identification of duplicates. 
No documented method of data entry 
where a patient has dual isolates 
originating from different specimen 
types. 
NEPSS Enteric pathogens which arrive at 
MDU for further typing 
Not documented Antimicrobial susceptibility as interpreted by diagnostic 
laboratories 
NNDSS Invasive pneumococcal disease: 
isolation of S. pneumoniae from a 
normally sterile site by culture or by 
NAAT  
S. pneumoniae: 30 days AST data for S. pneumoniae originate from primary diagnostic 
laboratories in Victoria  - needs to be culture positive to have 
an AST 
M. tuberculosis: confirmed cases are
those diagnosed through isolation of
the organism by culture or NAAT
(except where there is a possibility of
inactive or previous disease), or those
diagnosed clinically. Only active TB
infections are notifiable, latent
infections are not notifiable.
M. tuberculosis: not applicable As defined by Victorian TB programme 
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NNN Australian Gonococcal Surveillance 
Programme (AGSP): any sample from 
which N. gonorrhoea is isolated 
N. gonorrhoea – 21 days Using AGSP guidelines 
Australian Meningococcal Surveillance 
Programme (AMSP): any sample of N. 
meningitidis considered invasive 
(blood, cerebrospinal or joint fluid, or 
a positive nuclear acid amplification 
test from a normally sterile site) (46). 
N. meningitidis – 30 days Using AMSP guidelines 
VHPSS All invasive isolates (blood and 
cerebrospinal fluid samples), any 
species 
Repeat isolates from a patient are 
included if they have been collected 
more than 14 days after the first 
positive specimen 
Antimicrobial susceptibility as interpreted by diagnostic 
laboratories 
Victorian 
AMR unit 
All notifiable diseases are reported to 
the DHHS 
Gonorrhoea notifications are 
considered to be re-infection if 
occurring 3 or more weeks after the 
initial notification 
High level resistance to azithromycin (MIC ≥256mg/L) and/or 
Ceftriaxone resistance (MIC>0.125mg/L) 
Shigellosis 6 months • MDR as per CARAlert case definitions
• Reduced susceptibility to ciprofloxacin (MIC ≥1mg/L
and resistance to azithromycin (MIC ≥16mg/L)
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Salmonella 6 months MDR (resistant to 3 or more antimicrobial classes) 
TB – not applicable • MDR TB: resistant to isoniazid and rifampicin
• Presumptive MDR TB includes any cases with a
GeneXpert test indicative of rifampicin resistance (a
PCR test which assesses rifampicin resistance in
addition to the presence of M. tuberculosis)
• Extremely drug resistant TB: MDR plus resistance to
one of ciprofloxacin, moxifloxacin, ofloxacin,
norfloxacin, levofloxacin plus resistant to one second
line drug (amikacin, kanamycin or capremycin)
VCRSU: Confirmed cases of CPE 
include both clinical infections and 
colonised patients, however must 
have a carbapenemase gene detected 
by MDU (30) 
• Once infected or colonised by CPE,
a patient is considered to be a
case of CPE indefinitely, as the
duration of colonisation is
currently unknown.
• Isolates of a different species,
resistance gene or multi-locus
sequence type are considered to
be an additional episode
• Suspect CPE include any Enterobacterales isolate with a
meropenem minimum inhibitory concentration of or more
than 0.5mg/L (30).
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Appendix 3. Definitions for AMR surveillance of 
gonorrhoea used by international systems 
It is thought that cephalosporin resistance emerged by commensal Neisseria species in the 
pharynx interacting with N. gonorrhoea present in the pharynx. As cephalosporins and other 
antimicrobials are often poorly effective in the pharynx, pharyngeal samples should have first 
priority as cephalosporin resistance is most likely to develop in the pharynx (47). 
Gonococcal Resistance to Antimicrobials Surveillance Programme (GRASP), Public Health 
England (48) 
Where there is more than one isolate per patient with different AST profiles, the more resistant 
code is prioritised for surveillance. If there is more than one isolate collected from multiple 
specimens for the same patient, isolates are prioritised using the following hierarchy: 
• Males: rectal, urethral
• Females: cervical, any other site
European Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme, European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (EUROGRASP) (47)  
Where there is more than one anatomical site infected in one patient, only one isolate is 
included in surveillance using the following hierarchy: 
• Males: pharyngeal, rectal, urethral, other
• Females: pharyngeal, cervical, other anogenital (high vaginal swab, rectal, urethral),
other
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Appendix 4. Data submission methods for selected AMR surveillance systems in Victoria 
Surveillance System Submission method 
AGAR • submitted either by manual entry in a webportal, or upload of an Excel spreadsheet to the portal
APAS • APAS uses a data cube which accepts data extractions from laboratory information systems
CARAlert • Diagnostic laboratories submit isolate with hardcopy CARAlert form or routine laboratory reports to MDU
• MDU manually enters data into CARAlert portal
• Relevant lab reports are manually checked to ensure they meet the CARAlert submission criteria prior to entry
• Selected data points require verification via the original laboratory submission form via the laboratory information management
system
• MDU conducts WGS of all CPE isolates in order to identify resistance genes and confirm the identity of the isolate as CPE. As CPE
subtypes are derived from WGS data, they are entered several days after initial confirmation results. At times, an isolate initially
entered as CPE is later revealed to be both a ribosomal methylase and CPE isolate. The current system does not allow these data to
be updated by the person entering data and this information is emailed to the CARAlert coordinator for updating
NNDSS • DHHS sends relevant AST data to NNDSS quarterly for S. pneumoniae and  daily for M. tuberculosis
NNN • MDU sends AST data in Excel spreadsheet on a quarterly basis
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VHPSS • Completion of hard copy form, submission of a Vitek printout or routine laboratory report
• Submitted by mail or fax
• Data entered into VHPSS manually via a portal
Victorian AMR unit • All notifiable disease reports from diagnostic laboratories and doctors are received by the DHHS via fax, email or hardcopy forms
• Data are then manually entered into the Public Health Event Surveillance System (PHESS)
• AST data received from MDU via emailed password-protected Excel spreadsheet
• Currently, AMRL notifies the DHHS of all TB cases by fax or hard copy form.
• Notifications are checked by the TB epidemiologist each day and couriered to the TB programme each afternoon. If MDR TB is
notified to the DHHS, the TB epidemiologist contacts Melbourne Health by phone call
• As with other aspects of AMR surveillance, implementation of electronic laboratory reporting will improve the notification process,
enabling TB notifications to be transferred to Melbourne Health via password protected pdf documents
• Diagnostic laboratories submit suspected CPE to MDU using the CPE isolate referral form, which collects patient demographics in
addition to details of hospital admissions and movements. All data stored in PHESS – AMR data are uploaded from excel
spreadsheets
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Appendix 5. AST conducted by MDU 
Organism Testing technique Guidelines used 
Enterococcus 
spp. 
Sensititre broth microdilution EUCAST 
Enterobacterales Vitek, Sensititre broth 
microdilution 
E tests 
EUCAST with CLSI where EUCAST 
breakpoints not available 
N. gonorrhoeae Agar dilution 
E tests 
AGSP 
N. meningitides Agar dilution 
E tests 
AMSP 
Salmonella spp. 
Shigella spp. 
Agar dilution 
E tests 
CLSI and EUCAST 
S. aureus Sensititre 
Broth microdilution 
EUCAST 
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Appendix 6. Timeliness of AMR surveillance in Victoria 
Surveillance 
System 
Data provided to surveillance system Public health follow up or reporting 
AGAR • Data are submitted to AGAR on a quarterly basis
• Complete results, including typing, take up to 12 months to be
reported back to contributing laboratories
• Contributing laboratories submit specimens for typing and
WGS on a quarterly basis
AGAR publishes annual reports; 2017 report was not published until early 
2019 
AURA • The timeliness of AURA is affected by the timeliness of each
contributing system.
None 
CARAlert • Once the isolate has been received by the confirming
laboratory, additional testing is conducted within five working
days (10).
• Due to batching of some isolates, such as by the NNN and
AMRL, some confirmatory testing results are not entered until
two months after collection of the isolate (25).
• MDU currently enters CARAlert data into the web portal once
weekly/fortnightly. This may mean that isolates are not
entered into the system for seven to 14 days after
confirmatory testing has been completed
Bimonthly data updates and annual reports, fortnightly updates sent to 
DHHS and selected laboratories 
• Only five laboratories of 11 surveyed indicated that they currently
receive regular CARAlert updates.
NNDSS • Data submitted quarterly from DHHS to NNDSS Latest M. tuberculosis report available online at the time of writing was 
for 2014  
For S. pneumoniae, the latest available reports including AST data were 
dated 2011 and 2012 
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NNN • Data submitted by laboratories quarterly to coordinating
centre in NSW
2017 annual report was not available online until April 2019 for 
gonorrhoea 
As of April 2019, the 2017 N. meningitidis annual report could not be 
located online 
VHPSS • Most samples being entered within a fortnight of receipt at
MDU
• Delays in data entry can occur as some laboratories submit
data in batches rather than continuously
No timely reporting or case follow-up 
Victorian AMR 
unit 
• MDU conducts AST twice weekly
• AST takes from 8-48 hours to complete (depending on the
rate of growth of the organism being tested)
• Once testing is completed, a spreadsheet of AST results can
be prepared on the same day
• On identification of AMR as defined in (Appendix 2. Case
definitions for AMR surveillance) MDU contacts the Principal
Epidemiologist for AMR and WGS immediately
AST data received by the DHHS quarterly for N. gonorrhoea and 
fortnightly for Salmonella spp. and Shigella spp 
• On identification of critical AMR gonorrhoea isolates, a Partner
Notification Officer or PHO conducts a risk assessment within 24
hours of notification
VCRSU 
• Suspected CPE isolates are reported to VICNISS and/or
DHHS/MDU within one business day.
• Laboratories notify infection control staff and treating
clinician immediately
• CPE cases entered into PHESS within six hours of receipt by
DHHS
• VICNISS usually obtains data on patient hospital movements within 24
hours of confirmation of a CPE case
• As CPE infection control processes are now well-established, the
healthcare facility has usually begun screening and contact tracing
prior to being directed to do so
TB 
• Infectious TB notifications are entered into PHESS within six hours of
receipt and referred to a public health nurse on the same day
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• All cases of TB must be notified to the DHHS within five days
of diagnosis.
• TB notifications are checked by the TB epidemiologist daily and are
couriered to the TB programme at Melbourne Health by 2pm on the
same day
• MDR and extremely drug resistant TB cases are entered into PHESS on
the same day of notification. For infectious (pulmonary) TB, a meeting
with the patient is arranged by Melbourne Health within three days of
receiving notification
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Appendix 7. Data collected by international 
systems for the surveillance of AMR within 
gonorrhoea 
Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (49) 
• Sex of patient’s sexual partners within the past three months
• Travel history overseas in the past 60 days
• Sex work exposure in the past 12 months – defined as exchange of sex for drugs, money
or exchange of drugs or money for sex
• Previous antibiotic use in the past 60 days for any reason, including systemic oral or
injectable antibiotics
• Injectable drug use in the past 12 months
• Non-injectable drug use in the past 12 months (e.g. Ecstasy, cocaine)
• Primary treatment (including the strength) – trade name of drug is included as options
• Other additional treatment including name and dose
• Other additional treatment including treatment for chlamydia
European Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme (47) 
• Previous gonorrhoea diagnosis
• Other STI diagnosed during current episode (all STIs)
• Probable country of infection – countries visited during incubation period of reported
disease
• Mode of transmission: heterosexual, MSM, mother to child, other, unknown
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1. Preface
This project was initiated by Professor Benjamin Howden, Director of the Microbiological 
Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU). The first snapshot study of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE) in Victoria was conducted in November 2015. The prevalence of 
vanA VRE was thought to have increased in Victoria since this time. In addition, there were 
concerns that vanA VRE may be spreading within and between healthcare facilities (HCF). The 
2018 study was therefore planned to provide enhanced understanding of the current genomic 
epidemiology of VRE, enabling changes since 2015 to be examined. In addition, evidence for 
transmission within and between HCF would be assessed. 
1.1 My role 
My role included: 
• Writing an ethics application, which was submitted to both the University of
Melbourne and Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committees
• Contributing to the design of the isolate submission form, for participating laboratories
to submit with isolates to be included in this study
• Liaising with staff from participating diagnostic laboratories in Victoria to arrange
submission of isolates and the required data to MDU
• Extracting study data from the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS)
• Cleaning data and transferring it into a Microsoft Access database to enable data
management
• Liaising with MDU bioinformatics to conduct genomic analyses
• Combing the genomic analyses with epidemiological data by annotation of
phylogenetic trees in R Studio
• Writing up findings for this chapter and presenting findings from this work at the
Australian Epidemiological Association (AEA) Annual Scientific Meeting 2019 and the
Communicable Disease Control Conference 2019
1.2 Lessons learnt 
This project enabled me to learn an array of new skills including writing an ethics application, 
coordinating data collection, and cleaning data. I learned how genomic data can be used to 
inform future surveillance and public health response activities. I also learned how to annotate 
and interpret phylogenetic analyses in combination with epidemiological data.  
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1.3 Public health implications 
This study found that there has not been an overall increase in the prevalence of vanA 
vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREfm) in Victoria since 2015. The results of this 
study, combined with those of the 2015 study, provide baseline data on the prevalence of 
vanA VREfm, in addition to the distribution of E. faecium sequence types found within Victoria. 
This study has also confirmed the value of the use of whole genome sequencing (WGS) data 
for surveillance of VRE. WGS enabled discrimination of VRE isolates beyond the multi-locus 
sequence type (MLST) level. Combining phylogenetic analyses with available epidemiological 
data indicated multiple likely episodes of transmission within and between HCF in Victoria.  
In future, the combination of phylogenetic analyses with additional epidemiological data (such 
as patient admissions and ward movements) could be used to confirm putative transmission 
pathways for VREfm, or identify pathways not previously considered. This would inform 
appropriate measures to limit the spread of outbreaks. At the time of writing, the regulations 
of the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 were under revision. As of 2020, 
colonisation or infection with vanA VRE will become a notifiable condition in Victoria. Using 
WGS and epidemiological data, a surveillance and response approach similar to that currently 
used for carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales (discussed in Chapter III: AMR 
Surveillance in Victoria) could be adapted to vanA VREfm in future.  
1.4 Literature review 
This Chapter satisfies the MAE requirement for conducting a literature review. Two databases 
were used for the literature search: the National Center for Biotechnology Information’s 
PubMed and Google Scholar. The following combinations of keywords were searched: 
“vancomycin resistant enterococci” or “VRE”, followed by “AND”, combined with the terms 
“outbreak”, “outbreak Australia”, “MLST”, “surveillance”, “genomics”, “whole genome 
sequencing”, and “emergence”. The literature review was an iterative process with references 
within articles sought out where relevant. In addition, I also assessed the grey literature 
relevant to this topic by conducting a google search in order to assess activities conducted by 
surveillance systems globally and locally. This identified surveillance activities conducted by 
the Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, the European Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance Network and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National 
Healthcare Safety Network.  
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2. Abstract
Background: VREfm colonises patients and can cause serious infections, particularly within 
HCF. In Australia, vanB VREfm predominates, however the prevalence of vanA VREfm are 
thought to be increasing. Compared to vanB VREfm, vanA VREfm are more highly vancomycin 
resistant and display resistance to teicoplanin.   
We conducted a cross-sectional study to investigate the genetic diversity and prevalence of 
VREfm within Victoria, Australia, in 2018, and compared findings to a similar 2015 study. We 
combined WGS and epidemiological data to assess for evidence of transmission within and 
between HCF.  
Methods: During November 2018, Victorian diagnostic laboratories were requested to 
submit all VREfm cultures (diagnostic and screening samples) to MDU. WGS was performed 
and in silico MLSTs and van genotypes were identified. Descriptive analyses were conducted 
using Stata 15.1. Differences in proportions were assessed using a two-tailed Z test. 
Phylogenetic relatedness of isolates was analysed and compared with HCF data. 
Results: In total, 311 isolates from 304 patients were identified. The incidence of VREfm 
infection in November 2018 was 0.15 per 100,000 population per month, similar to 2015 
results (0.16 per 100,000 per month (p=0.60). 796 was the dominant MLST in both years (182 
[59%] of 311 VREfm isolates, 2018, predominantly vanB). Among patients with VREfm, vanA 
was detected in 64 (21%) of 311 isolates, compared to 55 (19%) of 293 isolates in 2015 
(p=0.71). 
MLST 1424 vanA isolates were identified in Victoria in 2018 in 11 (28%) of 40 HCF. This MLST 
was not present in the 2015 study. Of the 33 MLST 1424 vanA isolates, 32 (97%) fell within 
three closely-related genomic clusters, indicating spread within and between HCF.  
Conclusions: The incidence of VREfm and the proportion of vanA VREfm were similar in the 
2015 and 2018 studies. The identification of MLST 1424 vanA VREfm clusters indicates the 
need for additional patient screening and management to prevent further spread of VREfm.
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3. Background
Enterococci are a normal part of the human gastrointestinal tract (1, 2). While enterococci 
have intrinsic or natural resistance to several antibiotics, they can also acquire new resistance 
genes and mutations which may confer resistance to additional antibiotics (1-4). Enterococci 
with genes conferring vancomycin resistance are known as vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
(VRE). There are nine known van genes among Enterococcus spp., vanA, B, C, D, E, G, L, M and 
N (5). VRE includes the species Enterococcus faecium and Enterococcus faecalis, however the 
majority of VRE are E. faecium (3, 6, 7). Throughout this chapter, the term VRE is used to refer 
specifically to vancomycin-resistant E. faecium (VREfm).  
Vancomycin was previously used to treat patients with enterococcal infections and penicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (2, 8). Resistance to vancomycin was first identified in E. 
faecium in the 1980s, in Europe, and the USA (1, 9). VRE has now been identified throughout 
Europe, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia (9). In Australia, outbreaks of VRE have been 
reported in Western Australia, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and Victoria 
(10-13).  
3.1 Public health significance 
Most people who acquire VREfm become carriers (a state known as colonisation), however 
those with immunosuppression or comorbid conditions can develop significant infections (14). 
Enterococcal infections can manifest as urinary tract infections, intra-abdominal infections, 
blood-stream infections, endocarditis and postoperative infections (3, 15).  
Compared to infections caused by vancomycin susceptible bacteria, VREfm infections are more 
difficult to treat and are associated with higher levels of morbidity and mortality (3, 16). In 
addition, the management of patients infected or colonised by VREfm within HCF is associated 
with increased healthcare costs (17). 
The World Health Organization has listed VREfm as high priority for the research and 
development of new antibiotics (18). VREfm is resistant to commonly used antimicrobials (e.g. 
ampicillin), and treatment therefore relies on last-line antibiotics such as daptomycin (6, 7, 14, 
19). There have only been two new antimicrobials developed for the treatment of VRE since its 
emergence; quinupristin/dalfopristin and linezolid (7). Quinupristin/dalfopristin requires 
placement of a central line, a type of catheter which can cause complications, and carries a 
number of side effects, while the effectiveness of daptomycin is considered to be unclear (7). 
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Concerningly, resistance to newer, last-line antibiotics such as daptomycin is emerging among 
VRE (20).  
Enterococci can colonise the gastrointestinal tract, urinary tract, medically implanted devices 
such as catheters, and chronic wounds (1, 7). Risk factors for colonisation include severe 
medical conditions resulting in long-term hospitalisation, haematologic malignancies, organ 
transplantation and long-term haemodialysis, the presence of invasive medical devices (e.g. 
indwelling urinary catheters), and previous treatment with broad-spectrum antimicrobials (14, 
21).  Patients who are colonised by VRE do not display any symptoms, but shed the organism 
in faeces, and carry it on their skin (3, 22) 
Among colonised patients, the development of a VRE infection is associated with admission to 
wards including ICU, acute, haematology or oncology, and undergoing dialysis or organ 
transplantation (3, 14). The proportion of colonised patients who go on to develop infections is 
variable, ranging from 0-45% (23, 24).  
Patients can acquire VRE from other colonised or infected patients, or commensal enterococci 
within the intestine can acquire vancomycin resistance when exposed to broad-spectrum 
antibiotics or other bacteria carrying vancomycin-resistance genes (14). Furthermore, VRE can 
transfer resistance genes to both related and unrelated strains of bacteria, including 
Staphylococcus aureus (3, 14).  
VRE are difficult for hospitals to control as the organism can spread via direct contact with 
infected or colonised patients or on the hands of healthcare staff, as well as through indirect 
contact with contaminated environmental surfaces such as medical equipment within a HCF 
(3, 14). Once a healthcare environment is contaminated with VRE, the organism can remain 
viable for months (1, 14). In addition, outbreaks of VRE within hospitals may be due to a 
subpopulation of E. faecium adapted to the healthcare environment (7). Attempts to control 
the spread of VRE therefore focus on disinfection, screening of patients to identify those 
colonised by VRE, and isolation of colonised and infected patients (9).  
3.2 Vancomycin-resistant mechanisms and genomics 
All bacteria have cell walls made up of compounds known as peptidoglycans. Glycopeptide 
antimicrobials, including vancomycin and teicoplanin, work by binding the outer surface of the 
cell membrane, which prevent the production of peptidoglycans and the formation of a cell 
wall (7). Resistance to glycopeptides occurs through the production of an alternative 
peptidoglycan precursor by bacteria (7). 
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Of the van genes encoding glycopeptide resistance, vanA and vanB are the two main types 
conferring vancomycin resistance within VREfm (7, 25, 26). Organisms expressing the vanB 
gene are resistant only to vancomycin, whereas those expressing the vanA gene have high-
level resistance to vancomycin in addition teicoplanin resistance (3, 7, 26, 27). 
3.3 MLST and WGS 
Multi-locus sequence typing (MLST) generally provides sufficient discrimination of VRE within 
HCF in order to assist with the identification of outbreaks. MLST assigns a four-digit code (e.g. 
1421) on the basis of the alleles present in seven housekeeping genes, with each allele 
assigned an integer (6, 28). Historically, MLST was conducted by performing multiple 
polymerase chain reaction tests targeting the loci of housekeeping genes (28). While used to 
infer outbreaks of VREfm, MLST lacks the level of detail required to identify all possible 
transmission pathways (5). 
The genome of E. faecium has high levels of recombination, whereby DNA is exchanged 
between organisms (15, 29). Recombination can affect the loci included in the MLST scheme, 
meaning that an isolate’s MLST may be reclassified once recombination is accounted for, 
indicating that the use of MLST alone is inadequate for examining the genomic epidemiology 
of VREfm (15, 30). WGS approaches enable isolates to be characterised to a higher level than 
MLST (31). Furthermore, the use of WGS data combined with epidemiological data can enable 
the identification of transmission pathways which can be used to inform appropriate public 
health actions (5). 
3.4 Australian context 
In Europe and the United States, vanA VREfm predominates (26). In contrast, in Australia, vanB 
VREfm predominates however the prevalence of vanA VREfm is thought to be increasing (25, 
26, 32). The prospect of increasing prevalence of vanA VREfm is concerning as these isolates 
are associated with higher minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) for vancomycin in 
addition to teicoplanin resistance (Table 1) (7, 33). Higher MICs mean that infections require 
higher doses of antibiotics (7, 32, 34). 
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Table 1. Comparison of van genotype characteristics (7, 33, 35) 
Genotype Vancomycin MIC Teicoplanin MIC 
vanA High level resistance 
>256mg/L
Resistant 
>64mg/L)
vanB Resistance 
16-32 mg/L 
Susceptible 
≤2 mg/L 
European Committee of Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing breakpoints 
Resistance >4 mg/L 
Susceptibility ≤4 mg/L 
Resistance >4 mg/L 
Susceptible ≤2 mg/L 
The Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR) conduct sentinel surveillance of 
enterococcal infections. In AGAR’s Australian Enterococcal Sepsis Outcome Program (AESOP) 
2017 report, there is a documented increase in the proportion of VREfm isolates with 
teicoplanin resistance in Australia, and an increase in the proportion of VREfm resistant to 
both vancomycin and teicoplanin in Victoria (19). Annual reports from AGAR have documented 
an increase of  the proportion of VREfm with vanA from 20.1% in 2015 to 24.9% in 2017 in 
Australia, and from 12.5% in 2015 to 14.9% in 2017 in Victoria (36). 
VRE was first identified in Victoria in 1994 and is now widespread within healthcare 
institutions (37). While AGAR sentinel surveillance enables monitoring of long-term trends for 
VRE, data are not representative for Victoria as only five large HCF contribute to the AGAR 
scheme. In 2018, 130 E. faecium isolates from blood-stream infections (BSI) were submitted to 
AGAR, with 61.5% reported as vancomycin non-susceptible (intermediate susceptibility and 
resistance combined). Conversely, in the same time period, 195 E. faecium isolates from BSI 
were submitted to the Victorian Hospital Pathogen Surveillance Scheme (VHPSS) (38). Of 189 
isolates submitted to the VHPSS with vancomycin susceptibility data, 59.8% were non-
susceptible to vancomycin (38). Both AGAR and VHPSS data are limited to blood culture 
isolates, therefore a comprehensive understanding of VREfm epidemiology is not able to be 
obtained from these systems.  
3.5 2015 VRE snapshot study 
In November 2015, MDU ran the first laboratory based cross-sectional study of VRE in Victoria. 
This study performed WGS on all VREfm specimens from 96% of Victorian laboratories over a 
30-day period. This enabled an assessment of the genetic factors associated with vancomycin
resistance and the phylogenetic relationships between isolates (37). The 2015 snapshot study 
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identified vanB VREfm in 42 of 47 HCF (89.4%), while vanA VREfm were only found in 11 of 47 
HCF (23.4%) (37).  
The 2018 snapshot study followed the methodology of the 2015 study, enabling changes 
between the two time periods to be identified. As VREfm from all specimens were included in 
both studies, this assisted with further characterisation of the burden of disease associated 
with VREfm in Victoria. The inclusion of both private and hospital-based laboratories in both 
studies enabled an assessment of community-acquired VREfm in addition to health-care 
acquired VREfm. Vancomycin sensitive E. faecium (VSEfm) bacteraemia isolates were included 
in both the 2015 and 2018 studies as they have been suggested to be important in the 
emergence of VREfm and should be included in efforts to control VRE spread (15). 
3.6 Objectives 
With this study we aimed to: 
• Investigate changes in the prevalence and genomic diversity of VREfm that have
occurred between November 2015 and November 2018 in Victoria
• Determine if the prevalence of vanA VREfm had increased in Victoria between the
2015 and the 2018 studies
• Describe the epidemiology of VREfm in Victoria in November 2018
• Evaluate the presence of transmission networks within and between HCF in Victoria in
November 2018
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4. Methods
All Victorian diagnostic laboratories were asked to submit to MDU all VREfm, from any 
diagnostic or screening sample, and all vancomycin-susceptible E. faecium (VSEfm) from blood 
cultures, from samples collected from 01 to 30 November 2018. Participation by laboratories 
was voluntary. 
Isolates were submitted with either a hardcopy or electronic submission form. The submission 
form included patient sex, unit record number, the site of specimen collection, HCF where the 
specimen was collected, date of collection, and whether the specimen was collected for 
clinical or screening purposes. 
4.1 Laboratory methods 
Diagnostic laboratories routinely screen isolates of E. faecium for phenotypic susceptibility to 
vancomycin. In addition, a polymerase chain reaction is conducted to ascertain the presence or 
absence of van genes. Based on the results of initial screening tests, isolates that met the 
criteria for the study were submitted to MDU for WGS. Submitted specimens were stored at 
4°C until laboratory testing was completed. Single colony isolates used for WGS were frozen in 
glycerol storage broth at -70°C. Genomic DNA from pure isolates was extracted using the 
JANUS automated workstation with the Chemagic viral DNA/RNA kit (PerkinElmer, Waltham, 
USA). Unique dual indexed libraries were prepared using the Nextera XT DNA sample 
preparation kit (Illumina, San Diego, USA). Libraries were sequenced on the Illumina NextSeq 
500 with 150-cycle paired-end chemistry.  
4.2 Bioinformatic analysis 
Illumina sequence reads were analysed using the public health bioinformatics pipeline, 
Nullarbor (39). Outputs from the Nullarbor pipeline include genome assembly, in silico MLST, 
detection of van genes, and phylogenetic analyses. Phylogenetic trees were constructed from 
core genome single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) identified by mapping reads to the E. 
faecium reference genome, Aus0085 (accession no. NC_021994).  
For sequence types where more than ten isolates were identified (MLST  17, 78, 80, 203, 796, 
1421 and 1424), a phylogenetic tree was constructed for isolates within that MLST, using the 
following reference genomes: MLST  17: AUSMDU0000004 (accession no. CP003351), MLST 78: 
AUSMDU00004055 (accession no. CP027506), MLST 80: AUSMDU00004142 (accession 
no. CP027501), MLST 796: AUSMDU00004028 (accession no. CP027512), MLST 203: 
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AUSMDU00000085 (accession no. CP006620), MLST 1421: AUSMDU00004167 (accession 
no. CP027497) and, MLST 1424: AUSMDU00011555 (no accession no. available). 
4.3 Epidemiological analysis 
All identifying patient information was removed and patient identification numbers were 
assigned in the order of isolate submission. HCF letter codes matched those used in the 2015 
study, with additional letter codes assigned by order of submission. Isolates with no known 
HCF origin or those submitted by general practitioners were classified as ‘community’ isolates. 
Without detailed medical information, the clinical significance of urine samples is often unclear 
as VREfm can colonise the urinary tract (40). Specimens from which isolates were derived were 
therefore classified as either clinical, colonisation, or urine. BSIs were examined as a subset of 
clinical infections, as they are a major cause of mortality (41).  
Descriptive analysis was performed using STATA 15.1 (StataCorp LLC, Texas, USA). Incidence 
rates were calculated using the mid-year Estimated Resident Population for Victoria in relevant 
years (42). Differences in incidence rates and proportions were assessed using a two-tailed Z 
test. P-values less than 0.05 were considered to be significant. 
Phylogenetic trees were annotated by MLST, HCF origin and van genotype using ggtree (43) in 
R Studio™ (RStudio Team, Boston, USA). Only MLSTs with more than ten isolates identified 
were highlighted, those with fewer than ten isolates were classified as “other” for 
visualisation.  
SNPs are mutations of a single base pair within a genome (29). Pairwise SNP differences 
indicate the number of nucleotide changes between two isolates, with fewer SNPs indicating 
isolates more closely related to each other. While the assessment of pairwise SNP differences 
does not take into account multiple mutations at a nucleotide site, or differences in the rates 
of transitions or transversions, assessing potentially related isolates using SNP cut-offs using 
WGS data is commonly performed as part of surveillance and outbreak detection for a variety 
of communicable organisms (29). In this study isolates falling within clusters as defined by 
number of SNPs were annotated on each MLST level phylogenetic tree. This aspect of VREfm 
was not examined in the 2015 study, therefore SNP cut-off levels were defined with reference 
to previous outbreak investigations and studies of VREfm (13, 44-46). Clusters were annotated 
at two cut-off levels to indicate the degree of relatedness of isolates: 5 SNPs and 25 SNPs. 
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To examine the pairwise distribution of SNP differences for isolates within and between HCF, 
violin plots, which are similar to box plots with the addition of probability density, were 
created using R Studio™. Where two isolates originated from the same HCF, they were 
categorised as “Within HCF.” Conversely, where two isolates originated from different HCFs, 
they were categorised as “Between HCF.” Isolates classified as having a community origin were 
excluded from this part of the analysis. Isolates were separated into vanA and vanB genotypes 
for comparison. In addition, as the 2015 study found that MLST 796 vanB displayed limited 
genetic diversity, vanB was further separated into vanB VREfm excluding MLST 796 isolates, 
and vanB VREfm MLST 796 only. Differences in the pairwise SNP differences between and 
within HCF were assessed using the Mann Whitney Rank Sum test, while differences in the 
median pairwise SNP difference were assessed using a nonparametric k-sample test on the 
equality of medians. 
5. Results
The majority of diagnostic laboratories (96%, 26/27) in Victoria participated in the study. While 
some laboratories used the study submission form, other laboratories sent isolates with 
routine laboratory reports. Upon exclusion of isolates (n=104) not meeting our study criteria, 
316 isolates remained for analysis (Figure 1). Of these, 301 isolates were collected from 294 
patients from 41 HCF. An additional fifteen patients had no known link to any HCF at the time 
their sample was collected (and are subsequently referred to as ‘community’ patients).  
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Figure 1. E. faecium isolates excluded from the 2018 VRE snapshot study 
5.1 Has the prevalence of vanA VREfm increased in Victoria between 
2015 and 2018? 
Of the 316 snapshot isolates, 311 (98.4%) were VREfm and five (1.6%) were VSEfm. Of 311 
VREfm isolates, 20.6% (n=64) were vanA and 78.5% (n=244) were vanB. Three isolates carried 
both the vanA and vanB mechanisms (vanA+B). The was no significant difference in the 
proportions of vanA and vanB VREfm isolates in 2018 compared to that found in 2015 (81% 
vanB and 19% vanA in 2015, p=0.71). 
5.2 Characterising the burden of disease of VREfm in Victoria 
Patient specimens from which VREfm isolates were derived (n=311) are summarised in Table 2. 
This included: 
• 45 VREfm from clinical infections in 45 patients
• 73 VREfm from 72 patient urine specimens
• 192 VREfm obtained from screening specimens in 187 patients
• One specimen collected for unknown purposes (treating clinician did not specify the
reason for collection)
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Among VREfm isolates classified as clinical infections, the most common specimen source was 
blood cultures (40%, n=20). Of specimens classified as colonisation, 83% were isolated from 
rectal swabs (n=158). 
The median age for patients infected or colonised by VREfm was 70 years (range 0 to 97 years), 
42% of patients (n=304) were female (n=127) and 58% were male (n=177). Of five patients 
with VSEfm bacteraemia, the median age was 72 years (range 60–94 years), three patients 
were males and two were females.  
The incidence of VREfm clinical infection (including urine isolates) was 0.15 per 100,000 
population per month. There was no statistically significant difference between the incidence 
rate of VRE infection in 2015 and 2018 (2015 rate of 0.16 per 100,000 per month, p=0.60). The 
incidence of vanA VREfm infection or colonisation was 1.0 per 100,000 population per month, 
similar to 2015 (0.92 per 100,000 population per month) (p =0.72).
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Table 2. Number of E. faecium isolates collected from specimen types by specimens 
classified as clinical, screening and urine. 
Specimen classification 
Specimen type Clinical Screening Unknown Urine Total 
Abdomen tissue 1 0 0 0 1 
Abdominal cavity fluid 1 0 0 0 1 
Abdominal cavity swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Abscess 1 0 0 0 1 
Arm wound swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Blood (whole) 
VREfm 20 0 0 0 20 
VSEfm 5 0 0 0 5 
Bone 1 0 0 0 1 
Drain wound fluid 3 0 0 0 3 
Faeces 0 7 0 0 7 
Foot/ankle wound swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Groin swab 0 3 0 0 3 
Groin tissue 1 0 0 0 1 
Hip swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Hip tissue 1 0 0 0 1 
Kidney (percutaneous nephrostomy) 1 0 0 0 1 
Leg swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Pancreas tissue 1 0 0 0 1 
Perianal swab 0 1 0 0 1 
Peritoneal cavity fluid 2 0 0 0 2 
Pleural cavity fluid 2 0 0 0 2 
Rectal swab 0 158 0 0 158 
Swab (unspecified site) 1 22 1 0 24 
Thigh swab 1 0 0 0 1 
Tissue 2 0 0 0 2 
Trachea aspirate 1 0 0 0 1 
Urine 0 1 0 73 74 
Total 50 192 1 73 316 
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Figure 2 summarises the specimen source and resistance genotype of all isolates. Of the 45 
isolates causing clinical infections, 20% were due to vanA VREfm (n=9) and 78% were due to 
vanB VREfm (n=35). One patient (2%) had a clinical infection due to VREfm carrying both vanA 
and B. There were no significant differences (p=0.63) in the proportion of van genotypes 
causing colonisation (18% vanA, 35/192; 81% vanB, 155/192; 1.0% vanA+B, 2/192) and isolates 
from urine samples (vanA, 27%, 20/73; 73% vanB, 53/73). 
Figure 2. Number of E. faecium isolates by van genotype and specimen classification 
5.2.1 E. faecium bacteraemia 
E. faecium bacteraemia was identified in 25 patients during the study period. Of these
patients, 20 had VREfm bacteraemia: 35% (n=7) had vanA VREfm and 65% (n=13) had vanB 
VREfm. The incidence of E. faecium bacteraemia in Victoria for the snapshot period was 0.38 
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per 100,000 per month, similar to the incidence found in 2015 (0.50 per 100,000 population 
per month, p=0.90). Of VREfm bacteraemia isolates, 44% (n=11) were vanB MLST 796.  
5.2.2 VREfm in Victorian HCF 
VREfm were distributed across 40 HCF (Figure 3). 
• Of all VREfm isolates, 32% were identified from HCF B (n=98/311)
• vanA VREfm isolates originated from 13 of 40 HCF, and from four community patients
• Of 64 vanA VREfm isolates, 31% (n=20) were identified by HCF B
• There were no statistically significant increases in the proportion of vanA VREfm
isolates originating from any individual HCF between 2015 and 2018 (data not shown)
• Clinical isolates were found in 18 HCF and two community patients.
o Of these, bacteraemia isolates were found in 12 HCF and two community
patients
• Urine isolates were found in 31 HCF and 12 community patients
• Screening isolates originated from 15 HCF and one community patient
• Of 192 isolates originating from screening samples, HCF B identified 47% of isolates
(n=91)
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Figure 3. Number of E. faecium isolates by healthcare facility (HCF) and van genotype. 
Clinical isolates (including urine isolates) and bloodstream isolates (BSI) are shown. Letters 
indicate HCF code, with NK indicating isolates with no known HCF origin.
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5.3 Changes in the genomic diversity of VREfm in Victoria between 
November 2015 and November 2018  
One way to examine changes in genomic diversity is to assess MLSTs among isolates. 
Overall, there were 16 MLSTs observed for VREfm (Table 3). 
• Among all vanA VREfm, there were nine MLSTs.
o Of 64 vanA VREfm isolates, 51.6% were MLST 1424 (n=33) and 23.4% were
MLST 1421 (n=15)
• Among vanB VREfm, there were 13 MLSTs, in addition to a non-typeable group of
three isolates (where alleles have not been able to be accurately identified, and
therefore MLST has not been able to be assigned).
o Of 244 vanB VREfm isolates, 74.2% were MLST  796 (n=181)
Among clinical samples, ML ST 1421 and 203 were most prevalent among vanA isolates, while 
among screening specimens with vanA, MLST  1421 and 1424 were most prevalent. Among 
vanA isolates, MLST 1424 was most prevalent among urine samples (11/20, 55.0%). Among 
vanB isolates, MLST 796 comprised the majority of clinical (24/35, 68.6%), screening (112/155, 
72.3%) and urine (44/53, 83.0%) specimens.  
Among vanA+B, there were three isolates of three MLSTs: 252,796 and 992. Among VSEfm, 
there were four MLSTs: 17, 203, 71 and 928.
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Table 3. MLST by van gene and specimen category12 
Specimen category 
MLST Clinical (except bacteraemia) Bacteraemia Screening Urine Unknown Total 
vanA 
1424 0 3 (42.9%) 19 (54.3%) 11 (55.0%) 0 33 (51.6%) 
1421 0 1 (14.3%) 8 (22.9%) 6 (30.0%) 0 15 (23.4%) 
203 1 1 (14.3%) 2 (5.7%) 1 (5.0%) 0 5 (7.8%) 
80 0 1 (14.3%) 3 (8.6%) 1 (5.0%) 0 5 (7.8%) 
17 1 0 1 (2.9%) 0 0 2 (3.1%) 
1489 0 0 0 1 (5.0%) 0 1 (1.6%) 
262 0 1 (14.3%) 0 0 0 1 (1.6%) 
761 0 0 1 (2.9%) 0 0 1 (1.6%) 
Novel 1 0 0 1 (2.9%) 0 0 1 (1.6%) 
Total 2 7 35 20 0 64 
vanB 
796 13 (59.1%) 11 (84.6%) 112 (72.3%) 44 (83.0%) 1 181 (74.2%) 
78 2 (9.1%) 0 11 (7.1%) 3 (5.7%) 0 16 (6.6%) 
80 0 1 (7.7%) 9 (5.8%) 2 (3.8%) 0 12 (4.9%) 
17 3 (13.6%) 0 6 (3.9%) 0 0 9 (3.7%) 
203 0 0 4 (2.6%) 1 (1.9%) 0 5 (2.0%) 
Non-typeable 1 (4.5%) 0 2 (1.3%) 0 0 3 (1.2%) 
1421 1 (4.5%) 0 2 (1.3%) 0 0 3 (1.2%) 
555 0 0 0 3 (5.7%) 0 3 (1.2%) 
1283 0 0 2 (1.3%) 0 0 2 (0.8%) 
1 Novel MLSTs indicate MLSTs not yet assigned 
2 Non-typeable MLST indicates isolates were not all alleles were able to be identified in order to assign an MLST 
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252 1 (4.5%) 0 1 (0.6%) 0 0 2 (0.8%) 
Novel 3 0 0 4 (2.6%) 0 0 4 (0.8%) 
992 0 0 1 (0.6%) 0 0 1 (0.4%) 
Novel 1 1 (4.5%) 0 0 0 0 1 (0.4%) 
Novel 2 0 1 (7.7%) 1 (0.6%) 0 0 2 (0.4%) 
Total 22 13 155 53 1 244 
vanA+B 
252 1 0 0 0 0 1 
796 0 0 1 0 0 1 
992 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 1 0 2 0 0 3 
VSEfm 
17 0 2 0 0 0 2 
71 0 1 0 0 0 1 
203 0 1 0 0 0 1 
928 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 0 5 0 0 0 5 
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Seven patients had more than one isolate with two different MLSTs or two van gene types 
(Appendix 1); five of these patients were from the same HCF (HCF B). Of note, HCF B was 
conducting a point prevalence survey for VREfm during the study period, which involved 
screening all patients at risk of VREfm. 
Of the patients with multiple isolates, most samples (11/14, 78.6%) were obtained from 
screening tests, and most (10/14, 71.4%) were obtained either on the same day or one day 
apart. Four of these patients were simultaneously colonised or infected with a vanA and a 
vanB isolate.  
The distribution of MLSTs among E. faecium has changed significantly between 2015 and 2018 
(p<0.001). Notably, MLST 1424 vanA VREfm was not present in the 2015 study (Figure 4). 
Among van B VREfm, the proportion of MLST 78 (p<0.001) and 80 (p=0.03) increased, and 
MLST 203 (p=0.003) decreased (Figure 4). There was no difference in the proportion of van B 
VREfm MLST 796 (p=0.24) or MLST 17 (p=0.35). MLST 1421 was not present in the 2015 study 
among vanB VREfm. 
Among van A VREfm, the proportion of MLST 80 and 203 decreased (p<0.001). There was no 
change in the proportion of MLST 1421 (p=0.12). MLST 1424 and 17 were not present in the 
2015 study among vanA VREfm. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of MLST among vanA and vanB VREfm, 2015 and 20183 
3 Other MLST are those were less than 10 isolates were identified during November 2018 
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MLST 1424 comprised the majority of vanA VREfm. MLST 1424 originated from 11 HCF and one 
community patient (Figure 5).  
• Of 34 MLST 1424 isolates, 38% (n=13) were isolated from HCF B
• All MLST  1424 isolates were vanA VREfm
• Of 34 MLST 1424 isolates, 56% (n=19) originated from screening samples, and 32%
(n=11) originated from urine samples
MLST 796 comprised the majority of vanB VREfm. MLST 796 originated from 33 HCF. In 
addition, there were nine community patients. 
• Of 182 MLST 796 isolates, 62% (n=113) originated from screening samples
• Except for a single vanA+B isolate, all MLST 796 were vanB
• Of 182 MLST 796 isolates, 29% (n=52) originated from HCF B
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Figure 5. Number of E. faecium isolates by MLST and Healthcare facility (HCF). MLSTs with 
less than ten isolates identified were classified as “other.”
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5.4 Evaluating the presence of transmission occurring within and 
between HCF in Victoria 
Figure 6. displays the genomic relationships of E. faecium isolates together with the MLST, 
HCF, and van genotype. Most isolates were part of a large monophyletic group with several 
distinct branches outside of this group. Isolates clustered mostly by MLST. Notably, there were 
multiple large clusters of MLST 796, spread across the majority of HCF. There were three 
clusters of MLST 1424, spread across several HCF. Interestingly, HCF B has identified at least 
one isolate of each of the most prevalent sequence types (MLSTs with more than ten isolates 
in the study). 
Phylogenetic analysis identified two divergent isolates originating from two different HCF. 
These isolates had a distance of more than 10,000 SNPs from other isolates in the study. One 
isolate was vanA, with a novel MLST, and the other was VSEfm, MLST 928. For useful 
visualisation, phylogenetic trees are presented excluding these isolates. 
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Figure 6. Phylogenetic tree displaying 314 E faecium isolates. Two highly divergent isolates have 
been excluded to enable data visualisation. The three columns adjacent to the phylogenetic tree 
display MLST, healthcare facility (HCF) and van gene. Only MLSTs with more than ten isolates are 
displayed. Only HCF with more than 20 isolates are shown.  
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One method to evaluate the presence of transmission within or between HCF is to use SNP 
cut-off levels to define clusters. Where clusters include isolates which originate from different 
HCFs, this could indicate transmission occurring between HCFs in Victoria. While several 
clusters were identified within each MLST examined, only MLST 1424 (present in the 2018, but 
not the 2015 study) and 796 (comprising the majority of vanB VREfm) are included here to 
demonstrate the identification of putative transmission events in Victoria. Other MLSTs are 
included in Appendix 2. 
Among MLST 1424, 32 of 33 isolates fell within three distinct clusters at the 25 SNP level 
(Figure 7).  
• Within these clusters, there were multiple clusters at the 5 SNP level
• Cluster one included eight HCF
• Cluster two included six HCF, and one community patient
• Cluster three included 11 isolates isolated from HCF B
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Figure 7. MLST 1424 vanA VREfm annotated by healthcare facility (HCF) code, displaying 
clusters at the 5 and 25 SNP level. Letters indicate HCF code. Coloured bars indicate 
clustering of isolates.
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Among MLST 796 VREfm isolates, there were six clusters at the 25 SNP level and 17 clusters 
identified at the 5 SNP level. The largest cluster identified, at the 25 SNP level, comprised 160 
of 183 isolates (87%) (Figure 8). The large cluster at the 25 SNP level incorporated 31 of 40 HCF 
(77.5%). 
Figure 8. MLST 796 VREfm tree annotated by healthcare facility (HCF) code, displaying 
linkage clusters at the 5 and 25 SNP level. Only HCF with more than 10 isolates shown. Five 
SNP clusters only shown where six or more isolates included in the cluster. 
5.4.1 Pairwise SNP differences 
One method of assessing the possibility of transmission of VREfm occurring is to examine the 
diversity of pairwise SNP differences among isolates originating from within a facility or from 
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two different facilities. When comparing two groups of isolates, the group with a lower 
number of pairwise SNP differences has a lower level of genetic diversity. Furthermore, a 
lower number of pairwise SNP differences could indicate transmission of isolates, as genetic 
diversity is expected to decrease with transmission and mixing of genetic material between 
isolates. 
vanA VREfm 
The median number of pairwise SNP differences within vanA VREfm isolates was higher than 
the median number found among vanB VREfm isolates (p<0.001). Among vanA VREfm, the 
median number of pairwise SNPs was higher between HCF than within HCF (Figure 11, 
Appendix 4).  
vanB VREfm 
Among vanB VREfm, the median number of pairwise SNP differences was higher among vanB 
excluding MLST 796 compared to vanB 796 only (p<0.001) (Figure 11, Appendix 4). Among 
vanB VREfm, the median number of pairwise SNP differences was higher within HCF compared 
to between HCF. For vanB VREfm 796 only, the median number of SNPs within HCF was higher 
than that between HCF.
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Figure 9. Comparison of pairwise SNP differences for vanB and vanA for isolates originating from within and between 
healthcare facilities (HCF). Where two isolates have originated from two different HCF, they have been classified as “between 
HCF.” Where two isolates have originated from the same HCF, they have been classified as “within HCF”. 
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Figure 10. Comparison of pairwise SNP differences for vanB excluding MLST 796 and for MLST 796 vanB only for isolates originating 
from within and between healthcare facilities (HCF). Where two isolates have originated from two different HCF, they have been 
classified as “between HCF.” Where two isolates have originated from the same HCF, they have been classified as “within HCF”. 
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6. Discussion
This study assessed the prevalence and genomic diversity of VREfm from all specimens, and 
VSEfm from blood cultures, over a one-month period in 2018 in Victoria. There has been no 
significant increase in the incidence of VREfm clinical infection since a similar cross sectional 
survey conducted in 2015, nor has there been an increase in the incidence of VREfm 
colonisation or clinical infection for vanA isolates. While the overall proportion of vanA VREfm 
has not increased between 2015 and 2018, the presence of a new MLST among vanA VREfm 
was identified, MLST 1424. In addition, multiple clusters of isolates were identified, indicating 
that transmission of VREfm is likely to be occurring within and between HCF in Victoria.  
While annual reports from the Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR) reported 
that the proportion of VREfm with vanA has increased in Victoria, the increase in Victoria is not 
statistically significant, consistent with our results (36). Of note, this study has identified MLST 
1424 vanA VREfm, which was not identified in the 2015 study. AGAR sentinel surveillance of 
blood cultures identified a single 1424 isolate in Victoria in 2017, and two isolates in 2018, 
however it was not reported in Victoria prior to this (19, 47-49). In 2016, AGAR identified 1424 
in NSW (19). In 2018, AGAR identified  1424 in all jurisdictions except for the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia, which could indicate that this MLST is spreading throughout 
Australia (49). In addition, in 2017, 1424 was isolated in Scotland, indicating possible 
international spread (50).  
MLST 1424 comprised the majority of vanA VREfm isolates in this study. Among 1424 vanA 
VREfm, there were three clusters containing potentially related isolates. Some clusters of MLST 
1424 were more closely associated with other MLSTs. This reinforces why WGS is useful for 
more accurate identification of transmission networks. Following application of WGS, MLSTs 
do not always cluster together, demonstrating the improved accuracy of WGS for defining 
linked isolates.  
MLST  1424 lacks one of the loci, pstS, one of the housekeeping genes on which the MLST 
scheme is based. E. faecium which lack this locus are known as pstS-, and include both MLST 
1421 and 1424. PstS- E. faecium was first isolated in Australia in 2012 and the emergence of 
these sequence types is thought to be contributing to the national increase in vanA VREfm 
(51). It has already been suggested that these isolates may be part of a multi-jurisdictional 
outbreak and they have been shown to have spread between Victoria and NSW (51, 52). In 
addition, the emergence of MLST 1421 and 1424 in recent years, both missing the pst allele, 
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suggests that MLST may become increasingly limited in its usefulness for the surveillance of 
VREfm, and that WGS is a more appropriate method (50, 51).  
The majority of VREfm identified within this study were ML ST 796 vanB isolates, consistent 
with the 2015 study and AGAR sentinel surveillance data (47). Not only is this MLST found in 
most HCFs, it caused most of VREfm bacteraemia identified in this study. The limited number 
of pairwise SNP differences among MLST  796 indicates a low level of genetic diversity 
compared to other vanB MLSTs. This low level of genetic diversity is likely to be a consequence 
of multiple episodes of transmission of 796 within and between HCF. Providing further 
evidence to the widespread transmission of vanB MLST  796, 87% of isolates in this study fell 
within a large cluster as defined at the 25 SNP level. 
The majority of VREfm in this study were isolated from specimens collected for screening 
purposes. While there was no significant difference in the proportion of vanA VREfm identified 
by screening compared to urine and clinical specimens, HCF B, which conducted increased 
screening as part of a point prevalence screen for the duration of the study, identified the 
majority of VREfm isolates submitted. The majority of 1424 isolates were isolated from 
screening specimens collected by HCF B. In addition, HCF B identified most of the patients in 
this study with VREfm with more than one van genotype and MLST and identified all seven of 
the most prevalent sequence types in the study. This could indicate that increased screening 
may capture a broader diversity of MLSTs, which is important for the identification of 
emerging sequence types and changes in the genomic epidemiology of VREfm.  
VREfm was distributed across many HCF. There were multiple clusters within all MLSTs 
analysed, which could indicate transmission both within and between Victorian HCF. Among 
vanA VREfm, there was a higher level of median pairwise SNP differences from isolates 
between HCF compared to within HCF. This could indicate that the population of vanA VREfm 
circulating within HCF have less genetic diversity than those between HCF. Therefore, it is likely 
that transmission of vanA VREfm between HCF is currently limited. Conversely, among vanB 
VREfm, there was a lower level of median pairwise SNP differences between HCF compared to 
within HCF. This could indicate that transmission of vanB VREfm between HCF is more 
widespread than vanA VREfm, as isolates between HCF are less genetically diverse than those 
circulating within individual HCFs. 
Among vanB VREfm, MLST 796 displayed a lower level of genetic diversity, as indicated by a 
relatively low number of pairwise SNP differences. This is consistent with this MLST being 
widespread throughout HCF in Victoria. Control of VREfm, by active surveillance screening, 
isolation of patients, and identifying patient contacts and transmission pathways, is resource 
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intensive. Future surveillance efforts need to prioritised, potentially focusing on preventing the 
spread of vanA VREfm, and in particular, the spread of new MLSTs such as 1424.   
6.1 Limitations 
This study had several limitations including a lack of standardised screening practices in 
Victorian HCF and insufficient epidemiological data to confirm putative transmission pathways. 
In addition, the effect of recombination on the genomics of VREfm has not yet been accounted 
for. 
At the time of this study, VREfm was not notifiable in Victoria, therefore surveillance and 
response was the responsibility of individual HCFs. In Victoria, there is currently no 
standardised screening or management guidelines for VRE (9). It is likely that varied screening 
practices result in several colonised patients not being identified, which contributes to the 
spread of VREfm within and between facilities. Variation in screening practices between HCFs 
also means it is likely that the numbers of VREfm identified within colonised patients have 
been underestimated by this study.  
Community patients in this study were defined as those where the healthcare origin was 
unknown. In reality, detailed healthcare history would be required to accurately classify 
patients as a community source of VREfm. Community isolates are usually defined as 
originating from patients with samples collected within 48 hours of admission to hospital (49). 
It is therefore possible that community patients have been misclassified. Furthermore, this 
study was not able to collect data on patient admissions or movements within and between 
HCFs in order to further identify putative transmission pathways. Future studies should 
endeavour to collect this information and combine it with genomic analyses to inform the 
required public health response. This is likely to be more feasible if vanA VREfm becomes 
notifiable under the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2019.  
As this was a laboratory based surveillance study, the clinical significance of isolates originating 
from urine samples was not always clear. As multi-resistant organisms can colonise the urinary 
tract, it is possible that many isolates from urine samples represent colonisation rather than 
infection. More detailed medical epidemiological data would be required to accurately classify 
these samples, as this information is often not provided on laboratory request forms, and 
needs to be obtained from the treating clinician. If isolates from urine samples represent 
colonisation, this study may have overestimated the true prevalence of VREfm infection. 
However, patients with urine colonised by VREfm still represent a possible source for 
transmission to the healthcare environment and other patients.  
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This study identified clusters based on SNP cut-off levels which are somewhat arbitrarily 
defined. Analyses have not yet accounted for the presence of recombination within VREfm, as 
this was considered beyond the scope of the project within the MAE context. This means that 
loci classified as an MLST may be reclassified once the effect of recombination is included (15). 
Recombination can also artificially inflate the number of SNPs (53). Further analyses will 
account for recombination in addition to conducting phylogenetic comparisons to isolates 
from the 2015 study. This may reveal additional clusters not identified in this analysis. 
6.2 Further work 
As mentioned, it is feasible that increased screening such as that being conducted by HCF B is 
able to identify a higher number of VREfm isolates and a wider diversity of MLSTs. To 
determine this in relation to specific facilities, additional information including the details of 
facility screening protocols for VREfm and the patient load of each facility are required. This 
could have implications for future screening practices, which could be based on the patient 
load of each facility, and how screening could be used as part of state-wide surveillance.  
As plasmids carried by VREfm can play an important role in transmission of van genes, 
additional analyses will also assess the role of VREfm plasmids in transmission. The use of a 
core genome approach to analyses means that the accessory genome (the part not shared by 
all isolates in this study) was not assessed (29). Further work may also include assessing the 
pan-genome (complete genome) and how this relates to the epidemiology of VREfm in 
Victoria. 
7. Conclusions
While this study has shown that the proportion of vanA VREfm have not increased in Victoria 
between the two study periods, 2015 and 2018, a new MLST was identified. This study has also 
demonstrated the potential use of WGS for future surveillance of VREfm in Victoria. WGS 
enabled the identification of several putative transmission events within and between 
Victorian HCF. These findings indicate that ongoing surveillance of VREfm, particularly vanA 
VREfm, is required, in order to inform appropriate public health measures to minimise further 
spread.  
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Appendix 1. VREfm phylogenetic trees 
Figure 11. MLST 203 E. faecium tree annotated by HCF code, displaying 
clusters at the 25 SNP level. Letters indicate HCF code, NK indicates no known 
HCF. 
Figure 12. MLST 1421 E. faecium tree annotated by HCF code, displaying 
clusters at the 5 and 25 SNP level. Letter indicate HCF code, NK indicates no 
known HCF. 
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Figure 13. MLST 17 E. faecium tree annotated by HCF code, displaying 
clusters at the 25 SNP level. Letter indicate HCF code. 
Figure 14. MLST 78 E. faecium tree annotated by HCF code, displaying 
clusters at the 5 and 25 SNP level. Letter indicate HCF code. 
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Figure 15. MLST 80 E. faecium tree annotated by HCF code, displaying clusters at the 5 and 25 
SNP level. Letter indicate HCF code.
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Appendix 2. 
Patients with more than one VREfm MLST or van gene 
Patient identification number  Sample type Van gene MLST Healthcare facility Interval 
2 Screening – rectal swab 
Screening – rectal swab 
vanB 
vanA 
Not typeable 
1424 
B Collected on the same day 
1 Screening – rectal swab 
Screening – rectal swab 
vanB 
vanA 
1283 
203 
B Collected 1 day apart 
15 Screening – rectal swab 
Screening – rectal swab 
vanB 
vanB 
796 
80 
B Collected 10 days apart 
29 Screening – rectal swab  
Clinical – peritoneal cavity fluid 
vanB 
vanB 
796 
Novel 1 
C Collected 1 day apart 
49 Screening – rectal swab 
Screening – rectal swab 
vanB 
vanB 
796 
992 
B Collected 10 days apart 
56 Urine 
Urine 
vanA 
vanB 
1424 
78 
L Collected on the same day 
58 Screening – rectal swab 
Screening – rectal swab 
vanB 
vanA 
Novel 2 
1424 
B Collected on the same day 
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Appendix 3. 
Pairwise SNP distribution among van genotypes and within and between healthcare facilities (HCF) 
Van genotype Median no. and range of pairwise SNP 
differences 
Difference in distribution between and 
within HCF 
More diversity within or between 
HCF? 
vanA 659 SNPs, range 0–7453 - Between 
Within HCF 157 SNPs, range 0–7028 p<0.001 
Between HCF 706 SNPs, range 0–7453 
vanB 83 SNPs, range 0–5902 - Within 
Within HCF 169 SNPs, range 0–5671 p<0.001 
Between HCF 76 SNPs, range 0–5902 
vanB MLST 796 only 29 SNPs, range 0–2231 - Within 
Within HCF 31 SNPs, range 0–2226 p<0.001 
Between HCF 29 SNPs, range 0–2231 
vanB excluding MLST 
796 
1993 SNPs, range 0–5902 - No difference 
p=0.17 
Within HCF 1754 SNPs, range 0–5671 p=0.40 
Between HCF 2021 SNPs, range 5–5902 
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Appendix 4. Vancomycin-resistant 
Enterococci (VRE) Patient Information Sheet 
What is VRE? 
Enterococci are bacteria which are normally found in the bowel of both humans and animals. 
Vancomycin is an antibiotic which is usually used to treat these bacteria. Some enterococci 
have developed resistance to vancomycin, therefore this antibiotic can no longer be used to 
treat these infections. These bacteria are called vancomycin-resistant enterococci or VRE.  
Causes of VRE 
Enterococcal bacteria can develop resistance to vancomycin in your bowel after you have 
taken broad-spectrum antibiotics. VRE can be spread by coming into contact with a person 
who has VRE, as the bacteria can be shed in the person’s faeces or on their skin.  
Most people who have VRE are colonised, meaning they have the bacteria in their bowel but 
do not show any symptoms of illness. Infections caused by VRE occur mostly in people who are 
already unwell or who have a poorly functioning immune system. People who carry VRE have a 
risk of developing an infection if they undergo treatment in an intensive care unit, receive 
haemodialysis or cancer treatment. Taking antibiotics can also increase your risk of developing 
an infection if you are already colonised by VRE. 
Diagnosis of VRE  
VRE may be diagnosed by your doctor if you develop an infection, such as an infected wound, 
urinary tract infection, or an infection of the blood. Alternatively, if you are admitted to 
hospital for another reason, you may be screened for the presence of VRE. Screening is 
performed to prevent VRE is from spreading between patients within a hospital. 
Hospitals often screen people who have previously been admitted to other hospitals for 
treatment, and those who have had known contact with other people who have had VRE in 
the past. Some hospitals screen all patients admitted to wards where this is a known risk of 
VRE, such as the intensive care unit, or oncology ward.  
The most common and preferred method for screening of VRE is to test a rectal swab or a 
sample of faeces. Swabs may also be taken from any open wounds or from catheters or 
cannulas. The test result from the screening sample will usually take one or two days to be 
received.  
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Stopping the spread of VRE 
As a precaution, patients suspected of having VRE may be placed in a separate hospital room, 
to prevent the bacteria spreading to other patients. Staff who come into contact with patients 
suspected of having VRE wear gowns and gloves to ensure they do not spread the bacteria to 
other patients. Any visitors need to clean and disinfect their hands before entering or leaving 
the room to prevent them contracting the bacteria.  
Treatment of VRE 
If you are diagnosed with VRE, your doctor will decide if you need any treatment. As many 
people carry VRE without displaying any symptoms of illness, you may not need any treatment. 
As part of future hospital admissions, you may be retested for VRE, as it is not clear how long 
people carry the bacteria for. 
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Appendix 5. Presentation at AEA 2019 
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1. Preface
In May 2018, the Communicable Diseases, Prevention and Control (CDPC) branch at the 
Victorian Government DHHS was notified of an outbreak by a regional council. The council 
received notification of a possible outbreak by a restaurant who had received several complaints 
from patrons. The patrons had developed a gastrointestinal illness following attendance at a 
Mother’s Day function held at the restaurant. Follow up of the initial complaints led to the 
identification of a food-borne outbreak. Dr Zoe Cutcher, an OzFoodNet epidemiologist at DHHS, 
assigned me to the outbreak investigation as it appeared to be an ideal scenario for me to apply 
my knowledge and meet this core competency for the MAE.  
1.1 My role 
I was a co-investigator in this outbreak, working in a team that included Senior Public Health 
Officer, Sally Atkinson. Several other Public Health Officers (PHOs) assisted with the interviewing 
of function attendees. Dr Zoe Cutcher provided me with advice on the design of a menu-based 
questionnaire and provided me with guidance on data analysis using Stata. Sally Atkinson was 
responsible for liaising with the regional council and the regional Environmental Health Officer 
(EHO). The regional EHO obtained booking lists, details of menu items, and food processes from 
the restaurant and conducted interviews of restaurant staff.  
My role in the investigation included: 
• Designing the structured outbreak investigation questionnaire
• Interviewing a proportion of the function attendees
• Entering completed questionnaires into the DHHS Public Health Event Surveillance
System (PHESS)
• Identifying notified cases with Salmonella species sharing Multiple-locus Variable
Analysis of tandem repeats (MLVA) patterns similar to the outbreak strain, in the month
prior to the outbreak
• Conducting three day food history interviews for notifications with MLVA patterns that
were similar to the outbreak strain
• Attending an inspection of the egg farm supplying the restaurant
• Extraction of questionnaire data into Microsoft Excel and analysis of responses using
Stata
• Write up of the epidemiological section of the outbreak report which was distributed to
the regional council
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1.2 Lessons learnt 
My involvement in this investigation enabled me to apply classroom skills and theory to a real-
world setting. I learned a number of invaluable skills that will be applied to future outbreak 
investigations. Practical skills obtained during this investigation include the design of a 
structured outbreak questionnaire, data entry into PHESS, linking individual cases to an outbreak 
event within PHESS, extracting data from PHESS into Microsoft Excel, and analysis of outbreak 
data in Stata. 
My experience of this investigation highlighted the importance of a teamwork approach, even 
in relatively small outbreaks. Having assistance from multiple PHOs, epidemiologists and EHOs 
ensured that the investigation was conducted as quickly as possible. I also encountered some of 
the difficulties of working with regional EHOs where communication is mostly by telephone. As 
the initial staff interviews and food processes information did not include adequate detail, 
several phone conversations with the regional EHOs and a second restaurant inspection were 
required to obtain additional information. For the next food-borne outbreak investigation I am 
involved in, I would consider holding a brief teleconference with council staff prior to the 
restaurant inspection in order to ensure clarity regarding the information and level of detail 
required.  
This investigation enhanced my understanding of the importance of pursuing multiple lines of 
evidence during an outbreak. Although the investigation was conducted in a timely manner, all 
food and environmental samples tested were negative for Salmonella. Despite this, 
epidemiological investigation combined with the detailed interrogation of food processes at the 
restaurant provided strong evidence for the suspected food vehicle involved in this outbreak. 
I gained experience in the use of MLVA to screen for additional cases of salmonellosis which may 
not have been initially apparent in the investigation. While the use of MLVA patterns did not 
identify any additional cases associated with this outbreak, this process demonstrated the 
importance of active case-finding. My involvement in this investigation also demonstrated the 
concept of undercount in relation to surveillance systems, as the interviewing process enabled 
the identification of cases of salmonellosis, which would not otherwise have been notified to 
the DHHS.   
The site visit to the egg farm was an invaluable experience. Despite my training as a veterinarian, 
prior to this investigation I had minimal understanding of the processes involved in egg 
production. I am now much more aware of the complexities of trace-back investigations, egg 
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safety, and pathogen transmission in food-producing animals. The egg farm visit also provided 
me with insight into the food supplier business’s perspective in an outbreak investigation.  
1.3 Public health implications 
This outbreak investigation provided opportunities to educate restaurant staff on safe food 
preparation, particularly for egg-based foods. As a result of the outbreak investigation, the 
regional council recommended that the restaurant use processed egg products, rather than 
fresh eggs in the future. The egg farm inspection enabled the Principal Veterinary Officer to 
educate the owner of the facility on additional methods to minimise the risk of Salmonella in 
poultry and eggs. These measures are expected to reduce the risk of salmonellosis outbreaks 
occurring as a result of the preparation of egg-based foods at this restaurant in the future.  In 
addition, the case interview process provided an opportunity to educate function attendees 
regarding the risks associated with eating food containing lightly cooked eggs. 
1.4 Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge the following people for their assistance with this project: 
• Dr Zoe Cutcher, OzFoodNet Epidemiologist, for involving me in this investigation,
teaching me how to design a menu-based questionnaire, and inviting me to attend the
site visit at the egg farm
• Marion Easton for showing me how to screen for additional outbreak cases of
Salmonella based on MLVA patterns and for extracting the relevant data from PHESS
• Dr Emma Field for providing useful feedback on my writing and data analysis
• Siobhan St George for teaching me how to construct a working Stata do-file and to
recode data for Stata analysis
• PHOs Sally Atkinson, Matthew De Souza, Dania Thakar, Sarah Cleghorn and Kay Sturge
for assisting with case interviews and patiently answering my questions
• The restaurant staff for participating in interviews and environmental investigation and
for providing function contact lists
• The egg supplier for allowing me to participate in the site visit
• Dr Joni Segal, Principal Veterinary Officer, for allowing me to participate in the site visit
and for sharing his wealth of knowledge
• All people who participated in questionnaires conducted as part of this investigation
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2. Abstract
Introduction: In May 2018 a Salmonella Typhimurium MLVA 03-15-11-10-523 outbreak 
occurred following a function held at a restaurant in Victoria. Epidemiological and 
environmental investigations were performed with the aim of determining the source of the 
outbreak. 
Methods: A retrospective cohort study was conducted. Function attendees were interviewed 
using a structured menu-based questionnaire. Descriptive analysis of the cohort was performed 
and the risk ratio of illness (RR) associated with the consumption of each menu item was 
calculated. Initial microbiological testing of faecal samples was conducted by either Victorian 
diagnostic laboratories or MDU. MDU performed MLVA on all S. Typhimurium isolates. 
Results: Thirty-nine out of 53 function attendees (73.6%) were interviewed. Nineteen cases 
were identified resulting in an attack rate of 48.7%. There was a significant association between 
consumption of chocolate mousse and illness (RR 5.1, 95% confidence interval: 1.8–14.6) 
indicating that this was the most likely food vehicle for Salmonella. The chocolate mousse was 
prepared using lightly cooked eggs. 
Conclusion: Chocolate mousse was the most likely food source for this outbreak. The use of 
lightly cooked eggs is likely to have contributed to contamination with Salmonella. Using 
appropriate cooking temperatures is essential when preparing eggs in order to minimise the risk 
of food-borne salmonellosis.  
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3. Background
Salmonella is a common cause of food-borne gastroenteritis (1). In addition to transmission 
through contaminated food, Salmonella can be spread through contact with the faeces of a 
person or animal that is infected with or carrying the bacteria (2). Salmonellosis can be severe 
with symptoms including fever, vomiting, and diarrhoea which may be bloody (3). 
Hospitalisation may be required due to dehydration or sepsis (3). Worldwide, non-typhoidal 
Annually, more than 90 million cases of gastroenteritis and 155,000 deaths are caused by 
Salmonella (4, 5). 
In Australia, the rate of Salmonella notifications has increased over the past five years (6). 
Salmonella is a significant cause of a large number of food-borne outbreaks (1, 7, 8). In 2017, 
there were over 16,000 notifications of salmonellosis in Australia, a rate of 67 per 100,000 
population per year (6). Salmonellosis is often associated with the consumption of foods 
containing undercooked egg (9). In 2011, OzFoodNet reported that almost half of Salmonella 
outbreaks were associated with eggs (8).  
There are more than 2,500 serotypes of Salmonella (3, 4, 10). Salmonella enterica serovar 
Typhimurium (hereafter referred to as S. Typhimurium) is the most commonly notified serotype 
and a common cause of salmonellosis outbreaks in Australia (8). S. Typhimurium was the 
causative agent of more than a quarter of Australian food-borne outbreaks from 2007-2011 (1, 
7, 8, 11-13). Eggs have caused many previous food-borne outbreaks of S. Typhimurium in 
Australia and internationally (14). From 2001-2011, more than 150 egg-associated outbreaks in 
Australia were caused by S. Typhimurium; this represented 90% of egg-associated outbreaks, 
caused 2,880 cases of illness, and more than 500 hospitalisations (15).  
While the infectious dose of Salmonella is low in humans, poultry may harbour Salmonella while 
displaying no signs of infection (16). Eggs can become contaminated with Salmonella by 
transmission from the chicken’s reproductive tract, or the bacteria can cross the eggshell during 
or after laying (17). Horizontal transmission, whereby Salmonella crosses the eggshell, is the 
most common way in which eggs become contaminated with S. Typhimurium (17, 18).  
Salmonella present on egg shells may contaminate the internal egg contents or other food 
during preparation (19). While the reported frequency of eggs contaminated with Salmonella is 
low, food-borne illness can occur when contaminated eggs are eaten raw or are only lightly 
cooked (20). As consumers are increasingly eating raw or lightly cooked foods, undercooked egg 
is of particular concern as a potential vehicle for salmonellosis (16).  
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In Victoria, all Salmonella isolates are sent to the MDU for further characterisation by subtyping. 
One method of typing is MLVA which is used for various species of Salmonella including S. 
Typhimurium (21). MLVA assesses the number of tandem repeats, which are short repetitive 
sequences of DNA, at rapidly evolving loci or sites of the bacterial genome (10, 22). Between 
isolates, the number of tandem repeats at each locus differs (12). The resulting MLVA pattern is 
a code indicating the number of repeats at each loci (23). MLVA is used to enable the detection 
of clusters of isolates and can be used to assist in determining causality and conducting trace-
back investigations (10, 22).  
Following a Mother’s day function held on 13 May 2018, a restaurant received several 
complaints from function attendees who had become ill with gastroenteritis.  The restaurant 
notified their local council regarding a possible food-borne outbreak. On 21 May 2018, the 
council notified CDPC. As the initial notification included reports of several people with 
gastroenteritis following attendance of the restaurant, an outbreak was identified. An outbreak 
investigation was conducted to identify the most likely source of illness.  The investigation also 
aimed to identify the need for public health action to prevent the occurrence of additional cases. 
4. Methods
A retrospective cohort study of the function attendees was conducted. Environmental 
investigation included a restaurant inspection, staff interviews, and a site visit of the egg 
supplier. Laboratory investigation included testing of faecal samples from cases, food and 
environmental samples from the restaurant, and environmental samples from the egg supplier. 
4.1 Epidemiological investigation 
4.1.1 Study population 
Booking lists were obtained from the restaurant in order to identify all function attendees. The 
restaurant had not received any reports of illness from patrons who had attended in the days 
prior or following the function, and there were no booking lists available for these days. The 
cohort initially included any person who had attended and eaten at the restaurant on Sunday 
13 May. The Mother’s day function comprised three sittings – breakfast, early lunch (11:00) and 
late lunch (14:00). Once it was determined that none of the 28 people who had eaten breakfast 
on the day had become ill, the cohort was refined to include only those who had eaten lunch at 
either the 11:00 or 14:00 sittings. The early lunch sitting included 28 diners and the late lunch 
sitting included 25 diners. The menu for both lunch sittings was identical, therefore diners in 
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these sittings were considered to be one cohort for analysis. The cohort was therefore defined 
as the 53 people who ate lunch at the restaurant on 13 May. 
4.1.2 Questionnaire design and interview of function attendees 
A structured outbreak investigation questionnaire was designed based on the set menu 
provided by the restaurant. The details of the function menu items were clarified with the 
restaurant via the local EHO. Attempts were made to interview all 53 people in the cohort by 
telephone. Function attendees that reported becoming ill after eating at the restaurant were 
asked to provide a faecal sample for laboratory testing if they had not already provided one as 
advised by their doctor.  On completion of the interview, all function attendees were educated 
regarding the risks associated with eating lightly cooked eggs.  
Two case definitions were developed (Box 1). Probable cases included anyone who ate at the 
restaurant on 13 May 2018 and subsequently developed gastroenteritis. To allow for staff who 
developed gastroenteritis following the function, the probable case definition also includes 
anyone directly involved in food preparation for the function. Confirmed cases included anyone 
who ate at the restaurant on 13 May, or was directly involved in food preparation for the 
function on the 13 May, subsequently developed gastroenteritis, and had provided a faecal 
sample that tested positive for S. Typhimurium. Once the MLVA pattern for the S. Typhimurium 
was determined, the confirmed case definition was revised to include the MLVA result. 
Box 1: Outbreak case definitions 
Confirmed case 
A person who ate at the restaurant on 13 May, 2018, or was directly involved in food 
preparation for the function held on 13 May, subsequently developed gastroenteritis, and 
had a faecal sample positive for S. Typhimurium MLVA 03-15-11-10-523. 
Probable case 
A person who ate at the restaurant on 13 May, 2018, or was directly involved in food 
preparation for the function held on 13 May and subsequently developed gastroenteritis 
with symptoms including diarrhoea, abdominal pain, vomiting and/or nausea within 72 
hours of attending the function, but did not have a faecal specimen tested by a laboratory. 
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4.1.3 Statistical analysis 
On completion of all interviews, responses were entered into the question package created in 
the DHHS notification database, PHESS. Data were then extracted into Microsoft Excel and 
analysed in Stata® IC 15.1 (StataCorp, Texas, USA). An epidemic curve was constructed which 
included both function attendee cases and staff cases. Descriptive analysis of cases was 
performed to characterise the demographics and symptoms. Univariate analysis was conducted 
to calculate the crude risk ratio for each menu item, with 95% confidence intervals (CI). For menu 
items where the number of exposures was too small (i.e. an exposure of zero was present), an 
exact logistic regression was used to calculate an adjusted odds ratio, with 95% CI.  
4.2 Environmental investigation  
4.2.1 Restaurant inspection and interrogation of food preparation 
An inspection of the restaurant was conducted on 18 May in accordance with the Victorian 
Guidelines for the investigation of gastrointestinal illness, using the Gastroenteritis Outbreak 
Onsite Assessment form (24).  The inspection included interviewing staff, collecting food 
samples, and reviewing food processes, hygiene and cleaning practices in the kitchen. Ill staff 
were asked about food consumed in the three days prior to onset of illness and were requested 
to provide faecal samples for laboratory testing. 
The restaurant inspection resulted in the identification of a number of high-risk foods containing 
undercooked egg. Details of the restaurant’s egg supplier were obtained and a site visit of the 
egg supplier was arranged. 
None of the food served at the function remained. An environmental swab from the 
KitchenAid™ was collected in addition to representative samples of menu-items containing raw 
or lightly cooked egg. Food samples collected included homemade ice-cream, chocolate mousse, 
eggs, and aioli. These samples were submitted to the MDU. A second restaurant inspection was 
conducted on 29 May to obtain further information on food preparation methods. 
4.2.2 Egg supplier inspection 
The Principal Veterinary Officer, together with the local District Veterinary Officer, conducted 
an inspection of the egg farm on 25 May. An Egg Standards Inspection Report was completed, 
which included assessment of egg processing and inspection methods, as well as physical 
inspection of the free range chicken sheds and flock health. A swab of chicken faecal matter was 
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collected from the floor of both chicken sheds in order to test the flock for S. Typhimurium. 
These samples were submitted to the diagnostic laboratory at AgriBio. 
4.2.3 Laboratory investigation 
Faecal samples obtained from function attendees who had become ill, and had not previously 
had a sample taken, were submitted to MDU for culture and MLVA testing. The MLVA pattern 
was used for active-case finding by comparing the MLVA pattern of the outbreak strain to that 
of S. Typhimurium cases notified to the DHHS in the month prior to the outbreak. Closely related 
MLVA strains are as those with the number of tandem repeats differing by one or two numbers 
at one of the second to the fourth loci (23). Any cases with an identical or closely related MLVA 
strain were contacted to obtain a history of foods consumed in the three days prior to onset of 
illness in order to assess if the case had attended the restaurant where the outbreak had 
occurred.  
4.3 Ethics approval 
This study was conducted as an outbreak investigation under the Victorian Public Health and 
Wellbeing Act 2008. This study was also covered by a waiver of consent under ANU HREC 
protocol 2017/909.  
5. Results
5.1 Epidemiological investigation 
Thirty-nine of the 53 function attendees were interviewed, a response rate of 73.6%. One guest 
was not able to be contacted and a dining group of 13 people declined to participate in 
interviews. Nineteen attendees reported becoming ill after eating at the restaurant, an attack 
rate of 48.7%. Of the 19 attendees, there were six probable and 13 confirmed cases.  
Among the 19 cases, 10 attended the 11:00 sitting and nine attended the 14:00 sitting. Of these, 
nine were male (47.4%), and 10 were female (52.6%). The median age of function attendee cases 
was 45 years, with a range of 10 to 81 years. The median age of all function attendees was 48 
years, with a range of 8-81 years.  
The majority of function attendees were interviewed within two weeks of the function (53.8%). 
All interviews were completed within 19 days of the function. Among the cases, interviews were 
completed a median of 10 days after the function. Of the entire cohort, interviews were 
completed a median of 12 days following the event.  
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Of the 19 cases, 15 sought medical care (78.9%), four attended an emergency department 
(21.1%) and two people required admission to hospital (10.5%). The majority of cases had 
symptoms including fever (78.9%), nausea (73.7%) and abdominal pain (89.5%) (Table 1). Less 
than half of the cases (42.1%) experienced vomiting. All cases had diarrhoea, of which one had 
bloody diarrhoea.  
Table 1: Symptoms of cases who attended a Mother’s Day function on 13 May 2018 in Victoria 
The median incubation period was 27.5 hours after attending the function with a range of nine 
to 53.5 hours. The time of onset was not reported by three cases, therefore an incubation period 
could not be calculated for these cases. The median duration of illness was eight days (range 
four to 14 days). Illness duration was not reported for seven cases. The epidemic curve was 
consistent with a point source outbreak (Figure 1). The number of cases peaked between midday 
and 18:00 on 14 May.  
Symptom Number Percent of all cases (n=19) 
Fever 15 78.9% 
Nausea 14 73.7% 
Vomiting 8 42.1% 
Abdominal pain 17 89.5% 
Diarrhoea 19 100.0% 
Watery diarrhoea 18 94.7% 
Bloody diarrhoea 1 5.3% 
Headache 12 63.2% 
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve displaying number of ill function attendees and staff by onset date 
and time1 
Among the menu items, the attack rate of the chocolate mousse (80.0%) was highest (Table 1). 
Univariate analysis of each menu food item found that the risk ratio of illness among those who 
consumed chocolate mousse served with coffee anglaise was highest (RR 5.1, 95% CI: 1.8–14.6). 
5.1.1 Interviews of ill staff 
After working at the restaurant on the day of the Mother’s Day function and/or being directly 
involved in food preparation the day prior to the function, three members of staff including the 
apprentice chef and two food handlers became ill. All ill staff had symptoms consistent with 
salmonellosis including watery diarrhoea and abdominal pain. Two of these staff members had 
laboratory-confirmed salmonellosis.  
The structured menu-based questionnaire was not administered to these staff, however a three 
day food history questionnaire was completed. These staff recalled tasting various food items 
including hot chips with aioli, chocolate mousse, and coffee anglaise while at work, however 
they were not able to recall specific details. These staff may have consumed various other items 
1 An onset of 12:00 on the date of onset is assumed for three cases where a time of onset was not 
recorded  
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in the restaurant. All ill staff were advised not to attend work until their symptoms resolved. 
Staff were not included in the epidemiological analysis. 
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Table 1: Univariate analysis of risk ratio (RR) for individual menu items. Values meeting statistical significance of p<0.05 are bolded. 
Food item Exposed Not exposed 
RR (95% CI) Exact logistic 
regression 
OR (95% CI) 
p 
value 
Ill Not ill Attack Rate Ill Not ill Attack rate 
Salami 16 15 51.6% 0 1 0 - 0.9 (0.0–∞) 1.000 
Mustard 8 10 44.4% 8 7 53.3% 0.8 (0.4–1.7) - 0.611 
Cornichon 12 13 48.0% 3 4 42.9% 1.1 (0.4–2.9) - 0.810 
Jamon (Spanish ham) 15 15 50.0% 0 1 0 - 0.9 (0.0–∞) 1.000 
Croquettes 19 18 51.4% 0 2 0 - 2.4 (0.2–∞) 0.487 
Aioli with croquettes 13 13 21.4% 2 5 28.6% 1.8 (0.5–6.0) - 0.312 
Salmon 14 15 48.3% 4 4 50.0% 1.0 (0.4–2.1) - 0.931 
Oysters 10 14 41.7% 9 6 60.0% 0.7 (0.4–1.3) - 0.265 
Beef 9 6 60.0% 10 14 41.7% 1.4 (0.8–2.7) - 0.265 
Duck 3 6 33.3% 16 14 53.3% 0.6 (0.2–1.7) - 0.292 
Barramundi 9 10 47.4% 10 10 50.0% 1.0 (0.5–1.8) - 0.870 
Fries 16 14 53.3% 1 3 25.0% 2.1 (0.4–12.0) - 0.287 
Aioli with fries 7 6 53.9% 9 6 60.0% 0.9 (0.5–1.7) - 0.743 
Chapter V: Salmonellosis at a Mother’s day lunch 
186 
Broccolini 12 17 41.4% 2 2 50.0% 0.8 (0.3–2.4) - 0.744 
Radish and shallot salad 15 12 55.6% 4 6 40.0% 1.4 (0.6–3.2) - 0.401 
Quince tart 5 5 55.0% 14 15 48.3% 1.0 (0.5–2.1) - 0.925 
Crème brulee 6 8 42.9% 11 12 47.8% 0.9 (0.4–1.9) - 0.769 
Chocolate mousse 16 4 80.0% 3 16 15.8% 5.1 (1.8–14.6) - <0.001 
Cheese platter 0 4 0.0% 19 16 54.3% - 0.2 (0.0–1.5) 0.106 
Aioli overall 14 13 51.9% 5 5 50.0% 1.0 (0.5–2.1) - 0.920 
Chicken 0 1 - 2 1 66.7% - 1.0 (0–39) 1.000 
Fish and chips 2 1 66.7% 0 1 0 - 1.0 (0.0–∞) 1.000 
Icecream 2 2 50.0% 0 0 0 - - - 
Cake 0 0 - 19 18 51.4% - - -
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5.2 Environmental investigation 
5.2.1 Restaurant inspection and food preparation interrogation 
The restaurant inspection found no obvious issues with hygiene or food storage. On the day of 
the function, a set menu was provided with a number of shared entrée, main, side dishes, and 
desserts served. The menu included several foods that contained raw or lightly cooked egg: aioli, 
chocolate mousse served with coffee anglaise, and home-made icecream. Children had the 
option of ordering from a separate menu with a limited number of items. 
The aioli and the chocolate mousse were prepared the evening prior to the function. The aioli 
contained raw egg, while the chocolate mousse contained egg yolk, which was lightly cooked 
over a water bath prior to storage in a cool room. Preparation of the chocolate mousse involved 
egg separation, which was performed by hand using the shell-shell method. Coffee anglaise 
accompanied the chocolate mousse and contained egg yolks, which had been heated to 
approximately 80°C in a Thermomix®. The homemade ice-cream also contained egg yolks which 
were cooked to approximately 80°C prior to being frozen. 
Staff interviews revealed that the eggs used for the above dishes had been delivered on 09 May 
and that the person delivering the eggs advised that they were softer than normal. The delivery 
person advised that this may have occurred as the farm had been in the process of removing old 
chickens and introducing new chickens. Both the head and assistant chef prepared the chocolate 
mousse and tasted it, reporting that the mix was softer than normal, potentially indicating that 
the eggs used were more runny than usual. 
5.2.2 Egg supplier inspection 
The inspection of the egg farm supplying the restaurant found no major issues. The farm 
operated a free-range system with chickens appearing to be in good health. The owner of the 
farm was unsure about the use of vaccines for Salmonella at the breeder from which he 
purchases the chickens. The condition of the chickens was checked on a daily basis and drinking 
water was free from contamination. Eggs are collected from the paddocks by hand and any 
soiled or cracked eggs being disposed of at the time of collection. The owner reported that egg 
washing is not performed as minimal numbers of soiled eggs are produced; small amounts of 
dirt on the surface of eggs are removed with sandpaper or a dry cloth. No records of cracked or 
discarded eggs were kept.  
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Eggs were visually inspected for cracks in the egg-processing shed. No handwashing facility was 
present in the egg sorting room; staff currently use the facilities at an adjacent restaurant. The 
Principal Veterinary Officer recommended that the owner inspect eggs for cracks using the 
candling method, as visual inspection may miss hairline cracks on the surface of the eggs. It was 
also recommended that handwashing facilities are installed in the sorting room as soon as 
possible and that records of cracked and soiled eggs should are kept at egg collection points. 
The egg supplier was advised to obtain chickens from a breeder who vaccinates their flock for 
Salmonella.  
5.2.3 Laboratory results 
Samples of the homemade ice-cream, chocolate mousse, eggs and aioli, and the environmental 
swab from the KitchenAid™ obtained from the restaurant were negative for Salmonella. The two 
environmental samples obtained from the egg farm were negative for Salmonella. Among the 
function attendees there were 13 laboratory confirmed cases of S. Typhimurium. Among the 
staff there were two confirmed cases of S. Typhimurium. All confirmed cases had the same 
MLVA pattern of 03-15-11-10-523.  
In the 30-day period prior to the outbreak, six cases with a similar or identical MLVA pattern had 
been notified to the DHHS. All of these cases were interviewed to obtain information on foods 
eaten in the three days prior to becoming ill. However, none of these cases reported dining at 
the restaurant involved in this outbreak and they were therefore excluded from the 
investigation. 
6. Discussion
6.1 Restaurant inspection and epidemiological investigation 
The epidemiological findings of the cohort study strongly supported the hypothesis that a food 
containing undercooked egg was the vehicle for salmonellosis. Eggs are frequently associated 
with outbreaks caused by S. Typhimurium and the consumption of raw or lightly cooked egg is 
a common factor in many previous outbreaks (15, 25-30). As indicated in this investigation, 
desserts containing egg that have not been heated adequately can act as a vehicle for the 
transmission of Salmonella (20).  
Despite a lack of microbiological evidence from food sampling in this investigation, univariate 
analysis strongly suggests that the chocolate mousse was the most likely vehicle for Salmonella. 
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In the cohort, those who consumed the chocolate mousse were five times (RR 5.1, 95% CI 1.8–
14.6) more likely to become ill, compared to those who did not consume the mousse. 
Negative culture results for the food samples tested in this investigation do not eliminate the 
chocolate mousse or the eggs as the underlying source of Salmonella in this outbreak. By the 
time of the restaurant inspection, all food served at the function associated with the outbreak 
had been discarded. Furthermore, Salmonella can be difficult to isolate from affected eggs (2). 
A study conducted from 2001–2009 found that Salmonella was only detected in eggs in 39% of 
outbreaks investigated where eggs were implicated (15). Even in experimentally infected 
chickens with confirmed colonization of reproductive tissue, S. Typhimurium was unable to be 
cultured from the internal contents of eggs (31).  
Food preparation techniques are an important aspect of preventing food-borne disease. The 
cooking process for the chocolate mousse was one of the main risks identified at the restaurant 
in relation to this outbreak. The chocolate mousse contained egg, which had been lightly cooked 
over a water bath of unspecified temperature. To minimise the risk of Salmonella transmission, 
egg should be adequately cooked to more than 75°C (19). The shell-shell separation method of 
eggs used for the chocolate mousse may have caused the egg contents to be contaminated by 
the eggshell. A sanitised egg separator is the recommended method for egg separation (14, 19). 
Although the coffee anglaise was served with the chocolate mousse, it contained egg that had 
been heated to 80°C and was therefore an unlikely vehicle for Salmonella.  
The restaurant inspection also identified the use of raw egg in aioli, another high-risk food for 
Salmonella. The aioli was not implicated as a food vehicle in this outbreak. The aioli was served 
with both the croquettes and the fries and had a risk ratio of 1.0 (95% CI 0.5–2.1). This indicates 
that there was no increase in the risk of becoming ill in those who consumed the aioli, compared 
to those who did not. It is likely that only a small number of eggs within the batch used to prepare 
food for the function were contaminated with Salmonella. It is possible that by chance, the eggs 
used to prepare the aioli were not contaminated.  
To minimise the risk of future outbreaks of salmonellosis, recommendations for the restaurant 
include the use of safer alternatives to raw or lightly cooked egg including pasteurised egg 
products, liquid, frozen or dried processed eggs, or sugared eggs for use in desserts (19). As 
some restaurants prefer not to use these alternative products, restaurant staff were also 
educated on the safe preparation of egg-based foods.  
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The requirement for a second restaurant visit highlighted the need for standardised data 
collection when conducting restaurant inspections as part of gastroenteritis outbreak 
investigations. It also indicated the need for regular training of EHOs, who may only sporadically 
be involved in outbreak investigation. Since this investigation the Victorian Guidelines for the 
investigation of gastroenteritis (32) have been revised. These revisions may contribute to the 
improved conduct of future investigations. 
6.2 Investigation of the egg supplier 
S. Typhimurium is thought to be endemic in Australian layers, however data on the prevalence
of Salmonella contaminated eggs, and the prevalence on Australian egg farms is limited (15, 33). 
The negative results for environmental samples obtained from the egg farm do not eliminate 
eggs as the underlying source of Salmonella in this outbreak. Faecal shedding of Salmonella may 
not accurately indicate the presence in the caecum of affected chickens (34). Furthermore, there 
is no correlation between the level of Salmonella in faeces and the recovery of Salmonella from 
the surface of the egg shells in experimentally infected chickens (31). Chickens colonised by S. 
Typhimurium are likely to shed the organism intermittently, with the amount shed varying with 
the stress levels of the individual, the season and the stocking density (9, 31). As Salmonella is 
shed intermittently the organism is difficult to isolate from infected flocks and successful 
isolation therefore depends on the number and type of samples collected (9). As only a single 
sample was collected from each chicken shed in this investigation, the negative results may be 
a result of intermittent shedding.  
The results of restaurant staff interviews suggest that the egg supplier’s chicken flock had 
recently been changed over. The change-over process is likely to act as a source of stress for the 
flock, potentially precipitating the shedding of Salmonella (31). As the eggs used to prepare the 
food for the function were delivered four days prior to the restaurant function and more than a 
week before the egg farm was inspected, the samples taken may not have originated from the 
same flock that had laid the eggs implicated in this outbreak. 
To reduce the number of outbreaks associated with the consumption of eggs, ongoing education 
of consumers and food-preparation staff and businesses is needed, however measures to 
minimise bacterial contamination of eggs at the farm level are also required (21). Any cracks and 
hairline fractures of the eggshell may provide a route for Salmonella to enter the internal egg 
contents (20). It is therefore recommended that the farm implement egg-candling practices to 
reduce the chance of missing small cracks in their egg supplies. Vaccination of chickens with a 
mutant live attenuated vaccine provides some protection against intestinal infection and can 
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decrease the risk of egg contamination with Salmonella by reducing the possibility of shedding 
(9, 35). The farm inspected during this investigation was unaware of the availability of the 
Salmonella vaccine, and will obtain information on the vaccination status of the farm from which 
chicks are purchased. 
6.3 Limitations 
Limitations of this cohort study included a lack of microbiological evidence to support the 
epidemiological findings, and potential recall bias for some interviews.  As the majority of 
function attendees were interviewed within two weeks of the outbreak, recall bias is likely to be 
minimal for the cohort study. However, some interviews were completed up to 19 days after 
the outbreak occurred, due to difficulties contacting several function attendees. Recall bias may 
have been significant for a small number of participants who were interviewed more than two 
weeks after attending the function. Recall bias may have caused differential misclassification of 
exposure, as function attendees without illness may have been less likely to recall menu items 
consumed, compared to attendees who experienced illness. This may have biased the results 
away from the null. This was somewhat unavoidable as CDPC was not notified of the outbreak 
until eight days after the restaurant function. 
The use of a structured outbreak questionnaire minimised the occurrence of interviewer bias. 
The outbreak investigation team included several highly experienced PHOs who assisted with 
conducting interviews of function attendees. Due to their experience, most of the PHOs were 
likely aware that a food item containing raw or lightly cooked egg was the source of the outbreak 
from the outset of the investigation. Providing those who conducted interviews with a 
structured set of interview questions ensured that PHOs asked about all individual menu items 
consumed, regardless of their suspicions regarding the source of the outbreak.  
There was a lack of microbiological evidence to support the chocolate mousse or the eggs as the 
causative agent of the outbreak, as all of the food items served at the function had either been 
discarded or consumed by the time the restaurant inspection was conducted. Furthermore, as 
it is possible that the swabs collected at the egg farm were collected from a different flock of 
chickens to those that laid the implicated eggs, it is not possible to definitively confirm the 
source of the Salmonella in this outbreak.  
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7. Conclusions
This outbreak was one of the many Salmonella outbreaks associated with egg-based foods each 
year. The environmental investigation highlighted several risky food preparation practices in 
place at the restaurant, and enabled restaurant staff to be educated on the risks associated with 
the preparation of egg-based dishes. Restaurant staff were also provided with 
recommendations on changes in practices to minimise the risk of future outbreaks.  
The site visit to the egg farm enabled some issues in the production chain to be identified, and 
provided an opportunity for education of the producer regarding ways in which the risk of 
Salmonella contamination of eggs can be minimised. Ongoing education of Victorian food 
businesses, food preparation staff, egg producers and consumers is essential to minimise the 
number of egg-associated Salmonella outbreaks in the future.  
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1. Preface
OzFoodNet conducts surveillance of foodborne disease in Australia. In early April 2018, 
OzFoodNet instigated a multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation (MJOI) in response to seven 
cases of locally acquired hepatitis A virus (HAV). All cases were genotype IB, and six of seven 
cases reported the consumption of frozen pomegranate. Commencing on 13 April 2018, a 
national case control study was led by Health Protection New South Wales (NSW). 
Dr Zoe Cutcher, an OzFoodNet Epidemiologist based at the DHHS, requested my assistance 
with interviewing case controls as part of the MJOI. I conducted interviews from late April to 
mid-May 2018. As I was not involved in data analysis or the synthesis of the outbreak report, I 
have not reported the study’s findings or methodology in detail. This chapter describes my 
experience of recruiting case controls as part of this investigation and provides a synopsis of 
the case-control study findings as reported by OzFoodNet. 
1.1 My role 
I was responsible for recruiting Victorian controls as part of the MJOI, with the aim of 
identifying and interviewing two controls for each case.  
• I liaised with Victorian OzFoodNet Epidemiologists in order to obtain and clarify the
details of the study protocol and the contact details for potential controls
• I contacted controls, assessed their eligibility for inclusion in the case-control study
and conducted case-control interviews as per the study protocol
• Once the control questionnaire was completed for the HAV MJOI, I also administered
standard salmonellosis, campylobacteriosis or cryptosporidiosis case questionnaires to
assess risk factors and obtain three day food histories, to be utilised if the person was
subsequently included in a gastroenteritis outbreak investigation
• I entered standard questionnaire results into the Public Health Event Surveillance
System (PHESS) and liaised with OzFoodNet Epidemiologists once case-control
interviews were complete
1.2 Lessons learnt 
This investigation demonstrated the resource-intensive nature of case-control studies. The 
volume of calls and interviews required to recruit controls enabled me to refine and enhance 
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my skills in conducting questionnaires.  The interview process also highlighted the potential for 
recall bias within case-control studies. 
1.3 Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge the following people for their assistance with this project: 
• Dr Zoe Cutcher and Joy Gregory, Victorian OzFoodNet Epidemiologists, who provided
me with the contact details for controls, and additional controls when I had exhausted
the original possibilities
• Ana-Lena Arnold, Epidemiologist at the DHHS, for sharing her experiences recruiting
controls for a previous foodborne Hepatitis A MJOI, and for encouraging me to include
this activity in my bound volume
• Kaye Sturge, Senior Public Health Officer, for assisting me with the logistics of
completing interviews and providing advice on how to conduct them efficiently and
accurately
• All participants who completed questionnaires as part of this investigation
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2. Background
HAV is transmitted by the faecal-oral route and can be spread by direct contact or through the 
consumption of contaminated food (1-3). Infection causes fever, inappetance, nausea, fatigue, 
abdominal pain, diarrhoea and jaundice which may progress to liver failure (1, 2, 4, 5). While 
adults usually develop symptomatic infection, infected children may remain asymptomatic (5). 
HAV has an average incubation period of 30 days, ranging from 15-50 days (1, 2).  
Consequently, as an infected person starts to shed the virus in faeces prior to the development 
of symptoms, the virus can be transmitted while asymptomatic (1, 2).  
Areas including South East Asia and Africa are endemic for HAV (6). Countries with a low 
incidence of HAV, including Australia, often import frozen food products from countries 
endemic for HAV, creating a potential route for foodborne transmission. Over the past five 
years there have been several foodborne outbreaks of HAV worldwide,  associated with the 
consumption of semi-dried tomatoes, frozen pomegranate and frozen berries (2, 4-11). In 
Australia in 2015, a MJOI of HAV was associated with the consumption of imported frozen 
mixed berries (12). 
HAV is a non-enveloped RNA virus able to persist for long periods in the environment (1). 
When present on frozen fruit, HAV can remain infectious for months (13). As frozen fruit 
products pass through multiple processing stages including sorting, washing, draining and 
packing, there are several points at which HAV contamination may occur (9).  
There are six HAV genotypes, with I to III causing infection in humans (11). The genotypes are 
subdivided into A and B (11). HAV is difficult to grow in cell culture and is rarely done. 
Therefore, molecular testing including PCR is used to detect HAV and genomic sequencing uses 
the PCR product to subtype the virus (1).  
Three cases of HAV, genotype IB, were identified in NSW in late March 2018. This genotype 
had not been previously detected in Australia. The cases had no history of overseas travel, and 
illness appeared to be associated with the consumption of imported frozen pomegranate arils 
(14). Four additional cases of locally acquired HAV were identified across four jurisdictions. Of 
a total of seven locally acquired HAV cases, six had consumed frozen pomegranate. Food 
Standards Australia and New Zealand subsequently implemented a national recall of frozen 
pomegranate on 7 April 2018, and OzFoodNet initiated a MJOI on 10 April 2018.  
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3. Methods
3.1 Study design 
A prospective, frequency matched case-control study was conducted to obtain epidemiological 
evidence for the association of HAV with the consumption of frozen pomegranate (14). Each 
jurisdiction was responsible for interviewing cases and controls residing within their state.  
For each case of HAV, two controls were recruited. Controls were frequency-matched to cases 
by age group. Controls were also matched by local government area (LGA) and where possible, 
sex. At the DHHS, controls were identified from other notifiable enteric disease cases stored in 
the notifiable disease database, PHESS. Controls were initially selected from notifications of 
salmonellosis, followed by campylobacteriosis, and lastly, other cases of notifiable diseases 
such as cryptosporidiosis. 
The case-control questionnaire commenced with questions to assess eligibility to be a control 
and obtain information on demographics. Eligible controls were then asked questions that 
assessed their exposure to a range of fresh and frozen food items in the five weeks prior the 
onset of their notifiable illness. This period was chosen to coincide with the incubation period 
for a HAV case. The participants were also asked about their awareness of the recent recall of 
the frozen pomegranate product.  
Whole genome sequencing often takes some time to be completed. This means that there 
were several Victorian locally acquired cases of HAV suspected to be part of the MJOI, pending 
sequencing results. To ensure that case-controls were interviewed as soon as possible, the 
control recruitment process was therefore initiated prior to confirmation of cases as HAV 
genotype IB.  
3.1.1 Case definition 
As per the study protocol, probable cases had to satisfy the following three conditions (14): 
• a person infected with HAV, with sequencing results pending or unavailable
• with an onset of illness from 1 January, 2018
• had spent some of their incubation period (15-50 days prior to onset of illness) in
Australia
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Confirmed cases were those infected with HAV, genotype IB, with an onset from 1 January, 
2018, and spent some of their acquisition period (15-50 days before onset of illness) in 
Australia (14). 
3.1.2 Selection of controls 
Controls had to satisfy the following three conditions: 
• notified to the DHHS and with a specimen collection date in the two weeks before the
onset of the corresponding HAV case
• same age group as the case (e.g. 0 to 14 years)
• with a residential address in the same LGA as the HAV case
When a control could not be identified from the same LGA, they were selected from 
neighbouring LGAs. Controls with a specimen collection date closest to the onset date of the 
corresponding case were prioritised.  
3.1.3 Eligibility of controls 
Controls who had lived in a country with a high incidence of HAV for more than a year in the 
first five years of life were excluded from the study. In these countries, HAV is often contracted 
as a child, therefore the majority of adults have HAV IgG antibodies (6).  
Controls who met any of the following conditions were excluded (14): 
• Previous infection with HAV or symptoms (e.g. jaundice) that may indicate previous
HAV infection
• Previous vaccination for HAV
• Previous treatment with normal human Immunoglobulin in the two months prior to
the onset of diarrhoea
• Salmonellosis or campylobacteriosis cases currently included in an outbreak
investigation
• People who are not contactable by mobile or landline telephone following two
attempts during business hours and two attempts after hours
• People who do not speak English or who cannot answer questions coherently
• People with a history of overseas travel in the two months prior to the onset of
diarrhoea
• People with close contact with someone known or thought to have HAV in the two
months prior to the onset of diarrhoea
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Once completed, questionnaires were provided to an information officer within the DHHS, to 
be entered into SharePoint. 
4. Results
4.1 Recruitment of case-controls in Victoria 
Over a two and a half week period, I made 76 phone calls as part of the study. This does not 
include additional phone calls which were sometimes required to obtain or confirm the 
control’s contact information, or to determine the referring doctor, if these details had been 
not been provided on the notification form.  
For four cases of HAV I successfully recruited eight controls over a two to three week period. 
As part of this process, I excluded 21 potential controls from inclusion in the study. This 
included: 
• Seven controls excluded due to previous HAV vaccination
• Two controls excluded due to previous HAV infection or symptoms potentially
indicating previous HAV infection
• Five people excluded due to travel overseas in the two months prior to developing
diarrhoea
• Five people who were unable to be contacted
• One person excluded due to birth in a country that is endemic for HAV
• One person excluded as they were unable to coherently complete the questionnaire
4.2 Summary of the MJOI (14, 15) 
Australia wide, a total of 30 cases met the confirmed case definition (14). There were 15 (50%) 
cases in NSW, six (20%) in Victoria, three (10%) in Western Australia, two (7%) each in South 
Australia and the Northern Territory, and one (33%) each in Queensland and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
Primary outbreak cases are those thought to have contracted HAV from the consumption of 
imported frozen pomegranate. There were 27 primary outbreak cases (90%), of which 18 
(67%) recalled consuming frozen pomegranate during their incubation period for HAV. Two 
cases recalled consuming frozen pomegranate in a salad purchased from a café, and one case 
was too unwell for interview, however frozen pomegranate was found in the case’s freezer 
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indicating possible consumption. Five cases (19%) could not recall consuming any 
pomegranate during their incubation period.  
Only one case, from NSW, reported a history of travel, to the USA, during their incubation 
period for HAV. There were three secondary cases, all in NSW, with epidemiological links to 
confirmed cases. These secondary cases were likely acquired through sexual contact.  
Twenty five cases (83%) required hospitalisation. One case residing in South Australia died, 
however it was unclear if this was as a direct result of HAV infection. 
4.3 Case-control study 
Thirteen cases of HAV genotype IB and twenty-one controls were included in the case control 
study. Victoria contributed seven controls for six cases. Univariate analysis for the association 
of infection with HAV genotype IB and the consumption of food items was conducted. Analysis 
identified an association between HAV infection and the consumption of several frozen fruits, 
with the strongest association identified for frozen pomegranate (Odds ratio 45.0, 95% CI 3.8-
2065.4, p<0.001)(14). 
4.4 Environmental investigation 
The frozen pomegranate implicated as the causative agent of this outbreak was imported from 
Egypt and had been distributed throughout Australia. A trace back investigation found that the 
pomegranate was most likely contaminated with HAV before importation into Australia. The 
Egyptian government were therefore responsible for investigation into the possible cause of 
the contamination. 
Nucleic acid testing of frozen pomegranate samples found one packet that was positive for 
HAV however the virus was not able to be typed. Any remaining frozen pomegranate was 
collected from the houses of HAV cases, as well as from retail and distribution centres.  
4.5 Control measures 
Subsequent to a national recall of the brand of frozen pomegranate implicated in this 
outbreak, individual jurisdictions published media releases regarding the outbreak’s 
association with frozen pomegranate. No further cases of HAV genotype IB were identified. 
Following the MJOI, the Australian Government implemented inspection and testing of all 
imports from the manufacturer of the pomegranate associated with the outbreak.  
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5. Discussion
This investigation taught me that recruiting controls can be a time-consuming and challenging 
process which requires persistence. At times, organising the most convenient time for 
interview was difficult and required multiple voicemails or after-hours phone calls over several 
days. Due to the number of controls that were excluded from the study and the time spent 
undertaking this process, it is likely that a degree of recall bias existed for some participants. 
As some controls were contacted many weeks after their potential exposure period, they may 
have been less likely than HAV cases to accurately recall the foods that they consumed.  This 
may have resulted in differential misclassification of exposure to the food item responsible for 
the outbreak between cases and controls, and therefore biased the study results away from 
the null. 
My involvement in this investigation has enabled me to become confident in conducting case-
control questionnaires. The process of control recruitment required me to clearly explain the 
reason for calling and to clarify the rationale for the case-control questionnaire. I also learnt 
the importance of adhering to the written wording of the questions in the structured case 
control questionnaire and ensuring that a clear “yes”, “no” or “don’t know” answer was 
obtained for each question. 
At times throughout the recruitment process it was difficult to ensure the exclusion criteria 
were accurately adhered to. Many controls were unable to remember if they had been 
vaccinated for HAV in the past, or how many vaccinations they had received. I often had to ask 
several follow up questions to determine the likelihood of previous vaccination. If there was 
any possibility of previous vaccination, I deemed the control ineligible and they were excluded 
from the study. Adhering to the study criteria was important as previous HAV vaccination 
would reduce the risk of contracting the infection, causing differential misclassification of 
exposure. Inclusion of previously vaccinated controls in the study may have biased analysis 
results towards the null.  
As part of the case-control questionnaire, all participants were asked if they were aware of the 
recent recall of frozen pomegranate, as this was the implicated food vehicle for the HAV 
outbreak. Interestingly, the majority were unaware of the recall. In future, consideration 
should be given to expanding the ways in which food recall information is disseminated.   
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6. Conclusion
My involvement in this case control study enabled me to understand some of the complexities 
in the study design and recruitment of controls in case-control studies. My experience 
conducting interviews also demonstrated the potential sources of bias in case-control studies.  
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1. Introduction
MAE scholars are required to be involved in two teaching activities to meet a teaching 
competency. These include designing and presenting a lesson to the first year MAE cohort, in 
addition to teaching a lesson from the field (LFF) to a group of our peers. My LFF was 
conducted within a group of five other MAE scholars. 
1.1 Lesson from the field 
Within the first few weeks of my field placement, I was asked to analyse data from the 
Victorian Seasonal Influenza Survey. This survey was designed by the media team at the DHHS 
to ascertain the level of knowledge of influenza among the general population of Victoria. The 
aim of the survey was to understand how the vaccination rates for influenza could be 
improved over the coming year. The findings of the survey were planned to be used to inform 
the media team’s upcoming flu campaign.  
I was very new to the field of epidemiology and data analysis at the time I was given this 
project, however the analysis was made more challenging due to several issues identified in 
the design of the survey. For example, there didn’t appear to be a clear hypothesis, and some 
of the questions had overlapping answer options. I later identified this scenario as a good 
opportunity for an LFF on the topic of survey design. 
I had approval to provide my LFF group with a copy of the survey for the lesson. I designed the 
LFF to encourage critical evaluation of the survey questions. The learning objectives of the LFF 
were to understand the steps and potential pit-falls associated with questionnaire design, and 
to demonstrate the importance of the steps of survey design and careful wording of questions. 
The LFF also provided a brief introduction to some methods that are available for the analysis 
of multiple-response questions in STATA. 
1.2 Teaching session for the first year MAE scholars 
I worked within a group of three MAE scholars to design and present a 30-minute session on 
data visualisation. The learning objectives were to gain an understanding of the importance of 
data visualisation and to introduce the variety of methods available. To make the lesson 
engaging, we also included examples of data visualisation for the students to evaluate and 
presented a demonstration using Power BI, a business analytics data visualisation software. 
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The sessions were evaluated using a brief questionnaire completed on the day. First year 
scholars were asked to rate the clarity of the learning objectives, the level of engagement of 
the presenters, the pace of the session and the usefulness of the content. Overall, students 
found our session useful and engaging with clear objectives.  
In addition to the above, I also participated in teaching an existing outbreak investigation case 
study to the first-year scholars. This involved leading a small group discussion together with 
another student within my cohort, as part of a sixty minute session.  
1.3 Lessons learnt 
My involvement in the above activities has confirmed my enjoyment teaching and 
collaborative discussions. The teaching session for the first years also further developed my 
public speaking skills.  
The experience of teaching the first year MAE scholars taught me the importance of writing 
presentations that are tailored to the audience. In future when teaching a postgraduate 
session, I would further investigate the level of prior knowledge of the students. The 2019 MAE 
cohort is particularly experienced and knowledgeable, therefore our session could have gone 
into further detail. Next time I am involved in teaching as part of a course, I would also obtain 
additional information on the content that had already been delivered to the students. This 
would further assist me in conducting a lesson appropriate to the audience. IT issues on the 
day of the teaching session highlighted the need to practice presentations in the environment 
in which they are to be delivered. 
Creating the LFF taught me the importance of constructing clearly worded, unambiguous 
questions. The LFF teleconference demonstrated the benefit of collaborate discussions. 
Designing the LFF also enabled the consolidation of my own knowledge on survey design and 
analysis. Due to the broad experience of my LFF group, the teleconference discussion provided 
me with additional strategies which I could use to improve my analysis in the future. 
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Appendix 1: LFF  
Lessons from the Field number 2 
Survey design and analysis of multiple response questions 
About this LFF 
This LFF has two parts. Part 1 consists of some questions about survey design in relation to a 
real-life case study survey on seasonal influenza. Part 2 consists of a brief exercise using the 
package mrtab to analyse multiple response questions in STATA.  
Learning objectives 
By the end of this LFF you should be able to: 
1. Understand the steps in designing a questionnaire
2. Understand the potential pit-falls associated with questionnaire design
3. Have an understanding of how to construct and word a questionnaire
4. Be able to apply some of the techniques that are available for the analysis of
multiple-response questions in STATA
The LFF teleconference has been booked for Friday the 2nd of May, 2019 for 2:00PM EST. 
The answers for the case study are due on Friday the 2nd of May. 
Participants are to dial……….and then enter the pin number which is………. 
If you have any difficulties connecting to the teleconference, you can contact Sophie on 
0412 317 347 or at Sophia.Bowman-Derrick@dhhs.vic.gov.au 
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Part 1. Survey design 
You are the new MAE at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in Victoria. 
The media and communications team has recently conducted a survey which intended to 
inform their upcoming flu season campaign. They had hoped to determine the potential 
reasons underlying low vaccination rates for influenza in the general population. The results 
of the survey were to be used to inform a media campaign to increase influenza vaccination 
rates. The media team asks for your help with analysing the survey results.  
Unfortunately, the epidemiology team was not consulted as part of the planning and design 
of the survey. Consequently, there are some issues with the survey, making the analysis 
challenging. The survey participants were heavily biased as more than half of them identify 
as health-care workers (HCW). You are told that the survey was largely disseminated via the 
Better Health website. This survey will be conducted again during the next flu season. 
Your role is to: 
• Identify how the survey can be improved for the following flu season
• To determine how to analyse survey questions where a respondent can select
multiple answers
The following readings (provided with this document) may be useful for part 1 of the LFF: 
• Surveys and sampling design. (Chapter 6 Field Epidemiology). Page 1-7 only are
relevant to survey design
• Hands-on guide to questionnaire research. Selecting, designing and developing your
questionnaire. Page 1312-1315.
• Developing a Questionnaire.
• Tip Sheet on question Wording.
To get started, open the pdf file titled “Seasonal influenza survey.” 
Question 1. Based on the survey questions provided, what are three 
possible hypotheses that this survey aimed to address?  
1. That people lacking knowledge of influenza have low rates of influenza
vaccination
2. That people who have regular contact with health professionals are more likely to
be vaccinated for influenza.
3. Those who have had influenza in the past are more likely to be vaccinated for
influenza.
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Question 3. What are three ways in which the flow of the survey be 
improved? 
Question 4. List two questions from the survey that you think are not 
relevant to the objective of understanding the reasons underlying low 
vaccination rates for influenza. Briefly explain why you think the 
question is not relevant.  
Question 5. For the following three questions from the survey, how can 
the wording or structure of the question be improved? 
1. “Are you employed in any of the following sectors? (Tick all that
apply)”
2. “How much influence does advice from a health professional have
on your decision to be immunised, or encourage others to be
immunised?”
3. “Have you ever had flu?"
1. With the use of skip patterns (unclear if these were utilised in the original survey
design)
2. Using introductory statements to explain why certain questions are being asked. E.g.
Question 1. To question 3. The following questions aim to assess your knowledge of
flu.
3. Use of subheadings to separate ‘blocks’ of questions
1. “Were you tested by a doctor?” This question really relates to diagnostic practices of
doctors and isn’t relevant to understanding low vaccination rates.
2. “If you went to hospital when ill with the flu, what were your main reasons for going
to hospital?” This question relates to understanding reasons for hospital attendance,
but was possibly included to assess perceived severity of influenza.
1. The question could ask which category best describes the main area of the
respondent’s employment. The question could be more specific about the
employment categories e.g. Health = those working in direct contact with patients,
for example nurses, doctors, pharmacists
2. This question could be broken down into several questions, for example, a series of
statements asking the respondent to rate the degree to which the situation
influences their decision to be immunised. E.g. Your GP recommends the influenza
vaccine. Please select the answer which most accurately represents how strongly
this influences your decision to be vaccinated: a) not at all, b) somewhat, c)
strongly
3. This question could be improved by better defining what is meant by flu. E.g. Have
you ever had a flu or flu-like illness where you had chills, fever, fatigue, a dry
cough? I.e. define the difference between cold and flu for the respondent.
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Question 6. “What was your reason for not getting the flu vaccine? 
(Tick all that apply)”.  
Suggest how this question could be changed to better address the 
objective “understanding the reasons underlying low influenza 
vaccination rates”. E, g, could additional answer choices be provided, 
or could the answer choices be given in a different way?  
Question 6. What are three steps that should be completed before 
beginning to write the questions for a survey? 
Question 7. Half of the respondents were health care workers. How 
could the survey have been better disseminated to get a representative 
sample of the population? 
1. Social media advertising
2. Mail out
3. Not exclusively disseminating the survey via the Better Health website – using other
websites/networks as well – e.g. doctor’s office, chemist, supermarket/other
retail/random text message numbers/email of past disease notifications?
The respondent could have been asked to rate a series of statements, and how strongly 
they agree or disagree with each statement. For example for the statement “I am fit and 
healthy, so I’m unlikely to get the flu”, the respondent could have been asked their level of 
agreement from strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree to strongly agree. 
1. Literature search to ensure the question hasn’t already been answered
2. Literature search to determine if a survey is the best way to answer this question
3. Identify your objective/research question in order to focus your questionnaire
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Part 2. Analysing multiple response questions in 
STATA 
The following documents may be useful in answering the questions in this section: 
1. Tabulation of multiple responses
2. STATA FAQ Dealing with multiple responses.
You only have one day left to analyse the Seasonal Influenza survey results, as the media 
team need to get their campaign underway. There are a few tricky questions where the 
survey has allowed more than one answer, and you are not sure how to perform the analysis 
for these. Luckily, you discover that a STATA package has been written to conduct this 
analysis efficiently.  
You need to do a bit of background reading to understand the management of variables for 
multiple response questions first. Please answer the following questions. 
Question 1. What are the two modes that data may be presented in for 
questions allowing respondents to provide more than one answer?  
What is the difference between these two modes? 
Question 2. Please identify the mode of the variables for the following 2 
tables (fill in the blank).  
Question: Are you employed in any of the following sectors? 
Variables: Education, Health, Aged care, Government, Private/Corporate sector, I do not 
work in any of these sectors  
Mode: ___________ 
Question: Are you employed in any of the following sectors? 
Table 1. 
Respondent 
id 
Education Health Aged 
Care 
Government Private/Corporate 
sector 
I do not work 
in any of 
these sectors 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
2 1 0 0 1 1 0 
3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 
6 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Indicator mode (or dummy variables). Each possible answer is coded as 0 or 1, with 0 
indicating that the item was not marked, and 1 indicated the item was marked on the 
survey.  
Polytomous mode. There is one variable for each possible answer. In this mode, each 
data point is represented by a first, second, third response etc. Responses may be 
integer or string variables.
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Variables: 1: Education, 2: Health, 3: Aged care, 4: Government, 5: Private/Corporate 
sector  
Mode: ___________ 
Table 2. 
Respondent 
id 
Employment 
1. 
Employment 
2. 
Employment 
3. 
Employment 
4. 
Employment 
5. 
1 0 2 1 0 5 
2 1 0 0 5 4 
3 4 0 0 3 0 
4 0 0 0 0 2 
5 0 0 0 0 5 
6 0 5 3 4 0 
Question 3. In table 1 (above), what area/s was respondent 1 employed 
in? 
Question 4. In table 2 (above), what area/s was respondent 2 employed 
in? 
To analyse a question where respondents have provided multiple answers, you could 
manually create dummy variables, however this would be quite time-consuming. The 
package “mrtab” enables one-way tables of frequency distribution of responses, two-way 
tables and frequencies of the number of responses and respondents to be easily calculated. 
Question 5. Which mode will the package mrtab assume data is in? 
Fortunately, you have already completing cleaning of the survey dataset. Follow the 
instructions below to finish your analysis of the multiple-response questions: 
Open STATA and import the Excel file titled “Seasonal influenza survey data” 
Install the package mrtab by typing: 
ssc install mrtab 
The first data sheet is in indicator mode. Type in the following code: 
Respondent no. 1 answered that they do work in Health, Aged Care and in the 
Private/Corporate sector.  
Respondent 2 works in Education, Private/Corporate sector and Government 
Indicator mode 
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mrtab Washingmyhandsproperlyafter- Idontknow 
Question 6. What percentage of respondents answered “Disposing of 
tissues into the rubbish?” 
Create a graph of the results obtained using the mrtab function, using the command 
mrgraph. Type in the following code. If performing an analysis, you would need to rename 
the variables so that they fit onto the graph  
Mr graph bar 
Now import the second Excel sheet entitled “polytomous variables.” Type in the following 
code: 
Mrtab ReasonA-Reason8, poly 
Question 7. What percentage of respondents selected “The vaccine is 
free for me”? Please refer to the data dictionary on the third tab in the 
Excel spread sheet provided 
Congratulations! The media team were so impressed with 
your analysis that they have asked you to oversee 
designing the survey for next year! 
97.76% 
Reason 4 =44.9% of cases 
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Appendix 2: First year MAE teaching session 
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